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ABSTRACT  
  
The present essay addresses the epistemic difficulties involved in achieving 
consensus with respect to the Hayek-Keynes debate. In particular, it is argued that 
the debate cannot be settled on the basis of the observable evidence; or, more 
precisely, that the empirical implications of the theories of Hayek and Keynes are 
such that, regardless of what is observed, both of the theories can be interpreted as 
true, or at least, not falsified. Regardless of the evidence, both Hayek and Keynes can 
be interpreted as right.  
The underdetermination of theories by evidence is an old and ubiquitous 
problem in science. The present essay makes explicit the respects in which the 
empirical evidence underdetermines the choice between the theories of Hayek and 
Keynes. In particular, it is argued both that there are convenient responses one can 
offer that protect each theory from what appears to be threatening evidence (i.e., that 
the choice between the two theories is underdetermined in the holist sense) and that, 
for particular kinds of evidence, the two theories are empirically equivalent (i.e., with 
respect to certain kinds of evidence, the choice between the two theories is 
underdetermined in the contrastive sense). 
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PREFACE  
“The great debate [in business cycle theory] is still Keynes versus Hayek. All else is 
footnote.”—NYU economist Mario Rizzo, July 1, 2010 Christian Science Monitor Online 
A casual perusal of the relevant literature makes it seem that every contemporary 
author who dares write the names of F.A. Hayek and John Maynard Keynes on the 
same page is obligated to the ghost of the late Sir John Hicks to open with a quote 
from Hicks’ 1967 discussion of Hayek’s business cycle theory. The reader should 
consider my duty to the late Professor Hicks hereby discharged: 
When the definitive history of economic analysis during the nineteen-thirties 
comes to be written, a leading character in the drama (and it was quite a 
drama) will be Professor Hayek. Hayek’s economic…writings are almost 
unknown to the modern student; it is hardly remembered that there was a 
time when the new theories of Hayek were the principal rival of the theories 
of Keynes. Which was right? Keynes or Hayek?1 
If there is any substance to the epigraph that precedes this essay – if it is true 
that everything in business theory is mere footnote to the Hayek-Keynes debate2 – 
then answering Hicks’ question decisively is one of the more pressing issues 
confronting economic science, and indeed, given the depressing (not to say depressed) 
                                                 
1 Hicks (1967, 203); Hicks wrote this critique at the height of the Keynesian 
ascendancy. The subsequent descent of the Keynesian orthodoxy and Hayek’s slight 
professional rebound belie Hicks’ assessment of Hayek’s lack of influence; 
nonetheless, the quote is a perfect indication of the rout that Austrian capital-based 
economics suffered at the expense of Keynes’ approach in the short- to 
intermediate-term wake of the 1936 publication of Keynes’ General Theory. 
 
2 And for the purposes of the current essay, we will assume that Rizzo’s assertion is 
correct. 
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economic conditions of the last several years, the world. Unfortunately, nearly 75 
years on from the publication of Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money (1936) and over 80 years on from the publication of Hayek’s Prices and 
Production (1931), there is little substantive agreement across the economics 
profession with respect to the correct answer to Hicks’ question. Of course, there are 
cliques within the profession in which one theory or the other is defended against all 
comers: there are Keynesians and there are Hayekians (AKA Austrians).3 Why do the 
members of these respective camps believe as they do? On what grounds have they 
made their particular choices? Why do they disagree? Can’t we all just get along? 
The present essay addresses the epistemic difficulties involved in achieving 
consensus with regard to the answer to Hicks’ question. In particular, it is argued 
that the question cannot be decided on the basis of the observable evidence; or, 
more precisely, that the empirical implications of the two theories are such that, 
regardless of what is observed, both of the theories can be interpreted as true, or, at 
                                                 
3 And, of course, there are economists who reject both approaches in favor of some 
third way or another. Some readers may wonder why the positions associated with 
the University of Chicago are not considered here. Despite the fact that they 
famously draw policy conclusions opposed to those of Keynes and his intellectual 
descendants, the business cycle theories of the Chicago School, such as they are, are 
all based on a Keynesian theoretical framework, and largely borrow Keynes’ 
methodology (i.e., the theoretical focus is on explaining relationships between 
aggregative and composite variables). For the purposes of the present paper, the 
relevant theories of the Chicago School count as Keynesian-related, or mere 
“footnote” in the sense of the epigraph above. Indeed, in general, whatever the 
unique details of some proposed third way, it is assumed in the present essay that 
they amount to no more than footnotes on the Hayek-Keynes debate. As can be 
easily shown – though no attempt will be made to show it here – there is no extant 
theory of the business cycle that dodges the epistemic difficulties raised in the later 
chapters of the present essay for the theories of Hayek and Keynes.  
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least, not falsified. Regardless of the evidence, both Hayek and Keynes can be 
interpreted as right.4 
The underdetermination of theories by evidence is an old and ubiquitous 
problem in science. The present essay makes explicit the respects in which evidence 
underdetermines the choice between the theories of Hayek and Keynes. In 
particular, it is argued both that there are convenient responses one can offer that 
protect each theory from what appears to be threatening evidence (i.e., that the 
choice between the two theories is underdetermined in the holist sense) and that, for 
particular kinds of evidence, the two theories are empirically equivalent (i.e., with 
respect to certain kinds of evidence, the choice between the two theories is 
underdetermined in the contrastive sense).5  
                                                 
4 This problem vis à vis business cycle theory has been recognized before. See, e.g., 
Rothbard (2008, xxxix-xl):  
 
Suppose a theory asserts that a certain policy will cure a depression. The 
government, obedient to the theory, puts the policy into effect. The 
depression is not cured. The critics and advocates of the theory now leap to 
the fore with interpretations. The critics say that failure proves the theory 
incorrect. The advocates say that the government erred in not pursuing the 
theory boldly enough, and that what is needed is stronger measures in the 
same direction. Now the point is that empirically there is no possible way of deciding 
between them. Where is the empirical “test” to resolve the debate? 
 
Rothbard answers this question to the effect that, “Clearly, the only possible way of 
resolving the issue is in the realm of pure theory—by examining the conflicting 
premises and chains of reasoning” (Ibid; italics in the original). This latter thesis is not 
the business of the present essay. Suffice it to say that I see little reason to think that 
epistemic difficulties similar to those raised here will not arise in deciding the status 
of the “conflicting premises.” It seems to me that Rothbard’s solution solves little.  
 
5 For more on the distinction between holist and contrastive forms of 
underdetermination, see Stanford (2009). In particular, note that  
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 The first chapter of the present essay encompasses a history of the debate 
between the two principals. The objective is to explicate the fundamental 
methodological and theoretical issues that differentiate the positions of Hayek and 
Keynes and their respective followers. If it is true that everything in business cycle 
theory is mere footnote to the Hayek-Keynes debate, then what is the subject of this 
marginalia? Unfortunately, the need for relative brevity prevents extensive discussion 
in this chapter of either the fascinating biographical and personal details of the two 
principals or the historical development of their respective theoretical perspectives. 
In any case, these matters have been dealt with adroitly by other authors.6 The 
discussion of the history of the Hayek-Keynes debate in the first chapter is slave to 
the argument of the second chapter concerning the epistemic difficulties involved in 
arriving at a consensus with respect to Hicks’ question. So, the first chapter seeks to 
say no more and no less than is necessary and sufficient to substantiate the argument 
in the sequel. 
                                                                                                                                     
Contrastive underdetermination is so-called because it questions the ability of 
the evidence to confirm any given hypothesis against alternatives, and the 
central focus in this connection…concerns the character of the supposed 
alternatives. Of course, the two problems are not entirely disconnected, 
because it is open to us to consider alternative possible modifications of the 
web of beliefs as alternative theories or theoretical “systems” between which 
the empirical evidence alone is powerless to decide. But…one need not think 
of the alternative responses to recalcitrant experience as competing 
theoretical alternatives to appreciate the character of the holist’s challenge, 
and…one need not embrace any version of holism about confirmation to 
appreciate the quite distinct problem that the available evidence might 
support more than one theoretical alternative…[I]f we give up such extreme 
holist views of evidence, meaning, and/or confirmation, the two problems 
take on very different identities, with very different considerations in favor of 
taking them seriously, very different consequences, and very different 
candidate solutions. 
 
6 For a recent treatment, see Wapshott (2011) 
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The second chapter addresses the difficulties involved in arriving at a 
consensus regarding the proper response to Hicks’ question. The observable 
implications of each theory are described, or, more carefully, the aspects of each 
theory that would have to be observable in order for empirical evidence to guide a 
choice between them are considered. In the process, the respects in which the choice 
between the theories of Hayek and Keynes is underdetermined both holistically and 
contrastively are revealed.  
The third chapter considers the relevance for the debate of various 
alternative strategies for choice between underdetermined theories. The implications 
of both theories are meant to work only under particular conditions; however, these 
conditions are underspecified by both Keynes and Hayek. In The Separate and Inexact 
Science of Economics,7 his canonical book on (micro)economic methodology, Dan 
Hausman advances four necessary criteria for belief in such implicitly qualified 
generalizations as scientific laws. It is argued that Hausman’s criteria, which are fine 
as far as they go, don’t go far toward resolving the absence of consensus with regard 
to the correct answer to Hicks’ question.  
In his seminal paper Demystifying Underdetermination,8 Larry Laudan suggests 
that, though it may be reasonable to believe that the resources of deductive logic 
underdetermine the choice of scientific theories, the addition of inductive (or 
“ampliative”) criteria may suffice to settle the choice between two or more theories. 
However, it is argued that, whatever the case may be with regard to science, or even 
                                                 
7 Hausman (1992) 
 
8 Laudan (1990) 
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just economics outside of business cycle theory, the appeal to inductive criteria is not 
sufficient to settle the case between Keynes and Hayek. Keynesians and Austrians 
adopt unique and, in many cases, competing ampliative criteria, and there is no non-
question-begging perspective from which we can judge the rationality of adopting 
different ampliative methodological principles. 
In the concluding chapter, I consider the consequences of the argument both 
for the future of business cycle research and for policies aimed at ameliorating the 
effects of the cycle. I defend a sort of pluralism as the proper methodological 
response and caution as the proper political one. I also briefly consider the question 
of whether, in his later years, Hayek may have found the consequences of the 
present paper agreeable, despite (or perhaps even because of) the pessimistic 
conclusions it draws with respect to the evaluation of his trade cycle theory. 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
A (RELATIVELY) BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HAYEK-KEYNES DEBATE 
1 Hayek’s Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (1929) 
Hayek’s first book, and the opening argument in his business cycle project, is 
primarily methodological in its focus. In order to understand Hayek’s argument in 
Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (hereafter MTTC) it helps to know something of 
the context in which it was written. The book, originally published in German in 
1929 and aimed at an audience of German-language business cycle theorists, was 
intended to counter the widespread resistance in German economics at the time to 
monetary theories of the trade cycle, which were typically associated with naïve 
versions of the quantity theory of money. Like his intended audience, Hayek was also 
critical of crude treatments of the quantity theory, yet his own account of the trade 
cycle was a monetary one. MTTC was Hayek’s attempt to convince skeptical German 
economists both that an acceptable monetary account of the trade cycle could be 
constructed that did not rely upon a simplistic understanding of the quantity theory, 
and moreover, that – in the prevailing state of economic-theoretical knowledge at the 
time – such an approach was the only legitimate one.  
Hayek’s argument begins with a theme that would have been familiar to 
anyone raised in the traditions of German-language economics (as it was a point that 
the founder of the Austrian school, Carl Menger, had pushed in the famous 
Methodenstreit against the German historical school economists of Menger’s own 
generation9), namely, that an explanation of the business cycle cannot start from 
                                                 
9 For more on the Methodenstreit see chapter three of Caldwell (2004) 
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presupposition-less observation of the relevant phenomena; some kind of theory is 
required. Hayek develops this point as part of an argument to the effect that 
statistical and empirical inquiries have a limited and always secondary role (to theory) 
to play in economic analysis. Such studies cannot “provide new insight into the 
causes or the necessity of the trade cycle.”10  
The unique task of trade cycle theory is to explain how particular prices are 
determined and to indicate their influence on other phenomena of production and 
consumption; therefore, such an explanation requires a theoretical account of price 
formation and of the influence of price changes on production and consumption 
such as is provided by static equilibrium theory: “the determining conditions of these 
phenomena are already given by elementary theory.”11 Any attempt to explain the 
trade cycle on the basis of observation unassisted by theory would have to reinvent 
the wheel, starting with a general explanation of all of the price phenomena that are 
already explained by static equilibrium theory; it could never proceed immediately to 
an explanation of the particular phenomena of the cycle.12  
Trade cycle phenomena can be integrated into existing theory only by adding 
new assumptions to the existing skeleton of static equilibrium theory. However, 
Hayek argues, these new assumptions cannot be discovered by statistical inquiry, 
because statistics cannot establish cause and effect: “Empirically established relations 
between various economic phenomena continue to present a problem to theory until 
                                                 




12 Ibid., 10 
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the necessity of their interconnections can be demonstrated independently of any 
statistical evidence.”13 Statistical correlations have no known causal significance until 
the interconnections they indicate are independently established by deduction from 
some set of theoretical assumptions.  
Hayek also assigns the statistical method little role with respect to the 
“verification” of trade cycle theories. Assuming that such a theory is logically sound, 
and that it explains the observed phenomena as a deductive consequence of the 
given theoretical assumptions, “the best statistical investigation can do is to show 
that there still remains an unexplained residue of processes. It could never prove that 
the determining relationships are of a different character from those maintained by 
the theory.”14 Thus, according to Hayek, the statistical method has a purely negative 
role to play with respect to trade cycle theory and economic theory more generally; 
the statistical method can indicate phenomena that a theory fails to explain, but it 
cannot alone show that a theory’s explanation of some observed phenomena is false. 
However, Hayek’s attitude toward statistical research is not entirely negative. 
Statistics can provide information about the events posited by a theory, and thereby 
“enable us not only to connect two consecutive events as cause and effect, a posteriori, 
but to grasp existing conditions completely enough for forecasts of the future and, 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 11 
 
14 Ibid., 12-13 
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eventually, appropriate action, to become possible. It is only through this possibility 
of forecasts of systematic action that theory gains practical importance.”15  
Hayek considers what he takes to be the methodological strengths and 
weaknesses of existing explanations of the business cycle, non-monetary and 
monetary, in turn. He argues, in essence, that non-monetary theories have the correct 
explanandum, but adopt an inconsistent technique of explanation; while monetary 
theories adopt the appropriate explanatory technique, but seek to explain the wrong 
phenomenon. Hayek’s explicit goal in MTTC is theoretical unification, i.e., the 
“bridging of the gulf that divides monetary from non-monetary theories.”16 
Non-monetary theories of the trade cycle all “regard the emergence of a 
disproportionality among the various productive groups, and in particular the excessive 
production of capital goods, as the first and main thing to be explained.”17 This, 
Hayek believes, is all to the good: “The development of theory owes a real debt to 
statistical research in that, today, there is at least no substantial disagreement as to the 
thing to be explained.”18 However, an immediate problem arises for non-monetary 
theories: none of the various devices posited to explain observed divergences from 
equilibrium can overcome the logic of the theoretical framework upon which these 
theories are founded. Static equilibrium theory permits only one sort of reaction to a 
change in the economic data, i.e., the establishment of a new equilibrium. The 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 14 
 
16 Ibid., 17-18 
 
17 Ibid., 25 
 
18 Ibid. 
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disproportionalities that non-monetary theorists seek to explain are inconsistent with 
the assumptions of the schema adopted to explain them. In Hayek’s words, 
There is a fundamental difficulty inherent in all trade cycle theories that take 
as their starting point an empirically ascertained disturbance of the 
equilibrium of the various branches of production. This difficulty arises 
because, in stating the effects of that disturbance, they have to make use of 
the logic of equilibrium theory. Yet this logic, properly followed through, can 
do no more than demonstrate that such disturbances of equilibrium can 
come only from outside—i.e., that they represent a change in the economic 
data—and that the economic system always reacts to such changes by its 
well-known methods of adaptation, i.e., by the formation of a new 
equilibrium. No tendency toward the special expansion of certain branches 
of production, however plausibly adduced, no shift in demand, in 
distribution or in production, could adequately explain, within the framework 
of this theoretical system, why a general “disproportionality” between supply 
and demand should arise. For the essential means of explanation in static 
theory—which is, at the same time, the indispensible assumption for the 
explanation of particular price variations—is the assumption that prices 
supply an automatic mechanism for equilibrating supply and demand…The 
problem before us cannot be solved by examining the effect of a certain 
cause within the framework, and by the methods, of equilibrium theory. Any 
theory that limits itself to the explanation of empirically observed 
  6 
interconnections by the methods of elementary theory necessarily contains a 
self-contradiction.19 
Hayek considers three distinct kinds of non-monetary explanations. There are those 
theories according to which the relevant disproportionalities are a consequence of 
changes in techniques of production; there are accounts which attribute disequilibria to 
discrepancies between savings and investment; and there are explanations according to 
which it is considerations of human psychology – ignorance, uncertainty, and error – 
that account for the cycle. The problem with such non-monetary explanations, 
Hayek argues, is not a lack of empirical evidence for the relevant factors they adduce, 
but that these causal factors are fundamentally inconsistent with the assumptions of 
the static equilibrium framework upon which such theories are based. It is simply 
inconsistent to attribute the cycle to human ignorance while assuming (as the 
equilibrium construct does) that all market participants possess perfect knowledge; 
nor can changes in production techniques be a convincing explanation in an 
explanatory framework that takes these as given; similarly, savings and investment 
are necessarily equal in the equilibrium framework, so no discrepancy between the 
two is theoretically possible in an equilibrium-based explanation of the cycle.  
Hayek does not deny the possibility of building an account of the trade cycle 
on some theoretical basis other than that of static equilibrium. However, anyone 
who might opt out of the equilibrium framework would lose the only then-accepted 
explanation of price formation and of the effects of price changes on production and 
distribution. Given the aforementioned point that cyclical phenomena are price 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 18-19 
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phenomena, anyone who eschews theorizing in terms of the equilibrium framework 
would have to rebuild the entirety of the economic-theoretical edifice. Thus, it seems 
that not only is one required to base an explanation of the trade cycle on some 
theory, but that this theory must be (or, at least, must have been in 1929 given the 
history of the discipline to that date) the equilibrium theory.  
Far from denying a role in an explanation of the business cycle to those 
factors that non-monetary theorists typically postulate, Hayek seeks a theory that 
accounts for these factors as secondary phenomena. The trick is to extend the 
equilibrium framework in such a way that all of the empirically-ascertained 
phenomena of the cycle appear as deductive consequences of the augmented set of 
assumptions:  
The obvious, and (to my mind) the only possible way out of this dilemma, is 
to explain the difference between the course of events described by static 
theory (which only permits movements toward an equilibrium, and which is 
deduced by directly contrasting the supply of and demand for goods) and the 
actual course of events, by the fact that, with the introduction of money (or 
strictly speaking with the introduction of indirect exchange), a new 
determining cause is introduced. Money being a commodity that, unlike all 
others, is incapable of finally satisfying demand, its introduction does away 
with the rigid interdependence and self-sufficiency of the “closed” system of 
  8 
equilibrium, and makes possible movements that would be excluded from 
the latter.20 
In other words, the introduction of money into the static system of equilibrium 
introduces a unique kind of good – a good the demand for which can never be fully 
satisfied – that makes it possible to demonstrate the appearance of the relevant 
cyclical phenomena as deductive consequences of the expanded set of assumptions. 
Moreover, the monetary starting point makes the factors that figure as explanans in 
non-monetary theories implications of the relevant assumptions:  
The existence of most of the interconnections elaborated by the various 
trade cycle theories can hardly be denied…our task is rather their 
coordination in a unified logical structure. When…the question is answered 
on different lines, viz., by reference to monetary circumstances, it can be 
shown that the elements of explanation adduced by different theories lose 
their independent importance and fall into a subordinate position as 
necessary consequences of the monetary cause.21 
Whereas Hayek argues against non-monetary theories on the grounds that, 
though they have the correct explanandum, they adopt an inconsistent technique of 
explanation; his argument against monetary theories is the reverse of this: monetary 
theories adopt the appropriate explanatory technique, but seek to explain the wrong 
phenomenon. Monetary theories generally identify fluctuations in trade with changes 
in the general price level. However, Hayek argues that an explanation of changes in 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 20 
 
21 Ibid., 23-24 
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the general price level is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for the 
disproportionalities in need of explanation:  
What we expect from a monetary trade cycle theory differs considerably 
from what most of the monetary trade cycle theorists regard as the essential 
aim of their explanation. We are in no way concerned to explain the effect of 
the monetary factor on trade fluctuations through changes in the value of 
money and variations in the price level—subjects that form the basis of 
current monetary theories. We expect such an explanation to emerge rather 
from a study of all the changes originating in the monetary field—more 
especially, variations in its quantity—changes that are bound to disturb the 
equilibrium interrelationships in the natural economy, whether the disturbance 
shows itself in a change in the so-called “general value of money” or not.22 [Italics in the 
original] 
Those theorists who identify changes in the volume of money with changes in its 
value and treat the latter as necessary and sufficient to explain the cycle ignore both 
the disequilibrating effects of changes in the volume of money that do not impact 
the general price level and that the general price level can change in the absence of 
any changes in the volume of money.23 An explanation of the business cycle should 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 52 
 
23 Hayek notes another problem with existing monetary theories of the trade cycle, 
namely, that they are typically based on the illegitimate assumption that the price 
level is “constant,” which itself is sufficient to break down the equilibrium 
relationships. This assumption “forces us to assume variations in the effective 
quantity of money as given.” Hayek continues, “Such variations, however, always 
dissolve the equilibrium interrelationships described by static theory; but they must 
necessarily be assumed if the value of money is to remain constant despite changes in 
  10 
be sought in changes in the volume of money alone without regard for general price 
level effects. 
Hayek begins his analysis of monetary theories with a discussion of the work 
of the influential Swedish economist, Knut Wicksell.24 With respect to trade cycle 
theory, Wicksell’s key contribution was the introduction of the concept of the 
“natural” rate of interest, i.e., “that rate which exactly balances the demand for loan 
capital and the supply of savings.”25 Wicksell, who, like other monetary theorists, 
assumed that the key phenomena to be explained concern the general price level, 
argued that money is neutral with respect to the price level if and only if the money 
(or bank or loan) rate of interest coincides with the natural rate. However, according 
to Hayek, Wicksell’s important contribution was not his analysis of the effects of 
deviations between bank rates and the natural rate on the general level of prices, but 
Wicksell’s discussion of the distortive effects of such deviations on incentives to 
produce and consume. That the latter are the important phenomena in need of 
theoretical explanation and not general price level effects, Hayek argues, follows 
from the fact that changes in supply and demand relationships always follow (on the 
assumptions of static theory) from such deviations in the relevant interest rates, but 
that general price level effects do not: 
                                                                                                                                     
data; and therefore they cannot be used to explain deviations from the course of 
events which static theory lays down” (Ibid., 54-55).  
 
24 Wicksell (1898) 
 
25 Or, in other words, the rate that would prevail in the absence of money, i.e., the 
equilibrium interest rate. 
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If one were to make a systematic attempt to coordinate these ideas into an 
explanation of the trade cycle…a curious contradiction would arise. On the 
one hand, we are told [by Wicksell] that the price level remains unaltered when the 
money rate of interest is the same as the natural rate; and, on the other, that the 
production of capital goods is, at the same time, kept within the limits imposed by the 
supply of real savings.26 One need say no more to show that there are cases—
certainly all cases of an expanding economy, which are those most relevant to 
trade cycle theory—in which the rate of interest that equilibrates the supply 
of real savings and the demand for capital cannot be the rate of interest that 
also prevents changes in the price level. In this case, stability of the price 
level presupposes changes in the volume of money; but these changes must 
always lead to a discrepancy between the amount of real savings and the 
volume of investment. The rate of interest at which, in an expanding economy, the 
amount of new money entering circulation is just sufficient to keep the price level stable, is 
always lower than the rate that would keep the amount of available loan capital equal to 
the amount simultaneously saved by the public; and thus, despite the stability of the 
price level, it makes possible a development leading away from the 
equilibrium position.27 [Italics in the original]  
In short, changes in the volume of money may or may not influence the general level 
of prices, but such changes always (again, given the assumptions of static equilibrium 
                                                 
26 That is, the supply of savings that would be brought forth under the natural rate of 
interest. 
 
27 Hayek ([1933] 2008, 58-59) 
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theory) lead the economic system away from equilibrium; price level effects are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for such disequilibria to appear. This means that an 
adequate monetary theory of the trade cycle must focus on changes in relative prices – 
i.e., changes in the relations between prices of individual goods or classes of goods – 
and not on changes in the average level of prices.  
Hayek then considers Ludwig von Mises’ extension of Wicksell’s account of 
deviations between the natural rate and money rate. Mises’  
exposition already contains an account of practically all those effects of a rate 
of interest altered through monetary influences, which are important for an 
explanation of the course of the trade cycle…he describes the 
disproportionate development of various branches of production and the 
resulting changes in the income structure.28  
This said, Mises’ account is “dangerous,” according to Hayek, because, like 
Wicksell’s theory, it ignores the effects of discrepancies between the relevant rates of 
interest that do not influence the general price level, but do – as all such 
discrepancies must given the assumptions of static equilibrium theory – give rise to 
disproportionalities between supply and demand: “The effects of an artificially 
lowered rate of interest, pointed out by Wicksell and Mises, exist whether this same 
circumstance does or does not eventually react on the general value of money…they 
must be dealt with independently if they are to be properly understood.”29  
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Hayek refers again to the case of an expanding economy in which price 
stability requires an increase in the volume of money that is sufficient to 
discombobulate the relation between the natural and loan rates of interest, and notes 
further that “This case is particularly important, because under contemporary 
currency systems, the automatic adjustment of the value of money in the form of a 
flow of precious metals will regularly make available new supplies of purchasing 
power that will depress the money rate of interest below its natural level.”30 In other 
words, the presence of a deviation between the relevant rates of interest – more 
exactly, a money rate below the natural rate – is the normal state of an expanding 
economy under a commodity money standard; moreover, such deviations do not 
necessarily reveal themselves in effects on the general level of prices. Under the 
influence of the view that stable prices are necessary and sufficient to avoid trade 
cycle effects “Economists have overlooked the fact that the changes in the volume 
of money, which, in an expanding economy, are necessary to maintain price stability, 
lead to a new state of affairs foreign to static analysis, so that the development that 
occurs under a stable price level cannot be regarded as consonant with static laws.”31 
Hayek makes plain the significance of the foregoing for the methodology of 
business cycle theory:  
General price changes are no essential feature of a monetary theory of the 
trade cycle; they are not only unessential, but they would be completely irrelevant if only 
they were completely “general”—that is, if they affected all prices at the same time and in 
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the same proportion. The point of real interest to trade cycle theory is the 
existence of certain deviations in individual price relations occurring because 
changes in the volume of money appear at certain individual points; 
deviations, that is, away from the position that is necessary to maintain the 
whole system in equilibrium…the nature of changes in the composition of 
the existing stock of goods, which are effected through such monetary 
changes, depends of course on the point at which the money is injected into 
the economic system.32 [Italics in the original]  
In other words, unlike the quantity theory of money, the then-modern Austrian 
theory of money – due in large part to Mises’ development of Wicksell’s ideas in the 
former’s The Theory of Money and Credit33 – is not satisfied with comparing end-states, 
but attempts to trace the consequences of an influx of new money on the successive 
changes in particular prices. Unlike the older (and later) quantity theories, which 
assume that new money enters the economic system all at once and is spread evenly 
across the economy, the fact that new money always enters the economic system at 
specific points plays a central role in the Austrian theory of money.  
The first recipients of new money can expand their demand, thereby pushing 
up the prices of the goods demanded, at the expense of others, who suffer the price 
effects of this increased demand without new money to compensate. The latter must 
curtail their consumption, i.e., they are “forced” to “save,” as a consequence. The 
price effects of new money spread out from the initial injection point and, contra 
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quantity theories, effect distinct sectors of the economy unevenly. The exact price 
effects of a new influx of money are contingent upon the point at which the money 
enters the economic system and related considerations. This means that, as Austrians 
picture the operations of modern economies, accurate predictions of the effects of 
increases in the volume of money require knowledge about the location within the 
economic system where new money enters and the uses to which it is put. Hayek 
thereby solidifies the fourth and final methodological principle with respect to trade 
cycle theory that he originally set out to establish, namely, that it is relative price changes 
not changes in the general price level that are relevant to the cycle.  
In summary, Hayek’s argument in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle proceeds 
1) from the recognition that presupposition-less observation alone cannot explain 
the cycle to the claim that some theory is required for an explanation; 2) from this 
latter claim and the fact that only the static equilibrium framework is – or was in the 
then-prevailing state of economic-theoretical knowledge – the only sufficient 
explanation of price phenomena, Hayek draws the conclusion that an explanation of 
the trade cycle must be built on the foundations of equilibrium theory; 3) from this 
latter claim and the recognition that only money is capable of dislodging the rigid 
interrelationships of the equilibrium system, Hayek draws the conclusion that an 
explanation of the trade cycle must be built on monetary assumptions; finally, 4) 
from this latter claim and the recognition both that disequilibria need not result from 
changes in the general price level and that price level stability is not sufficient to 
avoid disequilibria, Hayek draws the conclusion that relative price changes rather 
than changes in the general price level are the truly important phenomena of the 
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cycle. As Hayek’s biographer, Bruce Caldwell, points out, “by a process of 
elimination,” Hayek’s account “is the only contender that remains.”34  
Hayek offers a sketch of his positive explanation of the cycle. He considers 
the question “why, under the existing organization of the economic system, [do] we 
constantly find those deviations of the money rate of interest from the equilibrium 
rate which, as we have seen, must be regarded as the cause of the periodically 
recurring disproportionalities in the structure of production[?]”35 The answer to this 
question, Hayek argues, will explain why certain changes lead the economic system 
away from equilibrium, and “are, actually, the cause of recurrent shifts in economic 
activity that subsequently have to be reversed before a new equilibrium can be 
established.”36 In other words, we will have explained the cycle when we have shown 
why certain changes in the data lead to a “boom” that must later be reversed in the 
form of a “bust” before a new equilibrium can obtain. 
The foregoing analysis pinpoints the elasticity of the currency as the 
fundamental cause of the cycle, which is another way of saying that the cycle is a 
consequence of the fact that the loan rate of interest can deviate from the natural 
rate, i.e., that banks can and do throw onto the credit market more funds than the 
supply of voluntary savings alone would permit. The question that Hayek considers 
is whether the elasticity of the currency is a contingent fact or “an immanent 
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characteristic of our present money and credit system.”37 More to the point, Hayek 
asks whether deviations between the relevant rates of interest are due to “arbitrary 
interferences by the authorities responsible for the regulation of the volume of 
currency media,” or whether such deviations are a fact of the economic system 
against which all of the knowledge in the world and the best of political intentions 
are impotent.  
Yet another way of posing the same question is to consider whether the 
correct theory of the cycle is an exogenous or an endogenous one. Endogenous theories, 
“in the course of their proof, avoid making use of assumptions that cannot either be 
decided by purely economic considerations, or regarded as general characteristics of 
our economic system,”38 and therefore, can claim general validity. Exogenous 
theories, on the other hand, because they ascribe causal influence to factors external 
to the economic system, have “to be proved separately in each individual case.”39 
Mises’ account of the cycle is an exogenous one: it attributes deviations between the 
natural and bank rates of interest always and everywhere to external interferences on 
the part of bankers. This, Hayek notes, is “perhaps, one of the main reasons for the 
prevailing skepticism concerning the value of such theories. A theory that has to call 
upon the deus ex machina of a false step by bankers, in order to reach its conclusions 
is, perhaps, inevitably suspect.”40 Hayek argues that it is not necessary to adopt this 
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contrivance in order to generate the cycle. Mises erred in treating “a single especially 
striking case…as the normal[.]”41 In fact, intentional interference on the part of 
banks, while sufficient to cause the cycle, is by no means necessary:  
The situation in which the money rate of interest is below the natural rate 
need not…originate in a deliberate lowering of the rate of interest by the banks. 
The same effect is obviously produced by an improvement in the 
expectations of profit or a diminution in the rate of saving, which may drive 
the “natural rate” (at which the demand for, and the supply of, savings are 
equal) above its previous level; while the banks refrain from raising their rate 
of interest to a proportionate extent, but continue to lend at the previous 
rate, and thus enable a greater demand for loans to be satisfied than would be 
possible by the exclusive use of the available supply of savings.42 [Italics in 
the original]  
The latter case is important, not mainly due to the fact that it is “probably the 
commonest in practice, but to the fact that it must inevitably recur under the existing 
credit organization”43 [italics in the original]. That is, Hayek’s account of the trade 
cycle is an endogenous theory that attributes the trade cycle to the operations of the 
economic system itself, and not to some external force. 
 The volume of money in an economic system on a commodity money 
standard is governed by three interrelated factors: “changes in the volume of cash, 
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caused by inflows and outflows of gold; changes in the note circulation of the central 
banks: and last, and in many ways most important the often-disputed ‘creation’ of 
deposits by other banks.”44 The question to be answered concerns whether 
expansion of the money supply by the banking system “may not take place 
automatically under certain conditions—without the necessity for any special 
assumption of the inadequate functioning of any part of the system…this certainly 
appears to be true as regards the third factor of money expansion—the ‘credit 
creation’ of the commercial banks.”45 
Hayek argues that it is impossible for bankers to know whether they are at 
any time creating additional credit or lending on the basis of accumulated savings: 
“As credit created on the basis of additional deposits does not normally appear in the 
accounts of the same bank that granted the credit, it is fundamentally impossible to 
distinguish, in individual cases, between” deposits based on savings and those that 
result from the extension of credit.46 In other words, with respect to any particular 
loan, it is typically the case that the lending institution is not the deposit institution 
(either because the lendee deposits the loan in another bank or because the lendee 
spends the money with a vendor who then deposits the loaned funds in another 
bank), and because new deposits don’t arrive dog-eared either “savings-based” or 
“credit-based,” it is impossible for the deposit institution to know whether they are 
receiving (and subsequently lending on the basis of) savings or credit.  
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But this consideration rules out, a priori, the possibility of bankers limiting the 
amount of credit granted by them to the amount of “real” accumulated 
deposits…Once the impetus has been given to any part of the banking 
system, mere adherence to the routine of banking technique will lead to the 
creation of additional deposits without the possibility arising, at any point, of 
determining whether any particular credit should properly be regarded as 
“additional.” Every time money that has been deposited is re-lent…this 
process is to be regarded as the creation of additional purchasing power.47  
In other words, there is no reason to believe that banks engaged in credit operations 
necessarily act inappropriately or out-of-order with standard banking techniques. 
To this point in the analysis, the relevant assumption has been that banks 
receive newly-deposited funds which then serve as the basis for further loans. The 
next issue that Hayek considers is the banking system’s response to an increased 
demand for loans in the absence of new deposits. On the assumption that this 
increased demand is not a consequence of the banks lowering their own interest 
rates, “this additional demand is always a sign that the natural rate of interest has 
risen—that is, that a given amount of money can now find more profitable 
employment than hitherto.”48 Of course, were banks to respond to this increased 
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discoveries, the opening up of new markets, or even bad harvests, the 
appearance of entrepreneurs of genius who originate “new combinations” 
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demand by raising their lending rates in line with the increase in the natural rate, no 
discrepancy between the relevant rates could arise, and – assuming the soundness of 
Hayek’s explanation – no cycle could be set in motion. The question is why banks do 
not respond in this manner: is it a matter of malfeasance or a rational response to a 
change in economic circumstances? Furthermore, how it is even possible for banks 
to extend credit in the absence of an influx of new funds? Answers to these 
questions are to be found, according to Hayek,  
in the fact that the ratio of reserves to deposits does not represent a constant 
magnitude, but, as experience shows, is itself variable. But we shall achieve a 
satisfactory solution only by showing that the reason for this variability in the 
reserve is not based on arbitrary decisions of the bankers, but is itself 
conditioned by the general economic situation.49  
Hayek considers the response of a single bank manager to an increased 
demand for loans “in consequence of an all-round improvement in the business 
situation,” and further assumes that this bank is the first to experience the increased 
demand, “let us say, its customers are drawn from just those industries that first feel 
the effects of the new recovery.”50 This means that only one of the factors that 
                                                                                                                                     
Hayek’s point here is a subtle one and is important to keep in mind in much of what 
follows in the present essay. The initial deviation between the natural and bank rates 
of interest may occur for any number of non-monetary reasons; what must be 
attributed to the activities of the banks is not the initial disequilibrating change, but 
the failure of the economic system to re-equilibrate following the change. Many 
things might cause a disequilibrium situation, but, on Hayek’s account, only money 
can maintain one. 
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determine the bank’s lending decisions has changed: “whereas previously, at the 
same rate of interest and with the same security, no new borrowers came forward, 
now, under the same conditions of borrowing, more loans can be placed. On the 
other hand, the cash holdings of the bank remain unchanged.”51 Hayek argues that it 
is wrong to think that the same considerations of liquidity that guide the bank’s 
decisions under prior conditions continue to influence its decisions under the new 
conditions assumed. If the bank recognizes that its cash requirements can be met 
only by raising interest charges, then considerations of profit will lead the bank to dip 
into its cash reserves, i.e., “to a policy that involves diminishing the size of this non-
earning asset”52; they do this, furthermore, in the knowledge that the very conditions 
that call forth additional loans protect them to some degree against the standard risks 
of illiquidity. That is, when there is an increased demand for loans due to improved 
profit expectations “the risks of borrowing are less; and therefore a smaller cash 
reserve may suffice to provide the same degree of security.”53 All of this said, it is, in 
the final analysis, the forces of competition that ultimately lead such a bank to 
diminish its cash reserves: 
The bank that first feels the effect of an increased demand for credit cannot 
afford to reply by putting up its interest charges; for it would risk losing its 
best customers to other banks that had not yet experienced a similarly 
increased demand for credit. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the 
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bank or banks that are the first to feel the effects of new credit requirements 
will be forced to satisfy these even at the cost of reducing their liquidity.54  
Once a single bank or group of banks – be it the one that first experiences 
the amplified demand or a competitor – satisfies the increased demand for loans, the 
process described above whereby new deposits, which cannot be identified as 
savings or credit, lead to further loans is set in motion:  
Once one bank or group of banks has started the expansion, then all the 
other banks receive, as already described, a flow of cash that at first enables 
them to expand credit on their own account without impairing their liquidity. 
They make use of this possibility the more readily since they, in turn, soon 
feel the increased demand for credit. Once the process of expansion has 
become general, however, the banks soon realize that, for a moment at any 
rate, they can safely modify their ideas of liquidity.55  
This is due to the more or less simultaneous and equal settlement of claims at the 
clearinghouse. Any bank that opts out of the initial expansion of credit will, “sooner 
or later” be persuaded to join, “since it will continue to receive cash at the 
clearinghouse as long as it does not adjust itself to the new standard of liquidity.”56 
And, once a bank has joined the expansion, it is impossible for it to “apply the only 
control by which the demand for credit can, in the long run, be successfully kept 
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within bounds; that is, an increase in its interest charges,” lest it lose customers to 
competitor banks.57 For reasons of competition,  
concerted action in this direction, which…is the only action possible, will 
ensue only when the increased cash requirements of business compel the 
banks to protect their cash balances by checking further credit expansion, or 
when the central bank has preceded them by raising its discount rate. This, 
again, will only happen, as a rule, when the banks have been induced by the 
growing drain on their cash to increase their rediscount.58  
The crisis (“bust”) commences once banks stop expanding the volume of credit, and 
this must happen “sooner or later”: “Only so long as the volume of circulating media 
is increasing can the money rate of interest be kept below the equilibrium rate; once 
it has ceased to increase, the money rate must, despite the increased total volume in 
circulation, rise again to its natural level.”59 Many of the investments based upon lent 
credit are thereby rendered unprofitable by the increase in interest charges—in short, 
the bust has arrived. 
In sum, credit expansion provides a “means for enterprises for which no 
provision could be found if the choices of the different economic subjects were 
strictly followed[.]”60 By creating additional credit beyond what is available on the 
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basis of the supply of voluntary savings alone, the banks ensure that any tendency 
toward expansion of production will not be curbed by a rise in interest. Credit 
expansion prevents the equilibrating mechanism from operating as it does in static 
equilibrium theory; an economy with an elastic currency must react differently than 
the sort of economy described by the latter. 
Hayek considers whether his theory settles the relevant disputes between 
monetary and non-monetary theorists. He reiterates the point that there’s no 
necessary reason why the change that initially increases profitability must be of a 
monetary origin; there are many different factors that can increase the profitability of 
certain businesses. What is important is that – because of the forces unleashed by 
credit expansion – the economy responds to these changes not by adjusting to a new 
equilibrium, but by setting in motion a boom “that contains within itself the seeds of 
an inevitable reaction. This phenomenon…should undoubtedly be ascribed to 
monetary factors, and in particular to ‘additional credit’ that also necessarily 
determine the extent and duration of the cyclical fluctuation.”61 It is the failure to 
adjust to a new equilibrium, not necessarily the originating change in the data, which 
must be attributed to the influence of money. Moreover, the theory as presented – 
whether it should ultimately be treated as a monetary theory because it attributes the 
failure of the equilibrating mechanism to monetary factors or as a non-monetary 
theory because it leaves open the possibility that the initiating change in the 
economic data may not be of a monetary origin – has one important advantage over 
others:  
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It deals with problems that must, in any case, be dealt with, for they are necessarily given 
when the central apparatus of economic analysis is applied to the explanation of the 
existing organization of exchange. Even if we had never noticed cyclical fluctuations, even if 
all the actual fluctuations of history were accepted as consequences of natural events, a 
consequential analysis of the effects that follow from the peculiar working of our existing 
credit organization would be bound to demonstrate that fluctuations caused by monetary 
factors are unavoidable.62 [Italics in the original] 
Hayek then considers the policy implications of the theory. The most 
important political consequence of the theory is that, given prevailing monetary and 
credit institutions, we don’t know how to prevent the cycle; the theory “implies that no 
measure that can be conceived in practice would be able entirely to suppress these 
fluctuations.”63 It is a consequence of the theory that securing a stable price level is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent disproportionalities between supply and 
demand. Moreover, it is nonsensical to “blame” the banks—they have no way of 
knowing whether any of the particular deposit and lending activities in which they 
engage in the normal course of business constitute credit expansion or not: “Nobody 
has ever asked them to pursue a policy other than that which, as we have seen, gives 
rise to cyclical fluctuations; and it is not within their power to do away with such 
fluctuations, seeing that the latter originate not from their policy but from the very 
nature of the modern organization of credit.”64 
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Economic cycles are the price paid for the possibility opened up by the 
availability of bank credit, i.e., “a speed of development exceeding that which people 
would voluntarily make possible through their savings[.]”65 The appearance of cycles 
makes it obvious that the use of bank credit does not resolve all of the problems of 
economic progress, but “it is at least conceivable that the non-economic factors of 
progress, are thereby benefited in a way we should be reluctant to forgo.”66 Bank 
credit allows economies to grow more rapidly than they would in its absence, but it 
also necessitates the appearance of alternating periods of boom and bust. Everything 
in life is a tradeoff; but Hayek emphasizes the complexity of this particular tradeoff. 
The only conceivable course of action for the elimination of the cycle is the 
annihilation of bank credit, but this is “purely utopian.” Eliminating the credit 
operations of banks “would necessitate the complete abolition of all bank money—
i.e., notes and checks—and the reduction of the banks to the role of brokers, traders 
in savings.”67 Even if this course of action is possible, it is by no means obvious that 
it is advisable given its consequences, for it would mean that  
The stability of the economic system would be obtained at the price of 
curbing economic progress. The rate of interest would be constantly above 
the level maintained under the existing system…The utilization of new 
inventions and the “realization of new combinations” would be made more 
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difficult, and thus there would disappear a psychological incentive toward 
progress, whose importance cannot be judged on purely economic grounds.68 
The final chapter of MTTC considers certain unresolved problems in cycle 
theory. Hayek’s discussion of the contingency of predictions about cyclical 
phenomena is particularly relevant to our purposes in the present essay. Hayek 
argues that accurate predictions require sufficient information about the “genesis” of 
the change in the volume of money and “the part of the economic system where it 
took place.”69 Substantive predictions cannot be made about, e.g., changes in the 
volume of money that result from the discovery of new troves of the commodity 
money in the absence of additional information about the recipients of the new 
money and their various uses of it. Similarly, in the absence of information about the 
uses to which it will be put, little can be predicted about the effects of credit granted 
to the state.  
The situation is somewhat different with respect to credit granted to industry:  
This credit is only given when and where its utilization is profitable, or at 
least appears to be so. Profitability is determined, however, by the ratio of the 
interest paid on this credit to the profits earned by their use…The uses to 
which the additional money can be put are thus determined by the rate of 
interest, and the amount that can be said about those uses will therefore 
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depend, in turn, on how much is known about the importance and the 
effects of interest.70  
In other words, propositions about the effects of credit granted to industry require 
not only knowledge of the industries to which it is granted and the uses to which it is 
put, but also a thorough understanding of interest phenomena.  
2 Hayek’s Criticisms of Pre-Keynesians: “The ‘Paradox’ of Savings” 
(1929) 
Hayek’s next work on the business cycle, the lengthy essay “The ‘Paradox’ of 
Savings” also published in 1929, is an important part of the story of the debate with 
Keynes. Hayek uses the article to integrate the capital theory that he inherited from 
Knut Wicksell and Eugen Böhm-Bawerk with Ludwig von Mises’ explanation of the 
business cycle, thereby providing the latter with an explicit capital-theoretic 
foundation. Moreover, Hayek’s specific criticisms of the underconsumptionist theory 
of William Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings anticipate many of his later 
objections to Keynes’ various attempts – first in 1930’s Treatise on Money and later in 
The General Theory – to articulate an underconsumptionist explanation of 
unemployment and related cyclical phenomena.  
In general, Hayek objects to underconsumptionist theories on the grounds 
that they ignore the effects of changes in the effective quantity of money on the 
capital structure of the economy, and that it is only on the assumption that these 
effects can be safely ignored that these theories generate their particular results and 
policy implications. In “The ‘Paradox’ of Savings,” Hayek argues that Foster and 
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Catchings misapprehend the role of capital in a money-using economy, and that 
appending to Foster and Catchings account a proper theory of capital, in particular, 
the Austrian one, results in something that looks like Hayek’s own explanation of the 
business cycle. As we will see, these same objections are mirrored in the complaints 
Hayek later levels against Keynes’ underconsumptionism.  
The strange personal tale of Messrs. Foster and Catchings is entertainingly 
rehearsed in the introductory sections of “The ‘Paradox’ of Savings.” Suffice it to say 
here that the pair – the first a former college president, and the second a successful 
lawyer and banker – fancied themselves amateur economists, and via a series of 
publicity stunts, including a $5,000 essay prize for the best criticism of their view 
(Hayek did not submit an entry), managed to create a bit of a stir in American 
economics in the mid-1920s.71  
Hayek argues that Foster and Catchings’ theory is just another in a long and 
(theretofore) unsuccessful series of attempts to prove the old (“almost as old as the 
science of political economy itself”72) proposition that the effects of a ceteris paribus 
increase in savings, though they are generally beneficial to the individual saver, are 
deleterious with respect to society as a whole; in other words, that, as the title of one 
of Foster and Catchings’ more popular works put it, there is a Dilemma of Thrift.73 
According to Foster and Catchings’ account, an increase in the volume of saving 
makes it impossible to clear the market of the whole of current output, thereby 
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leading to entrepreneurial losses, shrinking production, unemployment, etc. Hayek 
argues that this same idea, which appeared in essentially unaltered form in the 
economic writings of the Earl of Lauderdale and Thomas Malthus, was refuted by 
James Mill and J.B. Say, only to be resuscitated in the nineteenth century by 
Thorstein Veblen and J.A. Hobson.74  
Foster and Catchings state their theory of the cycle clearly: 
Money spent in the consumption of commodities is the force that moves all 
the wheels of industry. When this force remains in the right relation to the 
volume of commodities offered for sale, business proceeds steadily. When 
money is spent faster than the commodities reach the retail markets, business 
booms forward. When commodities continue to reach the retail markets 
faster than money is spent, business slackens. To move commodities year 
after year without disturbing business, enough money must be spent by 
consumers, and no more than enough, to match all the commodities dollar 
for dollar.75  
The practical remedy associated with this theory is laid out in Foster and Catchings’ 
Profits: “The one thing that is needed above all others to sustain a forward movement 
of business is enough money in the hands of consumers.”76 The relevant theoretical 
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question is what circumstances make it the case that the funds in the pockets of 
consumers fail to suffice to sell the whole of output at cost-covering prices?  
Foster and Catchings’ answer is that, provided everyone in the community – 
consumers and the one enterprise alike – spends all that they earn, no difficulties 
arise in clearing the market of the relevant output: “But as soon as the company 
retains part of the profits in the business…in order to improve ‘capital facilities’, 
which puts it in the position to increases the volume of production, this happy state 
of affairs changes.”77 Foster and Catchings rule out by assumption the possibility of a 
fall in the prices per unit of this increased product, so it is that “As soon as the 
increased volume of products reaches the market, it is inevitable that the means of 
payment in the hands of the consumer should prove insufficient to take up the 
product at remunerative prices…a proportion of the enlarged product must 
therefore remain unsold”78—that is, of course, “unless the deficiency…is made up 
from outside sources.”79 In a subsequent analysis under a different assumption 
Foster and Catchings show that, if prices are permitted to fall, then the market clears, 
including the enlarged product due to the increase in investment; unfortunately, such 
investment is rendered unprofitable in virtue of the fall in prices and the incentive to 
continue production at the increased level disappears.  
Foster and Catchings argue that augmenting the supply of money is 
insufficient to ensure the clearing of the market at prices adequately remunerative to 
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sustain the incentive to continue production at the increased level. This, according to 
the authors, is for two reasons. In the first place, under the existing monetary system, 
credit is typically extended to the wrong people – i.e., to producers – a circumstance 
that only exacerbates the mismatch between the incomes and expenditures of 
consumers. Secondly, the system ensures that credit is extended at the wrong time, as 
a response to improved demand conditions, and restricted just as demand shrinks: 
“In this way…every advance toward higher standards would be promptly checked; 
for whenever it appeared that consumer income was too small, it would be made 
smaller still through wage reductions, and under-production would follow 
promptly.”80 What is needed, Foster and Catchings argue, is a system that provides 
credit to consumers at the time that the increased output arrives on the market for 
which the extant funds of consumers are insufficient:  
If any safe and practicable means could be devised, in connection with 
increased public works and decreased taxes, or in any other connection, of 
issuing just enough money to consumers to provide for individual savings 
and to enable them to buy an enlarged output, and business men were 
confident that issues to consumers would continue at this rate and at no 
other rate, there would be no drop in the price-level and no reason for 
curtailing production, but, on the contrary, the most powerful incentive for 
increasing production.81 
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With respect to concrete policy proposals, Foster and Catchings argue that, 
on the basis of a comprehensive system of economic statistics, all of the financial 
activities of the government, including the planning of public works, should be 
directed toward evening out fluctuations in consumption demand. Also, there should 
be a “Federal Budget Board” charged with collecting and publishing these statistics, 
and with designing and implementing a plan for consumption, and ensuring that 
consumption not lag behind production:  
Progress requires a constant flow of new money to consumers. If, therefore, 
business indexes show the need for a reinforced consumer demand which 
cannot be met without additional Government expenditure, the Board 
should bring about such expenditure, not only out of funds previously 
accumulated for that purpose, but at times out of loans which involve an 
expansion of bank credit. This feature of the plan is essential. It follows that 
the Government should borrow and spend the money whenever the indexes 
show that the needed flow of money will not come from other sources.82  
According to Hayek, none of the essay award criticisms83 successfully expose 
the main flaw in Foster and Catchings’ system. Most of the published objections 
attempt to resolve the purported dilemma of savings with the proof that the existing 
organization of money and credit “suffices to increase the supply of money in the 
course of an extension of production so as to avoid a fall in the price level.” 
However, “the alleged necessity to ease the sale of the enlarged product by an 
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increase in the money supply is, in general, allowed to pass unquestioned.”84 These 
critics resort to various expediencies to meet Foster and Catchings’ objection that 
extension of credit to productive enterprises tends to exacerbate the consumer’s 
deficient purchasing power, which, according to Hayek, “Correct as these objections 
may be, they miss the point. The main thesis remains untouched.”85 
Hayek argues that the flaw in Foster and Catchings’ theory arises from the 
pair’s tendency to “overlook the phenomenon of changes to more or less capitalistic 
methods of production”86 That is, Foster and Catchings ignore the possibility that 
production may increase (decrease) by shifting to more (less) capital-intensive 
methods of production and need not involve (as Foster and Catchings implicitly 
assume) employing capital in the same proportion relative to the “original” factors of 
production – land and labor – as before. In short, Hayek argues, the American 
authors fail to recognize the possibility that an increase in the volume of saving may 
be absorbed in an extension of the production process.  
Hayek’s criticism of Foster and Catchings and his own explanation of the 
trade cycle depend crucially on the Austrian theory of capital87 and the role it assigns 
to the interest rate in coordinating production and consumption decisions across 
time. According to this theory, and contra the suppositions of Foster and Catchings, 
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87 A theory which, it should be noted, has always had its critics within the Austrian 
camp. Indeed, Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian School, considered it “one 
of the greatest errors ever committed” (Schumpeter 1954, 847n). 
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the production of consumers’ goods is a time-consuming process that proceeds in 
multiple stages. On one end of the production process (or “structure”) are those 
stages of production that are most temporally remote from final consumption, such 
as research and development, geological extraction, and the production of the most 
durable capital goods (e.g., plant equipment, commercial and residential buildings). 
On the other end of the structure of production are those stages that are nearer in 
time to the end-consumer, e.g., wholesale and retail operations. Goods typically pass 
through a number of stages before emerging from the process ready for 
consumption.  
Under normal conditions, the interest rate on bank loans plays a vital role in 
coordinating intertemporal decision-making: it functions to balance the savings and 
consumption decisions of income-earners with the decisions of producers with 
respect to the production of goods on the far end of the structure (i.e., in industries 
producing “higher-order” or producers’ goods) versus the production of goods on 
the near end of the structure (i.e., in industries producing “lower-order” or 
consumers’ goods).88 That (other things equal) investors prefer longer-term 
investments – i.e., in Austrian-speak, investments in higher-order goods – is an 
implication of the standard model of cash-flow discounting. A relatively low interest 
rate increases the comparative value of any future cash flow – it is indication to 
                                                 
88 It should be noted that the distinction between producers’ goods and consumers’ 
goods is one of degree rather than of kind. There are some producers’ goods that are 
specific to particular stages of production and others that can be employed in 
multiple phases of the production process. Indeed, one and the same good might be 
a consumers’ good in certain uses (consider, e.g., a computer as used to access 
pornography for personal entertainment purposes) and a production good in other 
uses (e.g., the same computer as used to design a new building or a new machine). 
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investors that their future cash flow will suffice to cover their more immediate 
expenses – and, thus, ceteris paribus, lower interest rates encourage relatively greater 
investments in goods on the far end of the structure of production. Put another way, 
according to Hayek’s Wicksellian interest theory, the rate of interest on bank loans 
“governs not only the level of investment but also the allocation of resources within 
the investment sector...As implied by standard calculations of discounted factor 
values, interest rate sensitivity increases with the temporal distance of the…stage of 
production from final consumption.”89  
Other things equal, a higher interest rate is an indication that consumers 
prefer more goods in the near-term; that is, it is a sign that consumers are relatively 
unwilling to put off present consumption in order to save for the future, which is the 
same thing as saying that a higher rate of interest is a sign that consumers are 
relatively unwilling to make loans to producers. It is at the same time an indication to 
producers that, if they are to satisfy the relatively stronger demand for consumer 
goods in the near-term, then production must shift in the direction of methods 
capable of satisfying this demand, i.e., that production should shift to comparably 
less time-consuming (and, for this reason, less productive) methods. Conversely, 
ceteris paribus, a lower interest rate is a sign that consumers are relatively more willing 
to save in the present and wait for consumers’ goods; and it is a sign to producers 
that they can afford to wait longer for the sale of a final product and that production 
can be extended further into the future. In Austrian-speak, a lower interest rate is an 
indication to producers that they can afford to extend (or lengthen) the structure of 
production further out in time.  
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Under normal conditions, the loanable funds market operates reasonably 
smoothly. Consumers increase (decrease) their voluntary savings, producers lengthen 
(shorten) the structure of production, and the supply of consumer goods conforms 
to consumers’ demands. Of course, individual producers are human beings, and so, 
they occasionally make errors – that is, sometimes profit expectations for certain 
investments fail to meet reality – but, in the absence of some intervening factor, 
there is no reason why investors should make errors en masse and all in the same 
direction as they do during a typical business cycle. 
In order to understand the sources of such errors, Austrians argue, it is vital 
to recognize that the structure of production can be lengthened in two different 
ways, i.e., either, as above, via an increase in the volume of voluntary saving, or 
through an increase in the supply of loanable funds in the absence of a corresponding shift 
in consumers’ preferences for future consumption (saving), i.e., via an expansion of bank credit. 
A structure of production extended due to an expansion of credit is not sustainable 
in perpetuity; according to Hayek’s account of the business cycle, a point inevitably 
arises where consumers demand more consumers’ goods than the lengthened 
structure of production can provide; when this happens, the structure of production 
must shrink in order to again be compatible with the demands of consumers; but this 
means that the entrepreneurs who started new investment projects in virtue of the 
eased access to credit cannot all complete their projects, and the crisis appears. In 
short, given the Austrian theory of capital at its core, Hayek’s account of the business 
cycle explains economic disequilibrium in terms of the discombobulating effect that 
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credit expansion has on the delicate links between the interest rate, the supply of and 
demand for loanable funds, and consumers’ preferences and producers’ decisions. 
Hayek’s criticism of Foster and Catchings essentially amounts to the 
demonstration that their theoretical results depend on the absence of any such 
theoretical conception of the structure of production, and moreover, that appending 
the relevant capital theory to the authors’ other assumptions leads to results that 
mirror those of Hayek’s explanation of the business cycle. Moreover, echoing his 
discussion in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle and anticipating another of his 
objections to Keynes’, Hayek argues that Foster and Catchings’ theory starts from 
the assumption of the presence of the very disequilibrium phenomena that it 
purports to explain. That is, according to Hayek,  
Messrs. Foster and Catchings seem to avail themselves of the assumption of 
an “industrial reserve army”—a notion much favored in trade cycle theory—
from which the labor power necessary for a proportional extension of 
production can always be obtained at will. Quite apart from the 
incompatibility of this assumption with the known facts, it is theoretically 
inadmissible as a starting point for a theory that attempts…to show the 
causes of crises, and thus of unemployment, on the basis of the modern 
“equilibrium theory” of price determination.90  
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3 Hayek’s Prices and Production (1931) 
It was “The ‘Paradox’ of Savings” that brought Hayek to the attention of Lionel 
Robbins, who in 1929, at 30 years of age, was appointed chair of the economics 
department at the London School of Economics. Robbins took it at his first task as 
chair to hire a highly-rated economic theorist who could both improve the L.S.E. 
department’s theoretical bona fides and provide a counterweight to the mighty 
Cambridge theoretical tradition associated with Alfred Marshall, A.C. Pigou, and the 
Keyneses (both junior and senior, Maynard Keynes’ father John Neville having 
himself been a respected Cambridge economist and methodologist). It was in this 
context that Hayek – like Robbins, just barely in his thirties – was invited to the 
L.S.E. in early 1931 to give the four lectures that would be published later that same 
year as Prices and Production. Hayek’s lectures, according to his biographer Bruce 
Caldwell, “had been hurriedly prepared. His English was little less than awful. (He 
was later told that he was all but incomprehensible whenever he was reading, but 
became intelligible when he paused to answer a question.) Despite all that, the 
lectures caused a huge stir.”91 Hayek was offered a one-year visiting professorship at 
the L.S.E., and in the following year, the Tooke Chair in Economic Science and 
Statistics.92 
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92 It was during this same foray to England that Hayek gave a condensed version of 
the Prices and Production lectures to certain members of the so-called Cambridge 
“Circus,” (Keynes himself was not present). The lectures did not go over as well in 
Cambridge as they did in London and it seems that Hayek was rather mockingly 
treated. The story of Hayek’s visit to Cambridge and his reception there is recounted 
in Caldwell (2004). 
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The first lecture of Prices and Production encompasses a history of the 
development of monetary theory and its relation to contemporary accounts of the 
business cycle. Hayek identifies three distinct strands of thought, each developed 
mostly independently of the others, two of which were finally brought together in 
the groundbreaking work of the Swedish economist, Knut Wicksell, with the third 
added by Ludwig von Mises. 
The development of the first line of thought began with John Locke’s 
statement of the naïve quantity theory of money, according to which, changes in the 
quantity of money bear no influence on “real” economic activity. The subsequent 
contribution of Richard Cantillon consisted in tracing the chain of cause and effect 
between changes in the supply of money and concomitant changes in the relative 
prices of different goods. Cantillon concluded, contra Locke and the naïve quantity 
theory, that “those persons are benefited by the increase of money whose incomes 
rise early, while to persons whose incomes rise later the increase of money is 
harmful.”93 More famously, David Hume later argued that an increase in the quantity 
of money in circulation is a boon to industry only during the interval between the 
appearance of new money and its influence on prices. Here the development of 
monetary theory stagnated.  
It was only after the mid-19th century discoveries of gold in Australia and 
California that British economist John Cairnes was compelled to refine and precisify 
the arguments of Cantillon and Hume. Later, it was Ludwig von Mises’ who, early in 
the 20th century, developed and extended the analysis upon the more secure value-
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theoretical basis of marginal utility theory, and, moreover, made some progress 
toward a full integration of monetary theory with Wicksell’s capital theory. 
 Distinct from the story of the advancement of monetary theory proper are 
the coincident developments of two lines of thought that eventually came together in 
Wicksell’s capital theory, in particular, the explanation of the relationship between 
the quantity of money and the interest rate, and the related (but independently 
developed) theory of the influence of changes in the rate of interest upon the relative 
demand for capital (i.e., producers’) goods and consumers’ goods.  
The recognition of some relationship between the interest rate and the 
quantity of money was initially made by Locke, but, according to Hayek, the first 
author to offer anything like a theory of the relationship was Henry Thornton, who – 
as a major participant in the British Banking and Currency school debates of the 
early 1800s – argued that the extent of banks’ ability to place new loans is limited 
only by the difference between the prevailing rate of interest and the profit to be 
made on the use of credit, and so long as the latter exceeds the former, there is no 
limit upon banks’ ability to expand the supply of money in circulation. This same 
argument appears in the work of David Ricardo, who “gave it a still more modern 
ring by speaking of the rate of interest falling below its natural level in the interval 
between the issues of the bank and their effects on prices.”94 
Thomas Joplin, one of the more prominent members of the Currency 
school, extended the argument to show that the rate of interest functions so as to 
bring the supply of and demand for capital into (what more modern economists 
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would describe as) an equilibrium relation. Joplin added the further point that banks 
that both deal in capital and issue currency cannot distinguish between demand for 
one or the other: “the demand for currency and the demand for capital are so 
mingled together that all knowledge of either is totally confounded.”95 Similar 
arguments appeared in the work of Thomas Tooke (the namesake of the chair that 
Hayek occupied at the L.S.E.), Nassau Senior, and, “in a somewhat emasculated 
form,”96 in John Stuart Mill’s famous Principles of Political Economy. 
Another line of thought became bound up with the latter and eventually 
came to constitute capital theory as Hayek received it from his predecessors. This 
line concerns the effects of changes in the quantity of money on the production of 
capital goods and extends back to the economic works of Jeremy Bentham. 
However, the first author to clearly state the doctrine that came to be known as 
“forced saving” was Thomas Malthus, who wrote that  
Whenever…a fresh issue of notes comes into the hands of those who mean 
to employ them in the prosecution and extension of profitable business, a 
difference in the distribution of the circulating medium takes place…in 
altering the proportion between capital and revenue in favour of the former. 
The new notes go into the market as so much additional capital, to purchase 
what is necessary for the conduct of the concern. But, before the produce of 
the country has been increased, it is impossible for one person to have more 
of it, without diminishing the shares of some others. This diminution is 
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affected by the rise of prices, occasioned by the competition of the new 
notes, which puts it out of the power of those who are only buyers, and not 
sellers, to purchase as much of the annual produce as before.97 
Although the concept of forced saving appeared in the economic works of 
Dugald Stewart, and was later alluded to by Joplin, Mill, and Robert Torrens, the 
doctrine of forced savings received by Hayek was little changed from the one 
propounded by Malthus. It was only the later development and “perhaps 
independent rediscovery”98 of the principle of forced savings by Léon Walras that is 
important to subsequent developments and this only  
because it is probably through Walras that this doctrine reached Knut 
Wicksell. And it was only this great Swedish economist who at the end of the 
century finally succeeded in definitely welding the two, up to then, separate 
strands into one. His success in this regard is explained by the fact that his 
attempt was based on a modern and highly developed theory of interest: that 
of Böhm-Bawerk99 
 Unfortunately, from Hayek’s perspective, it was not this momentous 
synthesis for which Wicksell earned his reputation, but “for the one point in which 
he definitely erred: namely, for his attempt to establish a rigid connection between 
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the rate of interest and the changes in the general price level.”100 Hayek’s description 
of Wicksell’s theory is worth quoting at length: 
If it were not for monetary disturbances, the rate of interest would be 
determined so as to equalize the demand for and the supply of savings. This 
equilibrium rate, as I prefer to call it, he christens the natural rate of interest. 
In a money economy, the actual or money rate of interest may differ from 
the equilibrium or natural rate, because the demand for and the supply of 
capital do not meet in their natural form but in the form of money, the 
quantity of which available for capital purposes may be arbitrarily changed by 
the banks. Now, so long as the money rate of interest coincides with the 
equilibrium rate, the rate of interest remains “neutral” in its effects on the 
prices of goods, tending neither to raise nor lower them. When the banks, 
however, lower the money rate of interest below the equilibrium rate, which 
they can do by lending more than has been entrusted to them, i.e., by adding 
to the circulation, this must tend to raise prices; if they raise the money rate 
above the equilibrium rate—a case of less practical importance—they exert a 
depressing influence on prices. From this correct statement, however, which 
does not imply that the price level would remain unchanged if the money 
rate corresponds to the equilibrium rate, but only that, in such conditions, 
there are no monetary causes tending to produce a change in the price level, 
Wicksell jumps to the conclusion that, so long as the two rates agree, the 
price level must always remain steady…It is worth observing a further 
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development of the theory. The rise of the price level, which is supposed to 
be the necessary effect of the money rate remaining below the equilibrium 
rate, is in the first instance brought about by the entrepreneurs spending on 
production the increased amount of money loaned by the banks. This 
process, as Malthus had already shown, involves what Wicksell now called 
enforced or compulsory saving.101 
 On Hayek’s telling, in the early 1930s, monetary theory was both better 
developed than ever before, and yet, wholly inadequate. The former was evidenced 
by the widespread acceptance of Wicksell’s argument that, contrary to simplistic 
versions of the quantity theory, monetary changes could indeed influence “real” 
economic factors, while the latter inadequacy was, from Hayek’s perspective, 
manifested in the common insistence among economists – also responding to 
Wicksell’s arguments – that maintenance of a constant average value of money was 
both necessary and sufficient for economic stability.  
The next progressive development of monetary theory, Hayek says, 
tentatively began with his own Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle and “The ‘Paradox’ 
of Saving,” and involves both the rejection of the Wicksellian claim that stability of 
the general price level is both necessary and sufficient for economic equilibrium and 
the concomitant development of a theory that does not set out  
to explain any “general value” of money but only how and when money 
influences the relative values of goods and under what conditions it leaves 
these relative values undisturbed, or, to use a happy phrase of Wicksell, when 
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money remains neutral relatively to goods. Not a money which is stable in 
value but a neutral money must therefore form the starting point for the 
theoretical analysis of monetary influences on production, and the first object 
of monetary theory should be to clear up the conditions under which money 
might be considered neutral in this sense.102  
Hayek considers three explanations of variations in industrial output. The 
first, the view that “variations of industrial output are to be found in changes in the 
willingness of individuals to expand effort,”103 is rejected on the grounds that it is a 
“highly artificial assumption” that is not “at all justified by our common experience.” 
Hayek is prepared to resort to such an explanation only if all others fail; its adequacy 
is “a question of fact” that Hayek makes no effort to explicitly undermine, arguing 
instead that there are other “less artificial”104 explanations available. The second 
explanation accounts for variations in industrial output in terms of changes in the 
amount of factors of production used. Hayek argues – as he did in his earlier 
Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle – that all such theories start from the assumption 
that unused resources exist, i.e., they assume the very disequilibrium that they 
purport to explain:  
If we want to explain fluctuations of production, we have to give a complete 
explanation. Of course this does not mean that we have to start for that 
purpose ab ovo with an explanation of the whole economic process. But it 
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does mean that we have to start where general economic theory stops; that is 
to say, at a condition of equilibrium when no unused resources exist. The 
existence of such unused resources is itself a fact which needs explanation.105 
 The third account – the one that Hayek prefers – explains industrial 
fluctuations in terms of changes in the methods of using existing resources. More 
exactly, Hayek’s explanation does not invoke technological improvements as an 
explanation of increased productivity, but  
the increase of output made possible by a transition to more capitalistic 
methods of production, or, what is the same thing, by organizing production 
so that, at any given moment, the available resources are employed for the 
satisfaction of the needs of a future more distant than before. It is to this 
effect of a transition to more or less “roundabout” methods of production 
that I wish particularly to direct your attention. For, in my opinion, it is only 
by an analysis of this phenomenon that in the end we can show how a 
situation can be created in which it is temporarily impossible to employ all 
available resources.106 
 Hayek begins by specifying his stipulations and assumptions. Most important 
here is the assumption that a shift to temporally lengthier (more “roundabout”) 
methods of production is more productive, i.e., the premise that “within practical 
limits we may increase the output of consumers’ goods from a given quantity of 
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original means of production [land and labor] indefinitely, provided we are willing to 
wait long enough for the product.”107  
The notion that the extent of productivity (in value, but not necessarily in 
physical, terms) is directly related with the roundaboutness of prevailing production 
methods has perplexed many economists since it was first expounded by Böhm-
Bawerk108 There is, of course, nothing intrinsic to more time-consuming production 
methods that necessarily make them comparatively more productive. However, 
Austrian capital theory is predicated on the assumption that a shift to a more 
roundabout method will be undertaken only on the expectation that – because the 
possibilities for increasing production via temporally-shorter methods have all been 
exhausted (ceteris paribus of course; some technological innovation might increase the 
productivity of less time-consuming processes) – longer methods are the only means 
of increasing output. In other words, humans typically attempt to realize their 
respective individual ends via the shortest path; a longer path will be chosen only in 
the expectation that it will generate more value than the alternate route. Other things 
equal, a producer will adopt a longer process of production only if she expects it to 
be more productive than the existing process. 
To see this point better, consider Crusoe on his island, his waking hours 
entirely occupied with attempting to catch enough fish by hand to sustain him 
through the next morning. He imagines that he might be able to catch more fish per 
unit of time were he to fashion a net from sticks and kelp. Yet, he realizes that 
constructing the net will consume time that might otherwise be expended catching 
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fish by hand. Obviously, Crusoe will invest in constructing the net only if he believes 
that he will ultimately be compensated for the expense of its construction by an 
increased yield of fish, which, of course, might mean catching the same number of 
fish in a shorter period of time. Moreover, in order to construct the net at all, he will 
first have to save enough fish to sustain him through the period of its construction, a 
period during which he will catch no fish.109 Of course, Crusoe’s profit expectations 
might be disappointed: a rogue typhoon might drag his half-constructed net out to 
sea. But (to extend the analogy to the business cycle case), if we imagine a 
multiplicity of Crusoes scattered on disparate islands across the globe, then, absent 
some intervening force that deludes them all in the same way, there’s no reason why 
all their investments should suffer the same fate. In other words, given such a 
plurality of Crusoes and the absence of any comprehensively-deluding force, we 
should expect the typical result of each extension of the respective production 
processes to be an increased yield of fish.  
In Prices and Production, Hayek attempts to establish the direct relation 
between the extent of production and the roundaboutness of production methods 
with the assumption that the proportion between the amount of “intermediate 
goods” (which is to say producers’ goods that are not land or labor, the latter being 
the so-called “original factors of production”) that is required to generate a 
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of an increase in capital is to maintain industry long enough for the increased output 
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continuous output of consumers’ goods and the extent of that output increases with 
the length of production processes: “As the average time interval between the 
application of the original means of production and the completion of the 
consumers’ goods increases, production becomes more capitalistic, and vice versa.”110  
 Hayek’s analysis begins from the simplifying assumption that the process of 
production is divided into distinct periods or stages, and that goods move from one 
stage to the other in equal temporal intervals. He further assumes that each stage 
represents a distinct enterprise, so that “goods moving toward 
consumption…change hands against money in equal intervals which correspond to 
our unit production periods.” These two assumptions together imply that  
the proportion of money spent for consumers’ goods and money spent for 
intermediate products is equal to the proportion between the total demand 
for consumers’ goods and the total demand for the intermediate products 
necessary for their continuous production; and this, in turn, must 
correspond, in a state of equilibrium, to the proportion between the output 
of consumers’ goods during a period of time and the output of intermediate 
products of all earlier stages during the same period.111  
A shift to more (less) capital-intensive methods of production occurs when 
money demand for production goods increases (decreases) relative to money 
demand for consumers’ goods. Such a shift occurs when there is a change in the 
proportion between the quantity of money available to producers for the purchase of 
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factors of production and the quantity of money available for the purchase of 
consumers’ goods. The latter sort of shift occurs either as a result of changes in the 
voluntary saving decisions of the individual members (including firms) of society, or 
in the absence of such a change, when the lending activities of the banks alter the 
extent of credit available to producers for the purchase of capital goods. The effects 
of these distinct means of altering the structure of production are different in 
important ways. 
 Hayek first considers the case of a ceteris paribus increase in the volume of 
voluntary saving (and its concomitants, i.e., a fall in demand for consumers’ goods 
relative to producers’ goods – an increase in saving being identical with a decrease in 
consumption – and an increase in the supply of money available for lending, and 
therefore, a fall in the interest rate.)112 Such an increase in the funds available for 
production indicates to producers that they can afford to wait longer for an increased 
production, and so, they respond by extending the structure of production further 
out in time; under Hayek’s assumptions, this means that additional, earlier stages are 
added to the existing structure of production.113 In terms of prices and profits, an 
increase in voluntary savings means that, the prices of consumers’ goods fall relative 
to those of producers’ goods, or, what is the same thing, that production in the 
earlier stages becomes relatively more profitable than production in the later stages 
of production. If they are not to suffer losses in the short-run, producers of 
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consumers’ goods must restrict the supply of their goods that reach the market, i.e., 
they must build up inventories, which serve the dual purpose of protecting these 
entrepreneurs against loss and ensuring that a quantity of goods is available that 
suffices to bridge the temporal gap required to complete the new, extended process 
of production. Those factors of production that can be used in multiple stages, i.e., 
most kinds of land, labor, and “nonspecific” capital goods, shift toward the earlier 
stages of production; the prices of those “specific” factors that can only be used in 
earlier stages rise (and therefore, are produced in greater quantities), while the prices 
(and production) of capital goods specific to later stages suffer the opposite result.114  
 It is important to note that such an increase in the volume of voluntary 
saving leads to no particular disequilibrium effects except perhaps in the (presumably 
brief) period of transition from one equilibrium to another. Under Hayek’s 
assumptions – in particular, given the Austrian theory of capital – those factors 
thrown out of employment in the later stages of production due to the fall in the 
funds available for consumption find employment in the now more profitable earlier 
stages of production. To put the point another way, from Hayek’s perspective, that 
underconsumptionist explanations of the cycle lead to the result that a ceteris paribus 
increase in the volume of voluntary savings must cause unemployment is due to the 
failure to build such analyses upon a capital-theoretic foundation like that provided 
by the Austrian account; underconsumptionists thus fail to recognize the possibility 
(indeed, necessity, on Hayek’s assumptions) that such an increase in saving merely 
alters the composition of employment across the structure of production – i.e., 
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causes a relative shift in employment of factors from the later to the earlier stages of 
production – without manifesting persistent unemployment. Moreover, Hayek 
argues, the absence of such a capital-theoretic foundation blinds the authors of such 
explanations to the true effects of their common remedy, namely, increases in the 
quantity of money in circulation.  
Hayek next considers the effects of such a ceteris paribus increase in the 
amount of the circulating medium in the form of additional credit granted to 
producers. Like an increase in voluntary saving, this too represents an increase in the 
proportion between the quantity of money available to producers for the purchase of 
capital goods and the quantity of money available for the purchase of consumers’ 
goods, and producers respond as in the first instance, by extending the structure of 
production further out in time. However, 
When a change in the structure of production was brought about by saving, 
we were justified in assuming that the changed distribution of demand 
between consumers’ goods and producers’ goods would remain permanent, 
since it was the effect of voluntary decisions on the part of individuals. Only 
because a number of individuals had decided to spend a smaller share of their 
total money receipts on consumption and a larger share on production was 
there any change in the structure of production. And since, after the change 
had been completed, these persons would get a greater proportion of the 
increased total real income, they would have no reason again to increase the 
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proportion of their money receipts spent for consumption. There would 
accordingly exist no inherent cause for a return to the old proportions.115 
On the other hand, when the proportion between the respective demands for capital 
goods and consumers’ goods shifts in favor of the former in the absence of an 
increase in the volume of voluntary saving, a situation of forced saving arises, that is, 
consumers maintain the proportion of their money income allotted to saving and 
consumption, but, because factors are bid away from the consumption end of the 
structure of production in virtue of the additional credit available to producers, fewer 
consumption goods reach market and their prices begin to rise; those individuals 
who have yet to experience a rise in their money incomes (i.e., those who earn their 
income in stages of production closer to consumption) are forced to abstain from 
consuming as much as they’d like—i.e., given that a decrease in consumption is 
nothing but an increase in saving, such individuals are forced to save: “There can be 
no doubt that, if their money receipts should rise again, they would immediately 
attempt to expand consumption to the usual proportion.”116  
Hayek argues that, as the wage increases that are necessary to attract original 
means of production toward the far end of the structure of production spread out 
from the point at which increased credit is injected, money incomes do rise and 
consumers do reassert their old proportions between saving and consumption. That 
is, Hayek assumes that the proportion of their incomes that individuals allot to 
consumption and saving respectively are both relatively stable and not altered by the 
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credit activities of banks: in the case of an increase in the volume of voluntary saving, 
the new proportions are maintained and, in the case of forced saving, once their 
incomes rise again, individuals reassert their prior proportions. Thus, Hayek argues, 
it happens that the proportions between demand for producers’ goods and 
consumers’ goods shift again, this time in favor of the latter, and the structure of 
production shrinks.  
The prices of consumers’ goods will therefore rise relatively to the prices of 
producers’ goods. And this rise of the prices of consumers’ goods will be the 
more marked because it is the consequence not only of an increased demand 
for consumers’ goods but an increase in the demand as measured in money. 
All this must mean a return to shorter or less roundabout methods of 
production if the increase in the demand for consumers’ goods is not 
compensated by a further proportional injection of money by new bank 
loans granted to producers. And at first this is probable. The rise of the 
prices of consumers’ goods will offer prospects of temporary extra profits to 
entrepreneurs. They will be all the more ready to borrow at the prevailing 
rate of interest. And, so long as the banks go on progressively increasing their 
loans it will, therefore, be possible to continue the prolonged methods of 
production or perhaps even to extend them still further. But for obvious 
reasons the banks cannot continue indefinitely to extend credit; and even if 
they could, the other effects of a rapid and continuous rise of prices would, 
after a while, make it necessary to stop this process of inflation.117 
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In other words, the banks can prevent a contraction of the structure of production 
so long as they keep the lending rate below the profit expectations of entrepreneurs, 
which – because each (ceteris paribus) fall in the interest rate means that an increasing 
number of investments appear profitable – actually means “progressively increasing 
their loans.” However, “for obvious reasons” connected with either the depletion of 
their reserves, the inflationary price effects of prior credit expansions, or the simple 
fact that there is an absolute floor (i.e., zero) to the extent that they can lower the 
lending rate, a time inevitably arises when banks can no longer prevent the 
contraction of the production structure by further expanding their lending activities.  
The consequences of a shift to a shorter structure of production in virtue of 
the end of a credit expansion are similar to the effects of a ceteris paribus increase in 
credit granted to consumers, so Hayek considers the two cases together. The relative 
shift in favor of demand for consumers’ goods is first reflected in increased price 
margins on the later end of the structure of production. Entrepreneurs are tempted 
by the increased profitability of these stages to bid nonspecific factors of production 
away from earlier stages.  
Very soon the relative rise of the prices of the original factors and the more 
mobile intermediate products will make the longer processes unprofitable. 
The first effect on these processes will be that the producers’ goods of a 
more specific character, which have become relatively abundant by reason of 
the withdrawal of the complementary nonspecific goods, will fall in price. 
The fall of the prices of these goods will make their production unprofitable; 
it will in consequence be discontinued. Although goods in later stages of 
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production will generally be of a highly specific character, it may still pay to 
employ original factors to complete those that are nearly finished. But the fall 
in the price of intermediate products will be cumulative; and this will mean a 
fairly sudden stoppage of work in at least all the earlier stages of the longer 
processes. 
 What’s more, Hayek argues, it is not the case that those factors thrown out 
of work in the earlier stages of production are rapidly absorbed in the expanded later 
stages, “Quite the contrary; the shorter processes will have to be started at the very 
beginning and will only gradually absorb all the available producers’ goods as the 
product progresses toward consumption and as the necessary intermediate products 
come forward.”118 The unemployed factors remain unemployable, in other words, so 
long as it takes to build the intermediate products specifically suited to the later 
stages of a shortened structure of production. The increased demand for consumers’ 
goods that follows either at the end of a credit expansion financed by producers’ 
credits or the beginning of one financed by consumers’ credits removes some of the 
nonspecific capital goods required for the completion of the longer structure of 
production, the remaining nonspecific goods do not suffice, and the specific goods 
required to employ all of the nonspecific factors have not all been produced:  
The situation would be similar to that of a people of an isolated island, if, 
after having partially constructed an enormous machine which was to 
provide them with all necessities, they found out that they had exhausted all 
their savings and available free capital before the new machine could turn out 
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its product. They would then have no choice but to abandon temporarily the 
work on the new process and to devote all their labor to producing their daily 
food without any capital. Only after they had put themselves in a position in 
which new supplies of food were available could they proceed to attempt to 
get the new machinery into operation.119 
In other words, according to Hayek, the crisis phase of the cycle arises with the 
realization that the products of investments encouraged by credit expansion cannot 
be brought to market profitably because the demand envisioned will not ultimately 
materialize as originally anticipated when the investments were undertaken: “The 
spending decisions of income earners clashes with the production decisions that 
generated their income. An intertemporal mismatch between earning and spending 
patterns eventually turns boom into bust.”120 
Hayek proceeds to consider the effects of a change in the amount of money 
in circulation under the assumption that resources are not fully employed. Hayek 
immediately dispenses with the notion that such a circumstance could be rectified by 
an increase in consumers’ credits:  
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it should be fairly clear that the granting 
of credit to consumers, which has recently been so strongly advocated as a 
cure for depression, would in fact have quite the contrary effect; a relative 
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increase of the demand for consumers’ goods could only make matters 
worse.121  
On the other hand, Hayek allows that it is possible “in theory” that granting 
producers’ credits during the crisis stage, when the structure of production shrinks 
beyond what is necessary for the restoration of equilibrium, may produce positive 
effects; however, if such a measure is not to be more harmful than beneficial, 
precision and prudence are required with respect to both the quantity and recipients 
of such credits: “Frankly, I do not see how the banks can ever be in a position to 
keep credit within these limits.”122 Recall the difficulties indicated by Joplin123 and 
emphasized by Hayek in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle124 concerning the 
impossibility of distinguishing incoming deposits as either saving-based or credit-
based and the concomitant impossibility of knowing whether any particular loan is 
made on the basis of savings or credit. In essence, bankers are never in a position to 
know whether the current loan rate is below, above, or at par with the (natural) rate 
of interest that would obtain in a possible world, distinct from our own, in which the 
entire supply of loanable funds is the result of voluntary decisions to save rather than 
consume. In short, Hayek argues that any theoretical arguments that might be 
advanced for credit expansion during the crisis phase are undermined by the practical 
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– more specifically, epistemic – difficulties involved in preventing credit expansion 
from causing harm. 
Turning from the crisis stage to the actual depression phase, Hayek argues 
that “it is still more difficult to see what lasting good effects can come from credit 
expansion.”125 Equilibrium will be restored only when the structure of production is 
once again adapted to the proportion between the demand for consumers’ goods 
and the demand for producers’ goods as determined by the voluntary savings and 
consumption decisions of the individual members of society. Far from remedying 
economic depression, credit expansion can only foster the relevant 
disproportionalities. 
 Hayek infers an important methodological conclusion from his theoretical 
considerations, namely, that any theoretical emphasis on the effects of movements of 
the general price level is entirely misplaced: 
The average movements of general prices show us nothing of the really 
relevant facts; indeed, the index numbers generally used will, as a general rule, 
fail even to attain their general object because, being for practical reasons 
almost exclusively based on prices of goods of a nonspecific character, the 
data used are never random samples in the sense required by statistical 
method, but always a biased selection which can only give a picture of the 
peculiar movements of prices of goods of this class…for similar reasons 
every attempt to find a statistical measure in the form of a general average of 
the total volume of production, or the total volume of trade, or general 
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business activity, or whatever one may call it, will only result in veiling the 
really significant phenomena, the changes in the structure of production.126 
In the last lecture of Prices and Production Hayek considers “The Case For and 
Against an “Elastic’ Currency.” If Hayek’s theoretical considerations are sound, then 
the common view that the money supply should vary as production increases or 
decreases is mistaken. The fall in prices that typically accompanies a ceteris paribus 
increase in productivity is “not only entirely harmless but is in fact the only means of 
avoiding misdirections of production.”127 The contrary view is a symptom of the 
belief that stability in the general level of prices is both necessary and sufficient for 
economic equilibrium. Hayek’s theoretical considerations support instead the view 
that, in order to neutralize the effects of money on prices, the supply of the 
circulating medium must be invariable.  
Hayek adopts the oft-used metaphor of an inverted pyramid to represent a 
country’s credit structure. The bottom of the pyramid represents the structure’s cash 
basis; the next level corresponds to central bank credit, the level above it represents 
commercial bank credit, and above that is the level corresponding to business credits 
external to the banking system. It is  
only in regard to the two lower parts, cash and central bank credit, that an 
immediate control can be exercised by the central monetary authority. So far 
as the third part, the credits of the commercial banks, are concerned, it is at 
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least conceivable that a similar control could be exercised. But the uppermost 
section of the pyramid—private credits—can be controlled only indirectly 
through a change of the magnitude of their basis, i.e., in the magnitude of 
bank credit.128  
During the boom phase of a cycle, it often happens that the angle of the apex 
of the triangle increases, i.e., that relatively more central bank credit is granted on a 
certain cash basis, and relatively more commercial bank credit on a particular amount 
of central bank credit, and so on, so that  
even if central banks should succeed in keeping the basis of the credit 
structure unchanged during an upward swing of the cycle, there can be no 
doubt that the total quantity of the circulating medium would nonetheless 
increase. To prevent expansion, therefore, it would not be sufficient if central 
banks, contrary to their present practice, refrained from expanding their own 
credits…it would be necessary for them actually to contract credit 
proportionately.129  
Hayek finds it “entirely utopian” to believe that such an experiment could be 
conducted given the state of opinion with respect to monetary affairs. In his 
characteristically pessimistic fashion, as he proceeds to consider the theoretical case 
for changes in the quantity of money, Hayek further emphasizes the “enormous” 
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practical difficulties confronting the rationalization of monetary policy, “difficulties 
which monetary reformers are always so inclined to underrate.”130 
Heretofore, Hayek has assumed the rate at which money changes hands, the 
so-called “velocity of circulation,” to be constant. However, Hayek’s argument 
applies not to the amount of money as such, but to the “amount of payments made 
during a period of time,” which means that the invariability that must be maintained 
in order to secure monetary neutrality is not of the money supply narrowly 
understood but of the flow of the supply of money through the economy, the “money 
stream”: the maintenance of neutral money requires that monetary authorities 
compensate changes in the velocity of circulation131 such that the money stream 
remains constant. However, the practical difficulties of monetary neutrality do not 
end at discovering and quantitatively compensating for shifts in the velocity of 
circulation, “it would be necessary also to see that it came into the hands of those 
who actually require it, i.e., to that part of the system where that change in…the 
habits of payment had taken place.”132 
Regardless of whether such a problem could be managed in practice, it is 
evident, Hayek says, that “only to satisfy the legitimate demand for money in this 
sense, and otherwise to leave the amount of the circulation unchanged, can never be 
a practical maxim of currency policy.” This is due to the difficulty raised by Joplin 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
 
131 Such changes occur for many reasons, one which Hayek considers is the division 
of a single firm representing multiple stages of the structure of production into 
distinct enterprises (and the contrary case of merger), which results in the addition of 
payments to (subtraction of payments from) the money stream.  
 
132 Ibid. 
  65 
above, i.e., the fact that banks that both deal in capital and issue currency cannot 
distinguish between demand for one and demand for the other, or, as Hayek 
expresses it in Prices and Production, the difficulty of determining “the demand for 
money as money which is justifiable, and the demand for money as capital which is 
not justifiable.”133 It is stating the same problem in another way to say, as Hayek 
does, that “The ‘natural’ or equilibrium rate of interest which would exclude all 
demands for capital which exceed the real supply of capital [i.e., saving], is incapable 
of ascertainment.”134 
The only substantive policy advice that Hayek believes to follow from his 
theoretical considerations is  
probably the negative one that the simple fact of an increase of production 
and trade forms no justification for an expansion of credit, and that—save in 
an acute crisis—bankers need not be afraid to harm production by 
overcaution. Under existing conditions, to go beyond this is out of the 
question…It is probably an illusion to suppose that we can ever be able 
entirely to eliminate industrial fluctuations by means of monetary policy.135 
The best Hayek is willing to hope for in this respect is the gradual dampening of 
public resistance to the policies necessary for monetary neutrality by some method of 
economic education. 
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However, Hayek offers the further warning that monetary neutrality provides 
no actionable criterion of rational policy. Strict monetary neutrality requires the 
establishment of all of the conditions that the theory says are necessary, but it is 
“very probable that this is practically impossible.”136 In particular, securing a constant 
flow of the money stream requires the establishment of the conditions assumed by 
equilibrium theory, i.e., complete price and wage flexibility (the more or less 
immediate adjustment of prices and wages to changes in the economic data), and, 
relatedly, given that contracts are always written in terms of some medium of 
exchange, the basing of all intermediate- and long-term contracts on correct 
foresight with respect to future changes in the value of the exchange medium. Where 
these conditions do not obtain, “frictions” prevent the smooth and rapid adaptation 
of the price system to changes in the economic data that is assumed by equilibrium 
theory, and which are necessary for the effectiveness of policy aimed at monetary 
neutrality: “it may be necessary to seek for a compromise between two aims which 
can be realized only alternatively: the greatest possible realization of the forces 
working toward a state of equilibrium, and the avoidance of excessive frictional 
resistances.”137 But, if such a compromise is practically mandated,  
the elimination of the active influences of money has ceased to be the only, 
or even a fully realizable, purpose of monetary policy; and it could only cause 
confusion to describe this practical aim of monetary policy by the same 
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name, which is used to designate the theoretically conceivable situation, in 
which one of the two competing aims was fully obtained.138 
In other words, if the conditions required for the perfect adaptation of the price 
system to changed circumstances are not secured, the ideal of monetary neutrality 
“could not be realized by any kind of monetary policy.”139 
4 The Hayek-Keynes Debate Narrowly Construed (1930-1932) 
The published debate between Hayek and Keynes, such as it is, concerns the latter’s 
(1930) A Treatise on Money and not his better-known and more influential (1936) The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. The Treatise is a long (running to nearly 
seven-hundred pages in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, spread across two 
volumes) and challenging work. Thankfully, a detailed discussion of its contents is 
not necessary for our purposes.  
A brief discussion of the theory of the Treatise is offered before proceeding to 
an analysis of the published debate – which consists of Hayek’s review of the Treatise 
(published in two parts in the L.S.E.’s house journal Economica in August 1931 and 
February 1932, respectively), Keynes’ reply and Hayek’s rejoinder (both published in 
Economica in November 1931, i.e., after the public airing of the first part of Hayek’s 
review, but before the appearance of the second part) – as well as a brief 
correspondence between the two principals written between December 1931 and the 
following February. We then consider the March 1932 review of Prices and Production 
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written for the Economic Journal (Cambridge’s house journal) by Keynes’ close friend 
and follower Piero Sraffa, as well as Hayek’s June 1932 response to the latter.  
The aforementioned publications and correspondence constitute what I call 
the Hayek-Keynes debate “narrowly construed.” The debate more broadly construed 
both precedes Hayek and Keynes and, indeed, continues on to the present day; it is 
essentially identical to the continuing struggle over the methodological and 
theoretical issues raised by Hayek and Keynes.  
 The writing of the Treatise engaged Keynes during the latter part of the 1920s, 
at a time when he was considerably occupied with non-academic work in finance and 
government (and government finance). One can discern from the book’s preface 
that its author is less than fully satisfied with the results of such a long intellectual 
endeavor and recognizes it as a work representing a transition to ideas that he has yet 
to articulate: 
As I read through the page proofs of this book I am acutely conscious of its 
defects. It has occupied me for several years, not free from other 
occupations, during which my ideas have been developing and changing, 
with the result that its parts are not all entirely harmonious with one another. 
The ideas with which I have finished up are widely different from those with 
which I began. The result is, I am afraid, that there is a good deal in this book 
which represents the process of getting rid of the ideas which I used to have. 
There are many skins which I have sloughed still littering these pages. It 
follows that I could do it better and much shorter if I were to start over 
again. I feel like someone who has been forcing his way through a confused 
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jungle. Now that I have emerged from it, I see that I might have taken a 
more direct route and that many problems and perplexities which beset me 
during the journey had not precisely the significance which I supposed at the 
time. Nevertheless, I expect that I shall do well to offer my book to the 
world for what it is worth at the stage it is now reached, even if it represents 
a collection of material rather than a finished work.140 
The intellectual evolution that Keynes references here – the sloughing off of “many 
skins” – is, of course, the movement away from the Marshallianism of his youth and 
the gradual development of ideas uniquely his own, which, as we will see, ultimately 
culminates in the later General Theory.  
 In the Treatise, Keynes begins by grouping goods into two categories: 
investment goods and consumption goods; the output of each is decided at the 
beginning of each period on the basis of the profits of the preceding period. The 
units of each class of good are defined so that each unit has the same production 
cost (i.e., the earnings of factors of production at the beginning of the respective 
period).141 Income earners spend some part of their earnings on consumption goods 
and save the rest.142 All output is assumed to be sold in the current period. According 
to the Treatise, the price level of investment goods is determined on the stock market, 
the current output of investment goods being of minor significance as compared 
with the stock of accumulated capital, the prices of which are determined anew each 
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day on the stock market.143 Income earners have a choice to make, not only with 
respect to whether to consume or to save, but, if the latter, with regard to whether to 
save in terms of bank deposits (which yield interest) or in terms of equities (the 
values of which change with the value of the capital stock).144 Keynes further 
assumes that the interest rate on loaned funds (the “Bank Rate”) is a variable 
determined entirely by monetary policy, and that changes in the Bank Rate influence 
the supply of money.145 Moreover, the demand price of investment goods is a 
function of the Bank Rate: ceteris paribus, if the rate rises (falls), the demand price of 
investment goods falls (rises), and spending on investment falls (rises).146  
From these assumptions, the rudiments of the theory of the Treatise follow. 
The cost of the factors of production (and thus, the volume of supply) is determined 
at the start of each period. Spending on consumption goods is determined by the 
community’s earnings and tendency to save rather than consume. This spending 
translates into the earnings of entrepreneurs, and therefore, the price level of 
consumption goods and the profits to be had in their production are jointly 
determined. As mentioned, the prices of investment goods are determined in the 
stock market, and thus, too, the price level of investment goods and profits to be 
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made in their production. Finally, if entrepreneurs make profits (losses) in one 
period, they respond by expanding (decreasing) output in the next.147 
Keynes’ emphasis in the Treatise is on the relation between the Wicksellian 
“natural” rate of interest and the rate of interest at which loans are available (the 
“Bank Rate”). If the latter is equal to the former, then saving and investment are 
equal, and the economy is in equilibrium. Keynes argues that “windfall” profits 
(losses) appear if and only if investment is greater than (less than) saving. Thus, 
according to the Treatise, if the Bank Rate falls below the natural rate, firms respond 
by expanding investment, which then exceeds saving, and entrepreneurs earn 
windfall profits. In response to these profits, entrepreneurs compete to extend 
production, but, because all factors are fully employed, the result is simply wage 
inflation. Since the consequence of a Bank Rate below the natural rate is ultimately 
inflation of both profits and wages, equilibrium is ultimately restored at a higher level 
of general prices. In short, in equilibrium, the Bank Rate equals the natural rate, 
saving equals investment, windfalls are zero, and the price level remains (technically, 
given that the Treatise distinguishes the price level for investment goods from the 
price level for consumption goods, this should be “price levels remain”) stable. 
Conversely, in the absence of equilibrium, the Bank and natural rates of interest 
diverge, saving does not equal investment, windfalls appear, and the price level 
fluctuates (rises if investment exceeds saving, falls if saving exceeds investment).  
This result is very much in line with Keynes’ education in the Cambridge 
quantity theory tradition associated with Marshall; the unique twist is the addition of 
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Wicksell’s theory of the natural rate of interest. The Treatise is “Wicksellian” in that it 
is changes in the price level(s) that exert an influence on the course of the economy, 
with the price level(s) being explained in terms of differences between the natural 
rate of interest and the Bank Rate (the latter being a policy instrument for price 
stabilization) and, thus, in terms of differences between saving and investment.  
With respect to Keynes’ specific explanation of the credit cycle in the Treatise, 
Toshiaki Hirai offers a consolidated summary: 
Suppose that something (such as a new invention or a return of business 
confidence) happens that increases the attractiveness of investment. The 
price level of investment goods then rises, and the output increases in the 
next period. As a result of this, the level of employment increases and 
expenditure on consumption increases. Therefore the price level of 
consumption goods rises, and the output in the next period increases. Thus 
the behaviour of firms of increasing output under the condition of high 
profit causes a rise in money wages. In this process, the volume of working 
capital…also increases, so that business continues to pick up at an 
accelerated rate (the decrease in liquid capital will, it is argued, prove 
surprisingly small). The turning point in the boom occurs as a result of the 
accumulation of several causes: (i) the evaporation of the attractions of new 
investment; (ii) the faltering of financial expectation (as bearishness prevails 
the requirements of financial circulation increase); (iii) the fall in the price 
level of consumption goods (this is due to the stagnation of expenditure on 
consumption as compared with an increase in the output of consumption 
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goods) and iv) the growing inability of the banking system to keep pace with 
the increasing requirements of the industrial circulation to begin with, and 
then of the financial circulation (this brings about a rise in the rate of 
interest). Subsequently the economy tends to decline for the following 
reasons: (i) a fall in the price level of consumption goods drives away the 
entrepreneurs whose production costs are high; (ii) financial sentiment 
becomes bearish and (iii) an increase in the requirements of the industrial 
circulation, which occurs in the upward phase of the cycle, brings about a rise 
in the rate of interest which finally retards investment. The fall in the price 
level in this period is held to prove fairly large. Soon a cut in production and 
wages follows, together with a decrease in working capital, so that business 
deteriorates rapidly (on this occasion, liquid capital increases, but the increase 
will, it is argued, prove surprisingly small). Having fallen to the bottom of a 
cycle, the economy moves into the ascending phase once again due to the 
following causes: (i) the price level of consumption goods stops falling, and 
begins to rise. This follows from the fact that the degree of decrease in 
expenditure on consumption is smaller than that of the decrease of output; 
(ii) the liquid capital increases. Together with the restored attractiveness of 
new investment, these factors exert a pick-up effect on the economy.148 
 The first half of Hayek’s review of the Treatise – published in Economica in 
August 1931 – begins with the platitudinous praisings and having-said-thats that are 
common to critical book reviews, thus it is that “the appearance of any work by Mr. 
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J.M. Keynes must always be a matter of importance: and the publication of the 
Treatise on Money has long been awaited with intense interest by all economists.” 
“Nonetheless,” Hayek warns, “in the event, the Treatise proves to be so obviously—
and I think admittedly—the expression of a transitory phase in a process of rapid 
intellectual development that its appearance cannot be said to have that definitive 
significance which at one time was expected of it.”149  
While Hayek has minor quibbles with the classification of different kinds of 
money that appears in Book I of the Treatise, he lauds Keynes’ “excellent and much 
needed criticism of certain attempts to base the method of index numbers on the 
theory of probability”150 in Book II. It is with the theoretical analysis of Books III 
and IV of the Treatise that Hayek takes serious issue, and particularly, with Keynes’ 
treatment of entrepreneur’s profits: “I agree perfectly when he…depicts profits as 
the mainspring of change in the economic system. But I cannot agree with his 
explanation of why profits arise, nor with his implication that only changes in ‘total 
profits’ in his sense can lead to an expansion or curtailment of output.”151 Because 
Keynes lacks a theoretical apparatus that would permit him to trace the effects on 
prices and profits of changes in the relative demand for the goods of the various 
stages of production, he is led to treat profits as a purely monetary phenomenon “in 
the narrowest sense of that expression.” 
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The cause of the emergence of those profits…is not a “real” factor, not 
some maladjustment in the relative demand for and supply of cost goods and 
the irrespective products (i.e., of the relative supply of intermediate products 
in the successive stages of production) and therefore, something which could 
arise also in a barter economy, but simply and solely spontaneous changes in 
the quantity and direction of the flow of money…the flow of money is 
treated as if it were the only independent variable which could cause a 
positive or negative difference between the prices of the products and their 
respective costs. The structure of goods on which this flow impinges is assumed to be 
relatively rigid. In fact, of course, the original cause may just as well be a change 
in the relative supply of these classes of goods, which then, in turn, will affect 
the quantities of money expended on them152 (emphasis added). 
According to Hayek’s theory – a point which, though it is underemphasized in Prices 
and Production, is repeatedly stressed in his earlier Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle – 
the initial cause of a discrepancy between the natural and loan rates of interest (and, 
thus, between saving and investment) need not have a monetary origin.153  
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There is no necessary reason why the initiating change, the original  
disturbance eliciting a cyclical fluctuation in a stationary economy, should be 
of a monetary origin. Nor, in practice, is this even generally the case. The 
initial change need have no specific character at all; it may be any one among 
a thousand different factors that may at any time increase the profitability of 
any group of enterprises.  
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 Hayek argues that Keynes’ treatment of profits as purely monetary is a 
consequence of the latter’s adoption of only a part of the Wicksellian architecture, 
i.e., the interest rate theory, but not the capital theory upon which it is based, which 
blinds the author of the Treatise to the possibility that profits can arise via 
spontaneous changes in the relative supply of the various classes of intermediate 
products, and thus, need not result from monetary changes: 
As I shall repeatedly have occasion to point out, [Keynes] treats the process 
of the current output of consumption goods as an integral whole in which 
only the prices paid at the beginning for the factors of production have any 
bearing on its profitableness. He seems to think that sufficient account of 
any change in the relative supply (and therefore in the value) of intermediate 
products in the successive stages of that process is provided for by his 
concept of (positive or negative) investment, i.e., the net addition to (or 
diminution from) the capital of the community. But this is by no means 
sufficient if only the total or net increment (or decrement) of investment 
goods in all stages is considered and treated as a whole, and the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                     
It is the failure to immediately return to equilibrium under such circumstances and 
not the initiating movement away from equilibrium which, on Hayek’s account, must 
be attributed to monetary factors:  
 
It is not the occurrence of a “change of data” that is significant, but the fact 
that the economic system, instead of reacting to this change with an 
immediate “adjustment”—i.e., the formation of a new equilibrium—begins a 
particular movement of “boom” that contains within itself the seeds of an 
inevitable reaction. This phenomenon, as we have seen, should undoubtedly 
be ascribed to monetary factors (Ibid.). 
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fluctuations between these stages is neglected; yet this is just what Mr. Keynes does154 
(emphasis added). 
 Hayek notes other “mischievous peculiarities of this concept of profits” that 
he construes as consequences of Keynes’ inadequate understanding of capital. For 
instance, Keynes appears to separate the functions of entrepreneurs as owners of 
capital and as risk-takers, which leads to an “artificial separation of entrepreneurs’ 
profits from the earnings of existing capital” and “has serious consequences for the 
further analysis of investment.” 
It leads not to an explanation of the changes in the demand price offered by 
entrepreneurs for new capital, but only to an explanation of changes in their 
aggregate demand for “factors of production” in general. But, surely, an 
explanation of the causes which make investment more or less attractive 
should form the basis of any analysis of investment. Such an explanation can, 
however, only be reached by a close analysis of the factors determining the relative prices of 
capital goods in the different stages of production—for the difference between these 
prices is the only source of interest. But this is excluded from the outset if 
only total profits are made the aim of investigation. Mr. Keynes’s aggregates 
conceal the most fundamental mechanisms of change.155 
Here we have Hayek’s objection to Keynes’ method of analyzing and explaining 
economic activity in terms of relations between aggregate and composite variables 
(and which subsequently became part and parcel of modern macroeconomics): 
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according to Hayek, the important causal phenomena are changes in relative prices 
which are only obscured by an undue focus on causally irrelevant variables 
representing aggregated quantities.  
As might be expected, Hayek’s dissatisfaction with the lack of a capital-
theoretic basis of the Treatise comes to the fore in his discussion of Keynes’ 
treatment of investment. Hayek argues that Keynes attempts to analyze “complex 
dynamic processes without laying the necessary foundations by adequate static 
analysis of the fundamental process”; Keynes fails “to concern himself with the 
conditions that must be given to secure the continuation of the existing capitalistic 
(i.e., roundabout) organisation of production—the creating [of] an equilibrium 
between the depreciation and the renewal of existing capital.” Moreover, Keynes 
takes “the maintenance of the capital stock more or less as a matter of course (which 
it certainly is not—it requires quite definite relationships between the prices of 
consumption goods and the prices of capital goods to make it profitable to keep 
capital intact).” Finally, Keynes “does not even explain the conditions of equilibrium 
at any given rate of saving, nor the effects of any change in the rate of saving. Only 
when money comes in as a disturbing factor by making the rate at which additional 
capital goods are produced different from the rate at which saving is taking place 
does he begin to be interested.”156 
 All of this, according to Hayek, is due to the lack of a capital-theoretic 
foundation in the Treatise: the aforementioned misgivings “would do no harm if 
[Keynes’] analysis of this complicating moment were based on a clear and definite 
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theory of capital and saving developed elsewhere, either by himself or by others. But 
this is obviously not the case.”157 What’s more, any attempt to develop Keynes’ 
discussion of investment is hindered by the latter’s separation of the reproduction of 
existing capital from additions to the capital stock:  
New savings and new investment are treated as if they were something 
entirely different from the reinvestment of the quota of amortisation of old 
capital, and as if it were not the same market where the prices of capital 
goods needed for the current production of consumption goods and of 
additional capital goods are determined.158  
Rather than attempting the sort of “horizontal” division between goods of higher 
stages and goods of lower orders provided by the Austrian theory of capital, Keynes  
attempts a kind of vertical division, counting for that part of the production 
of capital goods which is necessary for the continuation of the current 
production of consumption goods as a part of the process of producing 
consumption goods, and only that part of the production of capital goods 
which adds to the existing stock of capital as production of investment 
goods.159  
This method of vertical division of the production structure makes it difficult, Hayek 
argues, to determine what Keynes counts as additional capital. 
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Wicksell’s theory of the natural rate of interest and of the effects of 
discrepancies between the latter and the market rate is a “natural outgrowth of the 
most elaborate theory of capital we possess, that of Böhm-Bawerk.” However, 
Keynes accepts only the interest theory and not the conception of a horizontal 
structure of production that justifies it; his notion of production as a vertically-
integrated process does not support the story about interest that he wants to tell.160 It 
is Keynes’ selective appropriation of Wicksell that troubles Hayek: Keynes’ interest 
rate story is unjustified without its original capital-theoretical support. 
 The first part of Hayek’s review of the Treatise on Money closes with an old 
complaint, first heard in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle,161 to the effect that 
monetary theorists in the Wicksellian tradition focus too much on the effects of 
divergences between the natural and market rates of interest upon the general level 
of prices rather than on the effects of such divergences on the structure of relative 
prices. “There can, of course, be no doubt,” Hayek says “that every divergence 
between [investment and saving] is of enormous importance. But that importance 
does not lie in the direction of its influence on the fluctuations of the price-level.”162 
All evidence suggests that Keynes was profoundly irritated with the first part 
of Hayek’s review of the Treatise. According to Donald Moggridge, the editor of 
Keynes’ Collected Writings, Keynes’ copy of the August 1931 edition of Economica  
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is among the most heavily annotated of the surviving copies of his journals, 
with no less than 34 penciled marks or comments on the 26-page review. At 
the end of his copy of the review, Keynes summed his reaction by writing: 
“Hayek has not read my book with that measure of ‘good will’ which an 
author is entitled to expect of a reader. Until he can do so, he will not see 
what I mean or know whether I am right. He evidently has a passion which 
leads him to pick on me, but I am left wondering what this passion is.”163 
Keynes does not restrain himself in his response to Hayek’s review. He 
begins his November 1931 “Reply to Dr. Hayek” in Economica by arguing that “What 
[Hayek] has done…is to pick over the precise words I have used with a view to 
discovering some verbal contradiction or insidious ambiguity.” In his review of the 
Treatise, Hayek asks for further clarification regarding particular arguments and the 
intended meanings of certain terms; but, Keynes argues, regardless of whatever 
clarifications he might provide,  
I feel sure that I shall have made little or no progress towards convincing Dr. 
Hayek. For it is not really my use of language or the fact that my treatment 
falls far short of a complete analysis (as it certainly does) which is troubling 
him. It is something much more fundamental. And after reading his article 
carefully, I have no doubt at all what it is.164 
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Keynes argues that Hayek fundamentally misconstrues the central thesis of 
the Treatise; he denies that the theory of the Treatise leads to the implication Hayek 
attributes to it that  
an act of monetary expansion…or an increase in the total quantity of money 
…is not merely a possible cause of investment exceeding saving, but (1) that 
it is a necessary cause of this and (2) that the amount of the monetary 
expansion exactly measures the excess of investment over saving and hence 
is equal to the amount of profits (in my terminology).165  
Indeed, referring to a passage in Prices and Production in which Hayek “succinctly” – 
perhaps too succinctly, as it turns out – “states his own theory,”166 Keynes attributes 
the preceding proposition to the Austrian. 
It is worth pausing to consider the extent to which the two principals talk 
past each other in the published debate: Hayek attributes a particular thesis to 
Keynes that the latter claims is no implication of his theory, while Keynes attributes 
the same thesis to Hayek, perhaps because, at the time he was writing, the former 
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166 Keynes refers here to Hayek ([1931, 1935], 217-218):  
 
It is perfectly clear that, in order that the supply and demand for real capital 
should be equalised, the banks must not lend more or less than has been 
deposited with them as savings. And this means naturally that they must never 
change the amount of their circulation. At the same time, it is no less clear that, in 
order that the price level may remain unchanged, the amount of money in 
circulation must change as the volume of production increases or decreases. 
The banks could either keep the demand for real capital within the limits set 
by the supply of savings, or keep the price level steady; but they cannot 
perform both functions at once. [Italics added by Keynes; quoted in Keynes 
1973, 245] 
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had no access to an English translation of Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (not 
translated until 1933) in which the stated thesis is explicitly denied.167, 168 Each of the 
principals attributes the same view to the other, a position that neither in fact 
maintained.  
Keynes partially absolves Hayek for misunderstanding the argument of the 
Treatise, noting that “Since Dr. Hayek has not been alone amongst competent critics 
of my Treatise in falling into this misapprehension (or into some more subtle 
variation of it), it must be my own fault, at least in part.”  
I suspect that it may be partly due to the fact that when I first began to work 
on Book 3…I believed something resembling this myself. My ceasing to 
believe it was the critical point in my own development and was the germ 
from which much of my eventual theory was worked out…after I had 
adopted this new view, I was at great pains to bring the rest of my work into 
line with it. But traces of old trains of thought are not easily obliterated, and 
certain passages which I wrote some time ago may have been unconsciously 
                                                 
167 Hayek ([1933] 2008, 98); see footnote 153 above. 
 
168 Keynes’ admittedly shaky grasp on the German language should also be noted: “in 
German I can only clearly understand what I know already!—so that new ideas are 
apt to be veiled from me by the difficulties of language” (Keynes [1930] 1971a, 
178n). This fact helps explain not only Keynes’ lack of familiarity with Hayek’s 
earlier Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, but also his failure to build on Wicksell’s 
(1893, but not translated into English until 1954) Über Wert, Kapital, and Rent 
(translated as Value, Capital, and Rent) in which the great Swedish economist 
synthesizes Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory with marginal productivity theory in a 
general equilibrium framework; the latter explanation of Keynes’ ignorance of the 
full scope of Wicksell’s work is emphasized by Caldwell (2004, 177-178). 
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cast into a mould less obviously inconsistent with my own former views than 
they would be if I were writing now.169 
 But Keynes is not willing to accept all responsibility for the 
misunderstandings of his critics. The failure to recognize the transition in his 
monetary thought is, “[f]or anyone brought up in the old Quantity-of-Money, 
Velocity-of-Circulation schools of thought, whether it be Cambridge Quantity 
Equations or Fisher Quantity Equations…a difficult transition to make. I found it so 
myself.” These critics “cannot bring themselves to believe that I am asking them to 
step into a new pair of trousers, and will insist on regarding it as nothing but an 
embroidered version of the old pair which they have been wearing for years.” 
However, for someone who holds “what Dr. Hayek believes…the transition would 
be easy.” In any case, Keynes writes, “I could never have expected, if it had not been 
for more than one experience to the contrary, that a competent economist could 
read my Treatise carefully and leave it with the idea that it was my view that the 
difference between saving and investment could be exactly measured by changes in 
the quantity of money.”170  
Keynes then launches into an impromptu review of Hayek’s Prices and 
Production, concluding that “My analysis is quite different…in my view saving and 
investment…can get out of gear without any change on the part of the banking 
system from ‘neutrality’ as defined by Dr. Hayek, merely as a result of the public 
changing their rate of saving or the entrepreneurs changing their rate of 
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investment.”171 The ersatz review continues and Keynes’ assessment is little short of 
withering:  
The book, as it stands, seems to me to be one of the most frightful muddles I 
have ever read, with scarcely a sound proposition in it beginning with page 
45, and yet it remains a book of some interest, which is likely to leave its 
mark on the mind of the reader. It is an extraordinary example of how, 
starting with a mistake, a remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam. Yet Dr. 
Hayek has seen a vision, and though when he woke up he has made 
nonsense of his story by giving the wrong names to the objects which occur 
in it, his Khubla Khan is not without inspiration and must set the reader 
thinking with the germs of an idea in his head.172 
This said, Keynes proceeds straight away to a concession of the central point 
of Hayek’s review, namely, the lack of a capital-theoretic basis for the theory of the 
Treatise. However, importantly, Keynes disputes the necessity of such a foundation to 
monetary theory: 
Dr. Hayek complains that I do not myself propound any satisfactory theory 
of capital and interest and that I do not build on any existing theory…This is 
quite true; and I agree with Dr. Hayek that a development of this theory 
would be highly relevant to my treatment of monetary matters and likely to 
throw light on dark corners. It is very possible that, looking back after a 
satisfactory theory has been completed, we shall see that the ideas that 
                                                 
171 Ibid., 251 
 
172 Ibid., 252 
  86 
Böhm-Bawerk was driving at, lie at the heart of the problem…But there is 
no such theory at present, and, as Dr. Hayek would agree, a thorough 
treatment of it might lead one rather a long way from monetary theory. 
Nevertheless, substantially I concede Dr. Hayek’s point. I agree with him that 
a clear account of the factors determining the natural rate of interest ought to 
have a place in a completed Treatise on Money, and that it is lacking in mine: 
And I can only plead that I had much to say for which such a theory is not 
required and that my own ideas about it were still too much in embryo to 
deserve publication. Later on, I will endeavour to make good this 
deficiency.173 
Despite the concluding rain check to his readers – the promise to make whole the 
capital-theoretic lacuna in his work – Keynes never did return to the capital problem. 
Whatever traces of capital theory that are present in the Treatise are absent from The 
General Theory.  
In any case, setting aside the manifest confusion on both sides regarding the 
substance of the principals’ respective theories, the crux of the Hayek-Keynes debate 
is well illustrated by the foregoing quote: Hayek and Keynes disagree about the 
relevance of capital theory to the sort of project in which they are both engaged. 
Both of the principals agree that Keynes’ Treatise on Money is not grounded in a 
satisfactory capital theory; moreover, both agree that no fully satisfactory theory of 
capital exists; yet, because he considers capital theory to be so essential to 
investigations of the effects of money, and, relatedly, to explanations of the business 
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cycle, Hayek is prepared to move forward on the basis of the best, yet far from fully 
adequate, theory of capital available, i.e., the one he inherited from Wicksell and 
Bohm-Bawerk; while, conversely, Keynes believes that “such a theory is not 
required” to substantiate the things he wants to say about money and the business 
cycle, and so he proceeds in the Treatise (and also in The General Theory) more or less 
sans capital theory. Thus, we arrive at the still unresolved question to which Keynes 
and Hayek (and their respective followers) offer different responses: in the absence 
of an adequate and satisfactory explanation of capital, is it better to attempt to 
explain the cycle on the basis of no capital theory at all or on the basis of an 
inadequate and unsatisfactory capital theory?174 
Before closing with an attempt to clarify the verbal confusions raised in the 
first half of Hayek’s review, Keynes argues that what really separates the two is the 
“long-period” focus of Hayek, an emphasis for which, Keynes argues, a theory of the 
                                                 
174 The motivation for the Austrian preference for an admittedly inadequate capital-
theoretic foundation for business cycle theory rather than none at all is connected 
with the manifest difficulties involved in theorizing about the phenomena of capital. 
In the Austrian reckoning, capital is fundamentally heterogeneous. There are significant, 
economically-relevant differences between, say, a pencil and a factory in which 
machines that make pencils are built, although pencils, pencil-making machines, and 
factories that build pencil-making machines are all capital-goods. The Austrian 
theory of capital, with its distinctions between stages of production and the degrees 
of specificity of particular capital goods is a first approximation to an adequate 
explanation of capital phenomena. Austrians have always recognized that a 
completed theory of capital would be far more complex than the first approximation of 
Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell (subsequently extended into a commensurately more 
complex second approximation by Hayek himself in The Pure Theory of Capital (Hayek 
[1941] 2007)). In other words, Austrians argue against Keynes’ decision to treat 
capital as essentially homogeneous on the grounds that it represents a movement away 
from what they would take to be an adequate explanation of capital phenomena.  
These issues are connected with a methodological problem that arises in the 
third chapter of the present paper, namely, the apparent tradeoff between the need 
for theories that are simple and the need for theories that are realistic. 
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structure of production may be required; he, however, is more concerned with the 
conditions that determine the natural rate of interest in the “short-period”: “If I am 
right…our theories occupy—as I believe they do—different terrains.”175  
Hayek’s “Rejoinder to Mr. Keynes” appears in the pages immediately 
following Keynes’ “Reply” in the same November 1931 edition of Economica. Hayek 
appears taken aback by Keynes’ choice to reply with a review of Prices and Production: 
Mr. Keynes’ answer does not seem to me to clear up many of the difficulties 
I have pointed out, or indeed to improve the basis for further discussion. 
Instead of devoting his answer mainly to clearing up the ambiguities which I 
have indicated carefully and in detail, and the existence of which he cannot 
deny, he replies chiefly by a sweeping accusation of confusion, not in my 
critical article, but in another work, and even here I am unable to reply as he 
does not specify my confusions in any single case. I am bound to say that 
while I am very ready and indeed eager seriously to consider any definite 
criticism which Mr. Keynes may care to make, I cannot see what possible end 
is served by an unproved condemnation of my views in general. I cannot 
believe Mr. Keynes wishes to give the impression that he is trying to distract 
the attention of the reader from the objections which have been raised 
against his analysis by abusing his opponent, and I can only hope that after 
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my critical article has appeared in its entirety he will not only try to refute my 
objection more specifically, but also to substantiate his counter-criticism.176 
 Whatever the merits of Keynes’ critique of Price and Production, Hayek is none 
too impressed with Keynes’ efforts to redress the confusions raised in the first part 
of the review:  
It is a regrettable fact that in none of the cases in which I have shown that 
several interpretations of the meaning of his exposition are possible has he 
explained decisively which of these interpretations is to be considered as 
authoritative. He has failed to elucidate his concept of Investment. I am as 
                                                 
176 Hayek ([1931c] 1995, 159). Hayek was not alone in taking a dim view of Keynes’ 
dialectical tactics. Keynes’ Cambridge colleague A.C. Pigou (himself soon to be the 
explicit target of Keynes’ withering pen in The General Theory) wrote in 1935, referring 
to the Hayek-Keynes debate, 
  
Are we, in our secret hearts, wholly satisfied with the manner, or manners, in 
which some of our controversies are carried on? A year or two ago, after the 
publication of an important book, there appeared an elaborate and careful 
critique of a number of particular passages in it. The author’s answer was, not 
to rebut the criticisms, but to attack with violence another book, which the 
critic had himself written several years before! Body-line bowling! The 
method of the duello! That kind of thing is surely a mistake” (Pigou 1935, 
23-24).  
 
It must be said that, from a less genteel modern perspective, it is difficult to 
understand what all the fuss was about over Keynes using his “Reply” to criticize 
Prices and Production: Hayek had attacked the Treatise using the theoretical apparatus of 
Prices and Production as a weapon; surely it was open to Keynes to disarm his 
opponent. However, it is perhaps easier to understand the rigmarole if we note a 
subtle distinction between Pigou’s complaint and Hayek’s assessment of Keynes’ 
tactics: unlike Pigou, Hayek’s complaint is not per se that Keynes attacked Prices and 
Production, but that the attack is of the form of a “sweeping accusation of 
confusion…an unproved condemnation of [Hayek’s] views in general” that does not 
“specify…confusions in any single case.” In other words, Pigou’s complaint is that 
Keynes, rather than sticking to a response to Hayek’s review of the Treatise, chose to 
attack Prices and Production; Hayek’s complaint is that the attack was overly broad and 
underspecified.  
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much at a loss as ever to see what it means exactly. The same thing is true of 
his concept of profits. Indeed, until he has elucidated the concept of 
investment I do not see how he can be clear in his use of the term profit.177 
 With respect to his interpretation of the central thesis of the Treatise, Hayek 
admits that, though he has pointed out that Keynes “does not consistently adhere to 
the idea that a discrepancy between saving and investment can only arise as a 
consequence of a change in the effective quantity of money,” he has assumed that this 
must be the main thesis of the Treatise  
because I have been unable, and indeed still am unable, to detect in his 
Treatise or his subsequent elucidations any other tenable explanation of this 
phenomenon, and because I refused to believe, as I am afraid I must now 
believe, that Mr. Keynes could possibly consider his analysis of the relation 
between profits and investment an independent and sufficient explanation of 
how this discrepancy arises.178  
In short, Hayek’s misapprehension of the central position is, he argues, due to the 
lack of any other reasonable explanation of the discrepancy between saving and 
investment in the Treatise. 
 Nor does Hayek consider Keynes’ clarification in the latter’s “Reply” an 
improvement: “As I understand him now, his position is that an excess of saving 
over investment will arise when part of the saving, instead of being used for new 
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investments, is used to make up losses.”179 Hayek considers the “simplest” such case, 
that of an entrepreneur who fails to earn his expected return and who responds by 
cutting back his personal expenditure (“to the extent to which his expenditure fell 
below his ‘normal’ wage, this would constitute saving in Mr. Keynes’s 
terminology”180) so as to continue to pay out to the factors of production as much as 
before his losses—“these ‘savings’ would not lead to corresponding investing.”181 
Hayek’s complaint here is familiar to readers of his earlier Monetary Theory and the 
Trade Cycle: Keynes assumes the very disequilibrium phenomena his theory purports 
to explain. That is, though Keynes’ explanation is  
no doubt true as a consequence of the definition of the concept chosen…it 
explains neither how the excess of saving over investing, nor how the 
windfall losses arose, but only that both are ex definitione identical. To say that 
the excess of saving over investment is the cause of the losses (or the 
reverse) has no sense whatever. There exists only the kind of disequilibrium 
which has been supposed to exist at the outset when the hypothesis that the 
                                                 
179 Ibid. In his “Reply,” Keynes argues that a change in the quantity of money can 
occur without any effect on the relationship between saving and investment: “(to 
indicate a general principle by means of an illustration)…if, desiring to be more 
liquid, I sell Consols to my bank in exchange for a bank deposit and my bank does 
not choose to offset this transaction but allows its deposits to be correspondingly 
increased, the quantity of money is changed without anything having happened 
either to saving or to investment” (Keynes 1973, 248). In a footnote in his 
“Rejoinder,” Hayek denies that such a transaction affects the effective circulation: “a 
sale of securities to a bank in order to improve liquidity (i.e., to hoard) does not 
change the effective quantity of money (in the sense of the concept on which we 
seem to be agreed” (Hayek [1931] 1995b, 161n). 
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entrepreneurs were making windfall losses was introduced, and he does not 
adduce any reason for assuming that the original and unspecified cause of the 
losses would be eliminated by the banking system making up for the 
difference by lending more to investors.182  
Worse still, according to Hayek, the proffered relation between profits, money, and 
investment does not explain how windfalls can arise as a consequence of a 
discrepancy between saving and investment in the absence of a change in the effective 
circulation of money: “So long as the money goes somewhere and is not hoarded and no 
new money is added…it is difficult to see how there can arise that difference 
between the total expenditure and the total receipts of entrepreneurs which alone 
can create total profits in Mr. Keynes’s sense.”183 
 Digging a bit deeper into the example, Hayek thinks he recognizes another 
point of substantive disagreement between he and Keynes: the assumption that an 
entrepreneur would continue to produce as before despite incurring windfall losses, 
even if it requires curtailing his own consumption, seems to Hayek to conceal the 
implicit assumption that agents do not respond to the price signals relevant to their 
economic activities:  
What does it actually mean if part of current savings is used to make up for 
losses in the production of consumption goods[?]…It must mean that 
though the production of consumption goods has become less profitable, 
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and that though at the same time the rate of interest has fallen so that the 
production of investment goods has become relatively more attractive than 
the production of consumption goods, yet entrepreneurs continue to 
produce the two types of goods in the same proportion as before. What 
justification can there be for this assumption?184 
All of this, of course, Hayek construes as a consequence of Keynes’ failure to build 
the Treatise upon Wicksell’s integration of Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory with general 
equilibrium—there (“where there is no banking system”) the function of the interest 
rate is precisely to coordinate intertemporal decision making. 
 Finally, with respect to the central point of contention between them, Hayek 
indicates his position clearly: “the obvious answer” to the problem of the absence of 
an adequate and satisfactory theory of capital  
is that even if we have no quite satisfactory theory we do at least possess a far 
better one than that on which [Keynes] is content to rely, namely that of 
Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell. That he neglects this theory, not because he 
thinks it wrong, but simply because he has never bothered to make himself 
acquainted with it,185 is amply proved by the fact that he finds unintelligible 
my attempt to develop certain corollaries of this theory—corollaries which 
are not only essential for the very problem we are discussing, but which, as 
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experience has shown me, are immediately intelligible to every student who 
has ever studied Bohm-Bawerk or Wicksell seriously.186 
Thus, Hayek’s position, contra Keynes, is that capital theory is “essential to the very 
problem we are discussing” and, though this may require moving forward on the 
basis of an incomplete theory, with respect to the problem at hand, some theory is 
better than none at all.187  
 A brief written correspondence arose between the two principals in the wake 
of the November 1931 dustup in Economica. It is a sufficient indication of the 
fruitlessness of this correspondence to consider the first and last letters written by 
Keynes to Hayek. In the first letter, dated December 10, 1931, Keynes asks Hayek 
for further clarification of the latter’s concept of saving: “I should find this clearer if 
you could give me a formula which shows how saving is measured. Also, what is the 
difference between ‘voluntary saving’ and ‘forced saving’ in your terminology”188 
[italics in the original]. In the final letter, dated February 11, 1932, Keynes seems as 
perplexed by Hayek as ever:  
Going back to the point at which our correspondence started, I am left 
where I began, namely in doubt as to just what you mean by voluntary saving 
and forced saving as applied to the actual world we live in: though I think I 
understand now what you mean by them in certain special cases, and this of 
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course gives me some sort of general idea as to the sort of thing you have in 
mind.189  
Keynes’ frustration with the brief dialogue is also illustrated by a February 1, 1932 
dispatch to Cambridge Circus members Piero Sraffa and Richard Kahn; with respect 
to his ongoing dialogue with Hayek, Keynes writes “What is the next move? I feel 
that the abyss yawns—and so do I. Yet I can’t help feeling that there is something 
interesting in it.”190 
 In the second part of his review of the Treatise, Hayek attempts to establish 
that, whatever the independent merits of Keynes’ subsidiary arguments that saving 
and investment can “get out of gear” for reasons unrelated to monetary 
considerations, these claims are no consequence of the theoretical framework of the 
Treatise. While Keynes’ explanation of deviations between the short-run market rate 
of interest and the equilibrium rate is intended to convince the reader that such 
divergences can arise independently of changes in the effective quantity of money – a 
point that Keynes emphasizes “so strongly that he could scarcely expect any reader 
to overlook the fact that he wishes to demonstrate it”191 – Hayek argues that the 
theory of the Treatise supports only the negation of this conclusion: “while he certainly 
wants to establish this proposition, I cannot find any proof of it in the Treatise. 
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Indeed, at all the critical points, the assumption seems to creep in that this 
divergence is made possible by the necessary change in the supply of money.”192  
Hayek argues that while the failure to base the explanation in the Treatise on a 
theory of capital like the Austrian one, with its distinctions between different stages 
of production and varying degrees of specificity of capital goods, blinds Keynes to 
the effects of divergences between the Bank Rate and the equilibrium rate, it does 
not account for Keynes unsatisfactory explanation of such divergences, “This has to 
be sought elsewhere, viz.,…in Mr. Keynes’s peculiar concept of saving.” 
[Keynes] believes that, in order to maintain equilibrium, new investment 
must be equal not only to that part of the money income of all individuals 
which exceeds what they spend on consumers’ goods plus what must be re-
invested in order to maintain existing capital equipment (which would 
constitute saving in the ordinary sense of the word); but also to that portion 
of entrepreneur’s “normal” incomes by which their actual income (and, 
therefore, their expenditure on consumption goods) has fallen short of that 
“normal” income. In other words, if entrepreneurs are experiencing 
losses…and make up for such losses either by cutting down their own 
consumption pari passu, or by borrowing a corresponding amount from the 
savers, then, argues Mr. Keynes, not only do these sums make replacement 
of the old capital possible, but there should also be a further amount of new 
investment corresponding to these sums. And as Mr. Keynes obviously 
thinks that saving (i.e., the refraining from buying consumers’ goods) may, in 
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many cases, actually cause some entrepreneurs to suffer losses which will 
absorb some of the savings which would otherwise have gone to new 
investment, this special concept of saving probably explains why he suspects 
almost any increase in saving of being conducive to the creation of a 
dangerous excess of saving over investment.193 
 If it is assumed that, following a fall in the relative demand for consumers’ 
goods due to an increase of saving, rather than cutting back production, producers of 
consumers’ goods continue to produce at capacity, then there are four possible ways 
for entrepreneurs to recoup their losses: “they must cut down their own expenditure 
(or, in Mr. Keynes’s terminology, they must save in order to cover their losses); 
reduce their bank balances; borrow from the people who save; or sell to these people 
other capital, such as securities.”194 The relevant question is whether under such 
circumstances an excess of saving over investment will cause total cost of production 
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to exceed total incomes:195 “The answer to this question seems to me to be an 
emphatic negative.”196  
This said, Hayek’s real objection is to the assumption that producers of 
consumers’ goods might fail to respond to the relevant price signals, which he 
attributes to Keynes’ neglect of the relation between changes in the rate of interest 
and concomitant effects on the structure of production, i.e., to Keynes’ failure to 
base the Treatise on a capital-theoretic foundation:  
It seems to me that a complete neglect of the part played by [the] rate of 
interest is involved in the assumption that, after investment in the production 
of consumption goods has become relatively less profitable, some other 
openings for investment which are now more profitable will not be found. 
The most curious fact is that, from the outset, all of Mr. Keynes’s reasoning 
which aims at proving that an increase in saving will not lead to an increase 
in investment is based on the assumption that, in spite of the decrease in the 
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demand for consumption goods, the available output is not reduced; this 
means, simply, that he assumes from the outset what he wants to prove.197 
Hayek takes the foregoing considerations to establish that there is no reason, given 
Keynes’ arguments in the Treatise, why saving and new investment (in Keynes’s 
sense) should ever be in equilibrium.198 
Hayek considers Keynes’ specific account of the credit cycle, a discussion 
that is greatly complicated, Hayek argues, by the fact that “when one tries to use all 
these concepts as tools for the purpose for which they were forged, all the difficulties 
which have been pointed out not only recur but increase. To show in detail how they 
affect the results would require a discussion many times longer than that contained in 
the respective sections of the Treatise.”199 Hayek’s main complaint is that, in contrast 
to Wicksell and his followers, Keynes makes little attempt to follow up the effects on 
real investment of monetary disequilibrium: “What he is really interested in is merely 
shifts in the money-streams and the consequent changes in price levels.” 
It seems never to have occurred to him that the artificial stimulus to 
investment, which makes it exceed current saving, may cause a dis-
equilibrium on the real structure of production which, sooner or later, must 
lead to a reaction. Like so many others who hold a purely monetary theory of 
the trade cycle…he seems to believe that, if the existing monetary 
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organisation did not make it impossible, the boom could be perpetuated by 
indefinite inflation.200 
 The main feature of the boom phase of the cycle is not, on Keynes’ 
reckoning as it is on Hayek’s, the increase in investment, but the increase in the 
prices of consumers’ goods and the resulting profits received by producers of 
consumers’ goods. This means, Hayek points out, that “Direct inflation for 
consumption purposes [i.e., the granting of credit directly to consumers] would, 
therefore, create a boom quite as effectively as would an excess of investment over 
saving.” The latter is a position which, from Hayek’s perspective, makes Keynes no 
better than those naïve underconsumptionists, Foster and Catchings.  
Since, according to [Keynes’] theory, it is the excess of demand for 
consumers’ goods over the costs of the available supply which constitutes the 
boom, this boom will last only so long as demand keeps ahead of supply and 
will end either when the demand ceases to increase or when the supply, 
stimulated by abnormal profits, catches up with demand. Then the prices of 
consumers’ goods will fall back to costs and the boom will be at an end, 
though it need not necessarily be followed by a depression; yet, in practice, 
deflationary tendencies are usually set up which will reverse the process. This 
seems to me to be, in broad outline, Mr. Keynes’s explanation of the cycle.201 
This explanation, Hayek argues, suffers from the same problems as other 
underconsumptionist accounts of the cycle, and he refers readers to “The ‘Paradox’ 
                                                 
200 Ibid., 192-193 
 
201 Ibid., 193 
  101 
of Saving” and Prices of Production for elaborate and extended critiques of 
underconsumptionist accounts. 
In closing, Hayek rejects Keynes’ argument that changes in the structure of 
production might be ignored in the short-run; this Hayek attributes, of course, to the 
distance separating his own understanding of capital from that of Keynes:  
I am afraid this contention merely proves that Mr. Keynes has not yet fully 
realized that any change in the amount of capital per head of working 
population is equivalent to a change in the average length of the roundabout 
process of production and that, therefore, all his demonstrations of the 
change in the amount of capital during the cycle prove my point.202 
The “next move” in the debate, as it turns out, was not made by Keynes 
himself, but by Keynes’ friend, Cambridge lecturer and Circus member, Piero 
Sraffa203 (one of the addressees of the February 1932 transmission in which Keynes 
expresses exasperation with his dialogue with Hayek) whose review of Prices and 
Production appears in the March 1932 edition of the Economic Journal.  
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Sraffa’s review pulls few punches. Thus it is that Hayek’s book only adds “to 
the prevailing confusion of thought on the subject”204; its one contribution being that 
it focuses on the effects of monetary changes on relative prices rather than on the 
effects of such changes on the general level of prices. Sraffa’s first complaint 
concerns Hayek’s starting concept of “neutral” money, which is supposed to leave 
relative prices as they would be in an economy without money. Such a starting point 
might be recommendable, Sraffa says, if Hayek were to compare the results of the 
moneyless economy with those realized under various monetary systems and 
policies,  
but the reader soon realises that Dr. Hayek completely forgets to deal with 
the task which he has set for himself, and that he is only concerned with the 
wholly different problem of proving that only one particular banking 
policy…succeeds in giving full effect to the voluntary “decisions of 
individuals”, especially in regard to saving, whilst under any other policy 
these decisions are “distorted”" by the “artificial” interference of banks.”205 
According to Sraffa, Hayek fails to appreciate that the desirability of the barter case 
can be questioned; having believed himself to have shown that the conditions of a 
“neutral” money correspond to those of a barter economy, Hayek blithely proceeds 
to the conclusion that the related policy is the only one worth considering.  
 Prices and Production ignores all of those features of money not connected with 
its use as a common medium of exchange; if he had stuck to his original purpose of 
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comparing the effects of neutral money with alternative monetary systems, Sraffa 
argues, Hayek would have realized that the value of money lies also in its use as a 
store of value and the standard of debt settlement and “other legal obligations, 
habits, opinions, conventions.”206 According to Sraffa, Hayek’s approach,  
which amounts to assuming away the very object of the inquiry, appears to 
originate in a well-founded objection to the vagueness of the conception of 
“the general price-level” understood as anything different from one out of 
many possible index numbers of prices, and in the opinion that such a 
conception can have no place in a theory of money.207  
Sraffa has no objection to such an approach per se provided that money’s price is one 
of the relative prices considered, “but Dr. Hayek goes further and rejects not only 
the notion of a general price level but every notion of the value of money in any 
sense whatever.”208 
Sraffa argues that Hayek’s reduction of money’s value to insignificance should 
have profound effects on his theory of the effects of monetary changes. In 
particular, having “emasculated” money, the results of Hayek’s assessments of the 
effects of different monetary systems should be that money is always neutral. Instead, 
according to Sraffa, Hayek manages to find insidious effects following from 
particular monetary systems. One can only conclude, Sraffa argues, that either Hayek 
has committed some major error of reasoning or has unintentionally introduced 
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some ad hoc assumption “which produces the difference attributed to the properties 
of the system itself.”209, 210  
 Sraffa proceeds to consider the two cases of voluntary and forced saving, 
arguing that no ill effects arise in the latter case; Hayek “accepts the above 
conclusions as far as they go, and must now try to find in a different set of 
considerations the reasons why inflation has not the same effects as saving.”  
The true difference between the two cases is, according to [Hayek], that the 
change in the structure of production brought about by saving is permanent, 
being due to the “voluntary decisions of individuals”; whereas the same 
change, if due to inflation, is “forced”, and therefore the consumers, as soon 
as inflation ceases and their freedom of action is restored, will proceed to 
consume all the capital accumulated against their will, and re-establish the 
initial position. That the position reached as the result of “voluntary saving” 
will be one of equilibrium…is clear enough…But equally stable would be 
that position if brought about by inflation; and Dr. Hayek fails to prove the 
contrary.211 
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Hayek argues that once consumers have regained their previous purchasing power 
following an expansion of credit in the form of producers’ credits – that is, once all 
incomes have risen as a consequence of the injection of money at the far end of the 
structure of production – they will attempt to expand the volume of their 
consumption to its prior proportion, but, according to Sraffa, “nothing of the sort 
will happen. One class has, for a time robbed another class of a part of their 
incomes; and has saved the plunder. When the robbery comes to an end, it is clear 
that the victims cannot possibly consume the capital which is now well out of their 
reach.”212 
 If Hayek were consistent, Sraffa argues, then, believing that he has shown 
producers’ credits to cause serious harm, Hayek should conclude that consumers’ 
credits cause little harm; instead Hayek argues that consumer inflation also leads to 
capital destruction: “Thus Dr. Hayek will have it both ways.”213 Moreover, Hayek 
ignores two cases that appear immediately pertinent to his analysis; in particular, the 
case where inflation is granted in such a way as to leave undisturbed the proportion 
between the relative demand for producers’ goods and that for consumers’ goods, 
and the case in which banks increase loans to producers to the extent that they 
simultaneously decrease credit to consumers, leaving the effective circulation of 
money unchanged; the latter being a case in which, by Hayek’s lights, money is 
“neutral” but the structure of production is altered.  
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What has happened is simply that, since money has been thoroughly 
“neutralised” from the start, whether its quantity rises, falls, or is kept steady, 
makes not the slightest difference; at the same time, an extraneous element, 
in the shape of the supposed power of the banks to settle the way in which 
money is spent, has crept into the argument and has done all the work. As 
Voltaire says, you can kill a flock of sheep by incantations, plus a little 
poison.214 
 Sraffa considers Hayek’s theory of the relation between the money and 
natural rates of interest and argues that, contra Hayek, the divergence between the two 
rates of interest is by no means a phenomenon unique to monetary economies:  
If money did not exist, and loans were made in terms of all sorts of 
commodities, there would be a single rate that satisfies the conditions of 
equilibrium, but there might be at any one moment as many “natural” rates 
of interest as there are commodities, though they would not be “equilibrium” 
rates. The “arbitrary” action of the banks is by no means a necessary 
condition for the divergence; if loans were made in wheat and farmers (or for 
that matter the weather) “arbitrarily changed” the quantity of wheat 
produced, the actual rate of interest on loans in terms of wheat would 
diverge from the rate on other commodities and there would be no single 
equilibrium rate.215 
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This same fact can be seen by considering futures markets where loans are made in 
terms of non-monetary commodities, like cotton:  
In equilibrium the spot and forward price coincide, for cotton as for any 
other commodity; and all the “natural” or commodity rates are equal to one 
another. But if, for any reason, the supply and the demand for a commodity 
are not in equilibrium (i.e., its market price exceeds or falls short of its cost of 
production), its spot and forward prices diverge, and the “natural” rate of 
interest on that commodity diverges from the “natural” rates on other 
commodities.216  
 None of this, Sraffa says, is intended as a criticism of Wicksell, for “there is a 
‘natural’ rate of interest which, if adopted as a bank-rate, will stabilize a price-level 
(i.e., the price of a composite commodity): It is an average of the ‘natural’ rates of the 
commodities entering into the price-level, weighted in the same way as they are in 
the price-level itself.”217 However, this route of escape is blocked for Hayek, who 
eschews the use of composite variables like average price-levels and average 
“natural” rates of interest. 
 The foregoing considerations establish, Sraffa argues, that non-monetary 
economies “retain the essential feature of money, the singleness of the standard; and 
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we are not much the wiser when we have been shown that a monetary policy is 
‘neutral’ in the sense of being equivalent to a non-monetary economy which differs 
from it almost only by name.” In any case, no policy can precisely replicate the 
results of “the other conceivable and more truly non-monetary” economies. But this 
is no cause for concern, Sraffa contends, because disequilibria would arise under a 
system of barter just as in monetary economies: “the essential characteristic of a 
divergence between the demand and supply of consumption goods is common to 
monetary and non-monetary economies.”218 
 In the main, Sraffa’s complaints with Prices and Production are three in number. 
The first issue is that, in a book ostensibly dealing with monetary issues, Hayek 
doesn’t really address money; his focus is instead on changes in the income stream 
available for the purchase of producers’ rather than consumers’ goods and 
concomitant effects on the structure of production. However, the latter issue really 
just obscures another, more fundamental difference between the two: Hayek, but not 
Sraffa, takes, the assumptions of the prevailing theory of equilibrium for granted; 
Hayek, but not Sraffa, assumes that equilibrium obtains in a moneyless world, and 
this justifies the former’s choice of starting from the point where equilibrium theory 
leaves off. Of course, Hayek defends this premise at length in Monetary Theory and the 
Trade Cycle,219 which was not available in English at the time of Sraffa’s review, but it 
is unlikely that the latter would have accepted Hayek’s argument there, for the root 
disagreement between the two concerns the validity of equilibrium theory itself. 
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Relatedly, Sraffa complains that Hayek’s use of the equilibrium construct 
surreptitiously elides into a defense of a policy judged to secure what Hayek takes to 
be the conditions of a barter economy. 
 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Sraffa claims that Hayek’s 
argument with respect to the divergent effects of voluntary as opposed to forced 
saving depends on a crucial and unproven assumption, namely, that consumers react 
differently in the two cases, leaving the capital created in virtue of saving untouched 
in the former case, but destroying the capital taken from them in the form of 
inflation in the latter case. According to Sraffa, there is no reason to believe this will 
happen as Hayek describes; consumers might opt to leave capital untouched in both 
cases. The significance of this objection is that the shrinkage of the structure of 
production that is alleged to follow the end of an inflation in the form of producers’ 
credits (or the beginning of an inflation in the form of consumers’ credits) is no 
necessary consequence of Hayek’s theory. In the words of Hayek’s biographer, Bruce 
Caldwell, “while the scenario painted by Hayek is a possible one, he neither 
demonstrated the necessity nor gave adequate attention to the lags implicit in the 
process of adjustment he portrayed. Hayek’s theory fits some, but not all, trade 
cycles: It is not, as Hayek portrayed it to be, a general theory of the cycle.”220 
 Sraffa’s third objection contends that, in a barter economy, there is no unique 
“natural” rate of interest; that there might be as many natural rates as there are 
commodities and none of them “equilibrium” rates. Related to this objection is 
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Sraffa’s point that Hayek cannot resort to an average “natural” rate given his 
eschewal of the method of aggregates and composite indices. 
 As mentioned above, Sraffa’s article appears in the March 1932 edition of the 
Economic Journal, edited at the time by Keynes. In the final dispatch in the 1931-1932 
correspondence between Hayek and Keynes, dated March 29, 1932, Keynes obliges 
Hayek’s request for space for a reply to Sraffa in the next edition of the Journal, and 
indicates both his unwillingness to return to their former controversy and that he has 
moved on to better things:  
Having been much occupied in other directions, I have not yet studied your 
Economica article [i.e., the second part of Hayek’s review of the Treatise] as 
closely as I shall. But, unless it be on one or two points which can perhaps be 
dealt with in isolation from the main issue, I doubt if I shall return to the 
charge in Economica. I am trying to re-shape and improve my central position, 
and that is probably a better way to spend one’s time than in controversy.221 
 Hayek’s reply to Sraffa does indeed appear in the June 1932 edition of the 
Economic Journal. Hayek considers Sraffa’s objections in turn, merely referring his 
critic to the then-forthcoming English translation of Monetary Theory and the Trade 
Cycle for a discussion of his perspective on the monetary issues raised by Sraffa and 
for a defense of the methodological choice to start from the conclusions of 
equilibrium theory. Of course, given that a root issue between the two concerns the 
validity of equilibrium theory, it should not be expected that Sraffa would have 
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concurred with Hayek’s argument in Monetary Theory. Recognizing this, Hayek argues 
that Sraffa’s methodological position seems to be “a curious mixture of, on the one 
hand, an extreme theoretical nihilism which denies that existing theories of 
equilibrium provide any useful description of the non-monetary forces at work; and, 
on the other hand, of an ultraconservatism which resents any attempt to show that 
the differences between a monetary and a non-monetary economy are not only, and 
not even mainly,” dependent on those characteristics of the value of money 
highlighted by Sraffa.222 
 With respect to Sraffa’s allegation that Hayek illegitimately elides into a 
defense of the policy of neutral money, the latter responds that he merely assumes 
that “it is generally thought desirable to avert any developments which lead the 
system away from an equilibrium position, and which, therefore, make a revulsion 
inevitable sooner or later.” However, beyond this, Hayek contends, “there is no 
justification for the suggestion that…my exposition takes certain aims of economic 
policy for granted—which I assume [in Sraffa’s words] ‘will be found desirable by 
every right-thinking person’.”223 
 With respect to the charge of ad hocness leveled by Sraffa against the analysis 
in Prices and Production, Hayek concedes that his theory “stands or falls” upon the 
truth of the proposition that the capital accumulated in virtue of forced saving must 
be, “at least partly, dissipated as soon as the cause…disappears.”224 Against the 
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charge, Hayek contends that Sraffa has misunderstood the reasons why the 
consequences of forced saving are different from those of voluntary saving. He 
proceeds to an analysis of forced saving under the assumption that no new voluntary 
saving occurs so that the proportion between the demand for producers’ goods and 
the demand for consumers’ goods is “entirely determined by what is necessary to 
maintain the existing capital.”225 Under such conditions, when the proportion that 
can be spent on capital falls in virtue of the end of a credit expansion in the form of 
producers’ credits, and the incomes of the original factors of production have all 
risen in virtue of the previous inflation,  
the proportion which [entrepreneurs] are able to spend on capital goods 
must fall. This means, however, not only that they must stop adding to the 
existing capital, but also that they will be unable to maintain and replace all 
the capital which is the product of the forced saving. Except in so far as they 
are able, and find it profitable, to make up for this at the expense of their 
own increased income, they will be able to replace their capital only at the 
same rate as before the forced saving took place, and their capital will, 
therefore, be gradually worn down to something approaching its former 
state.226 
In short, Hayek argues, at least part of the capital created by forced saving will be 
destroyed once the inflation slows. It is important to note that this, in essence, is a 
concession of Sraffa’s central point that Hayek has not proven that the capital 
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created by forced saving must soon or later be destroyed. “I have, of course,” Hayek 
indicates in a footnote, “never said, as Mr. Sraffa suggests…that the banks cannot 
cause any accumulation of capital.”227 Be that as it may, the implication is certainly 
present in Prices and Production that capital destruction due to the end of forced saving 
will be both severe and deleterious; it doesn’t sound nearly as scary to be told that 
such capital will be destroyed “at least partly.”228  
 In any case, with respect to Sraffa’s claim that Hayek’s analyses of the 
different effects of producers’ and consumers’ credits are inconsistent, Hayek argues 
that it is not a  
contradiction to say that an inflation for productive purposes will cause little 
permanent increase of capital, while an inflation for consumptive purposes will 
actually cause a consumption of capital. The fact is simply this, that any 
increase of incomes paid for consumptive purposes relatively to the sums 
available for productive purposes, will tend to decrease the “purchasing 
power” of these sums (i.e., the purchasing power of money-capital); and that, 
whereas in the former case, where the relative rise of incomes follows only a 
preceding rise in the demand for capital goods, only part of the capital 
created by the inflation is destroyed again, in the latter case, the destruction 
of capital is not offset by any preceding gain.229 
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 With respect to Sraffa’s criticism of his use of the concept of a money rate of 
interest which is different from the “equilibrium” rate, Hayek notes that it is “a 
concept which [his theory] has in common with the theories of a number of other 
contemporary writers.”230 Otherwise, Hayek largely concedes the point that there 
might be many “natural” rates in a barter economy, perhaps one for every 
commodity; however, “I think it would be truer to say that, in this situation, there 
would be no single rate which, applied to all commodities, would satisfy the conditions 
of equilibrium rates, but there might, at any moment, be as many ‘natural’ rates of 
interest as there are commodities, all of which would be equilibrium rates.”231 
Otherwise, Hayek does not specifically address the point that he could only carry on 
with the “natural” rate construct if he were to accept the introduction of composite 
variables into his explanatory scheme. 
Sraffa’s brief rejoinder, which appears alongside Hayek’s reply in the June 
1932 edition of the Economic Journal, adds little to his previous complaints beyond the 
point, offered in response to Hayek’s attempt to again establish the deleterious 
effects of forced saving, that, the new money injected into the economic system, far 
from eventually raising incomes across the structure of production and thereby 
contributing to a destruction of “at least part” of the capital created by the inflation, 
will – on Hayek’s own assumptions – be completely absorbed in the cash holdings of 
the new stages of the extended structure of production. “Let me remind him,” Sraffa 
writes,  
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that he has assumed…that capital will be accumulated in proportion to the 
quantity of money issued in the form of loans to producers; that the number 
of stages of production will increase in proportion to the quantity of capital; 
that the quantity of payments to be made will increase in proportion to the 
number of stages: As a result, the quantity of payments to be made increases 
in proportion to the quantity of money, and the whole of the additional 
money is absorbed in cash holdings for performing such payments.232 
 Over the course of the next several years, the theory of Prices and Production 
became the focus of considerable criticism from other prominent economists—John 
Hicks, Frank Knight, and Gunnar Myrdal (with whom Hayek would eventually share 
the 1974 Nobel Prize) among them. Much of this criticism centered around Hayek’s 
theory of capital and the use to which it was put in his analysis of the trade cycle. 
Hayek’s reaction was to retrench and reconstruct the theory of capital upon more 
solid foundations than those he inherited from Bohm-Bawerk, Wicksell, and Mises. 
It would be an arduous task, and one with which the results of which Hayek was 
never satisfied. Moreover, the ultimate goal of integrating this new theory with the 
other required elements in a more comprehensive explanation of the trade cycle was 
never completed by Hayek. By the time that Hayek’s Pure Theory of Capital233 – in 
which he attempts to describe the processes of capital creation and destruction in 
more detail than had theretofore been attempted – appeared in 1941, the world was 
at war, and few paid attention. Moreover, by 1941, the economics profession had 
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started to come under the sway of Keynes’ General Theory, and the long process of 
transition from earlier modes of thought known as the “Keynesian revolution” was 
under way.  
5 Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) 
The central thesis of Keynes’ General Theory is that, in the absence of countervailing 
influences, the market economy tends to equilibrate at a level of less-than-full 
employment. Keynes defends this view partially by way of criticism of competing 
approaches, namely, the “classical,” and, in a few places, the “neoclassical” schools 
of economics. Keynes identifies Hayek and economists influenced by Wicksell234 
with the latter school and the economists of the British tradition, i.e., Mill, Marshall, 
and (especially) Keynes’ Cambridge colleague Pigou with the former.  
According to the classical school, Keynes argues, the forces of the free 
market tend to ensure equilibrium at a point of full employment; persistent involuntary 
unemployment is impossible.235 If (real) wages are too high and unemployment 
                                                 
234 Keynes offers little sustained criticism of Wicksellian economics in The General 
Theory; his objections more often take the form of critical digressions from the main 
argument. In Chapter 7, Keynes objects to the notion that saving and investment can 
diverge, thereby rejecting the possibility of forced saving (Keynes [1936] 1973, 81-
85). Keynes denies the usefulness of the concept of the “natural rate of interest” 
(Ibid., 243). He further rejects the Austrian theory of capital, with its conception of 
roundabout production processes (Ibid., 213-217), as well as the related treatment of 
interest as the factor that coordinates intertemporal production and consumption 
decisions (Ibid., 192-193). 
 
235 It may be more accurate to say, “According to the arguments Keynes attributes to 
the classical school…” It is a long-standing objection to the General Theory that 
Keynes’ arguments don’t address the classical theory properly understood, but only a 
straw man. See, e.g., Schumpeter (1954, 1179):  
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appears, then production shifts to less labor-intensive methods, which raises the 
costs of the non-labor factors of production relative to the costs of labor, making 
labor-intensive methods of production comparatively more attractive, production 
shifts in the direction of these methods, and unemployment disappears. Voilà!  
Keynes argues that the latter theory of employment is based on two 
fundamental postulates. The first postulate, which he accepts, determines the 
demand for labor and states that wages equal the marginal product of labor, i.e., that 
“the wage of an employed person is equal to the value which would be lost if 
employment were to be reduced by one unit.”236 The second postulate, which is 
supposed to determine the supply of labor, states that the real wage of a worker is 
equal to the marginal disutility of labor. This Keynes rejects for two reasons: he 
argues that labor is not typically withdrawn in the event of a general rise in prices 
(equivalent to a fall in real wages) so long as money wages remain unchanged237; 
further, Keynes argues, it is not true, as the classical school implicitly assumes, that 
the “wage bargain” between labor and entrepreneurs determines the level of real 
wages, i.e., it is false that workers are able to dictate their real wages by adjusting their 
demands for money wages.238 
                                                                                                                                     
The arguments Keynes set forth against what he conceived to be the classical 
theory (in his sense) are entirely irrelevant against any correct statement of 
the full-employment equilibrium theory and his indictment that the classical 
theory knows no unemployment except a frictional one is true only if 
frictional is defined so widely as to rob the indictment of all significance. 
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True enough, the theory of unemployment of the classical school, as Keynes 
describes it, leaves room for the appearance of both frictional unemployment, as 
workers move between jobs, and voluntary unemployment, as a consequence of 
workers who opt to remain jobless rather than accept the prevailing wage, but the 
classical image of the economy leaves no room for involuntary unemployment, i.e., in 
Keynes peculiar phrasing, unemployment that arises when, “in the event of a small 
rise in the price of wage-goods relatively to the money wage, both the aggregate 
supply of labour willing to work for the current money-wage and the aggregate 
demand for it at that wage would be greater than the existing volume of 
employment.”239 On Keynes, picture, in short, there is involuntary unemployment if 
a small price-induced reduction in real wages encourages both employers to demand 
more labor and workers to supply it; consequently, there is full employment at that 
level of output where this condition is absent. In a monetary economy, Keynes 
argues, there is no fundamental mechanism that ensures the market’s tendency 
toward equilibrium at a level of full employment; the market can and does equilibrate 
in the presence of involuntary unemployment.  
Keynes’ explanation is directed toward the determination of the volume of 
employment. The theory itself – not to say the reasoning behind it – is simply stated 
in a number of places in the book.240 According to Keynes in The General Theory, 
given a particular state of resources, equipment, technology, and costs, the 
community’s income (Y) is a function of the volume of employment (N). The 
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proportion of the community’s income that it spends on consumption depends on a 
psychological factor – the propensity to consume (D1 rewritten as χ(N)); assuming the 
latter remains constant, consumption depends on the level of income, and so, on the 
volume of employment. The latter is determined by the expectations of 
entrepreneurs both with respect to the community’s intended consumption (i.e., D1) 
and their own plans for investment (D2). The sum of the community’s consumption 
and the entrepreneur’s investment is the effective demand (D). In equilibrium, effective 
(or aggregate) demand equals aggregate supply (Φ): “Hence, the volume of 
employment in equilibrium depends on (i) the aggregate supply function, Φ, (ii) the 
propensity to consume, χ, and (iii) the volume of investment, D2. This is the essence 
of the General Theory of Employment.”241  
For every level of employment, Keynes argues, there is a particular marginal 
productivity of labor. Given that the latter determines the real wage, it follows that 
the level of employment cannot be greater than the figure that reduces the real wage 
to the marginal disutility of labor, and thus, that “the supply of labor available at a 
given real wage sets a maximum level of employment.”242  
Perhaps the central assumption in Keynes’ argument is that when 
employment increases, both consumption and effective demand increase, but the 
former less than the latter; that is, that the result of a rise in an individual’s income 
tends to be that she consumes a smaller proportion of it: “The key to our practical 
problem is to be found in this psychological law.” 
                                                 
241 Ibid., 28-29 
 
242 Ibid., 30 
  120 
For it follows from this that the greater the volume of employment the 
greater will be the gap between the aggregate supply price (Z) of the 
corresponding output and the sum (D1) which the entrepreneurs can expect 
to get back out of the expenditure of consumers. Hence, if there is no change 
in the propensity to consume, employment cannot increase, unless at the 
same time D2 is increasing so as to fill the increasing gap between Z and D1. 
Thus—except on the special assumptions of the classical theory according to 
which there is some force in operation which, when employment increases, 
always causes D2 to increase sufficiently to fill the widening gap between Z 
and D1—the economic system may find itself in stable equilibrium with N at 
a level below full employment…If the propensity to consume and the rate of 
new investment result in a deficient effective demand, the actual level of 
employment will fall short of the supply of labour potentially available at the 
existing real wage, and the equilibrium real wage will be greater than the 
marginal disutility of the equilibrium level of employment.243  
In a bit plainer language, the upshot of Keynes’ theory is that involuntary 
unemployment arises when aggregate demand is insufficient to absorb the output 
available, i.e., when there is a “gap” between output and what is consumed, which 
leads to unsold goods and, thus, moving forward, less-than-potential output, and 
unnecessarily high unemployment.244  
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On Keynes’ picture, full employment requires that the level of investment be 
sufficient to absorb all of the unconsumed income paid out to wage-earners, i.e., D2 
must fill the gap between Z and D1. The level of investment, according to Keynes, is 
determined by the intersection of the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital 
with the interest rate. The marginal efficiency of capital is a psychological factor 
determined by expectations of the yield of a particular capital asset relative to its 
replacement cost.245 The rate of interest,246 Keynes argues, is determined jointly by 
the quantity of money (which is taken to be an exogenous policy variable determined 
by the central bank) and the function of liquidity preference, which is another 
psychological factor determined by the public’s preference to hold a particular 
proportion of the part of its income that it does not consume in liquid (i.e., cash and 
its equivalents) rather than interest-bearing assets. The extent to which investment is 
able to fill the gap between output and demand is thus determined by two 
endogenous factors – the marginal efficiency of capital and the community’s liquidity 
preference – and one exogenous variable, the quantity of money. It follows that the 
route to full employment involves the effective manipulation of these factors. 
Keynes’ discussion of the trade cycle in The General Theory, such as it is, 
appears as a series of “Notes” in chapter 22, and, given the loose form of 
presentation, should likely not be taken to constitute a full-fledged explanation of the 
cycle so much as a series of hints suggested by Keynes’ theory of employment. Here 
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Keynes attributes the cycle primarily to fluctuations in the marginal efficiency of 
capital, “though complicated and often aggravated by associated changes in the other 
significant short-period variables of the economic system.”247 The basic idea is that as 
the public’s expectations with respect to the future – their “animal spirits”248 – wax 
and wane, so too do expectations with respect to the future yields of particular 
capital assets relative to their replacement costs, i.e., the marginal efficiency of 
capital, and, as this factor fluctuates, so too does the capacity for investment to close 
the breach between output and consumption. Ceteris paribus, pessimistic (optimistic) 
public spirit means a fall (rise) in the marginal efficiency of capital, a concomitant fall 
(rise) in investment, and the widening (closing) of the output gap. 
When consumption falls short of output, thereby indicating less-than-full 
investment, there are a number of steps that the government can take to stimulate 
the respective factors influencing investment. If less money is spent than is necessary 
to sell all of the goods available, then either the central bank can increase the quantity 
of money in circulation, thereby lowering interest rates and encouraging income-
earners to save less and consume more (and, conversely, encouraging entrepreneurs 
to invest more), or the government can spend directly on fiscal projects, i.e., “public 
works.”  
The effects of these stimulus measures, as postulated by Keynes, are twofold. 
In the first place, by stimulating demand, they tend to raise prices, especially those of 
consumption goods. (Recall that Keynes definition is such that involuntary 
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unemployment disappears if, assuming no fall in money wages, real wages are 
brought down by an increase in the prices of consumption goods or “wage-goods,” 
in Keynes’ verbiage.) In the second place, they tend to directly bring about more 
employment, and in subsequent periods, as the newly employed spend their incomes, 
yet more employment. According to Keynes, such government “investment” 
translates into increased income for labor, which workers spend (in part) on 
consumption, thereby stimulating further production, more income, further 
spending, and so on. In short, the initial round of government stimulus sets in 
motion a series of events, the net effect of which is a total increase in economic 
activity that is posited to be a multiple, greater than unity, of the original stimulus 
amount. This is the fundamental idea behind Keynes’ investment multiplier, a concept 
borrowed from Circus member Richard Kahn and subsequently modified to fit 
Keynes’ unique approach, and defined as a function of the community’s marginal 
propensity to consume. 
With respect to the objectives and methods of government administration of 
the economy relative to the trade cycle, Keynes argues that  
the remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a lower rate of 
interest! For that may enable the so-called boom to last. The right remedy for 
the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us 
permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us 
permanently in a quasi-boom.”249  
                                                 
249 Ibid., 322 
 
  124 
And later, he adds, “The State will have to exercise a guiding influence on the 
propensity to consume partly through its scheme of taxation, partly by fixing the rate 
of interest, and partly, perhaps, in other ways.250  
 For whatever reason – and he offered many different and not entirely 
consistent reasons over the subsequent decades – Hayek’s pen fell silent in the wake 
of the publication of The General Theory.251 There would be no scathing disassembling 
by Hayek of Keynes’ latest book in the pages of Economica; and the heavyweight bout 
between the two principals would feature no rematch. 
6 Concluding Remarks: The Terms of the Debate  
The goal of this chapter has been to uncover the differences between Hayek and 
Keynes that inform their famous debate over business cycle theory. We first 
considered Hayek’s early writings on the business cycle, which provide the basis of 
his attack on Keynes’ Treatise. In turn, we considered the theory of the latter book, 
Hayek’s criticism of it, and Keynes’ response to this criticism. We also considered 
the objections of Cambridge Circus member Piero Sraffa to Hayek’s Prices and 
Production, as well as Keynes’ masterpiece The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money. Now is the time to take inventory. 
Once one gets past the verbal quibbles and manifest confusion, Hayek’s 
objections to the theory of the Treatise –– add up to three main points, all of which 
are echoes of previous criticisms that Hayek offered against earlier 
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underconsumptionist theories of industrial fluctuations. In the first place, Hayek is 
opposed to any attempt to explain the activities of monetary economies without 
resort to a capital-theoretic basis. Capital theory, he admits, is not a finished product 
and is not, in its given state, entirely adequate to the task, but that is no justification 
for ignoring capital’s role entirely; its role in monetary economics is too essential. 
Moreover, the shortcomings of the existing capital theory concern its failure to 
adequately capture the fundamental heterogeneity of capital phenomena. Thus, the 
next step in capital theory is likely to involve a shift away from the relatively simple 
account of the Austrian theory and toward a more complex explanation. Hayek 
ultimately objects to both Keynes’ reticence to confront these problems directly and, 
relatedly, his choice to treat capital-goods as homogenous.252 
Secondly, Hayek rejects any explanation of the presence of unused resources 
that assumes the phenomenon it intends to explain. The only legitimate way to 
explain the appearance of unemployment is to start from a point where it is absent; 
this essentially reduces to a requirement that such an explanation start from a 
position of economic equilibrium with full employment.  
Finally, Hayek rejects any explanation that runs in terms of composite and 
aggregate variables, especially, the notion of the “general level of prices”; this 
method obscures the phenomenon – the relations between particular prices – which 
Hayek argues are central to an understanding of industrial fluctuations; economic 
aggregates and composites possess no causal efficacy, thus, whatever correlations 
might be established between them using the methods of statistics must be spurious. 
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All of this said, it is important to recognize that the latter two complaints are 
images of the first. Hayek’s insistence on an equilibrium framework is a consequence 
of his belief that appending a theory of capital, including a proper explanation of the 
rate of interest, to equilibrium theory, is essential for an explanation of saving and 
investment in a money-using economy. Moreover, Hayek’s notion of equilibrium 
must be understood in an intertemporal sense, i.e., equilibrium obtains when a 
sustainable proportion exists between the demand for producers’ goods relative to 
the demand for consumers’ goods, and this picture of equilibrium is nonsensical 
without Austrian capital theory according to which production is a time-consuming 
process guided largely by changes in the interest rate. Similarly, Hayek’s rejection of 
the price-level notion is a consequence of his belief that the effects of monetary 
changes upon relative prices are the interesting phenomena, where the relevant price 
relations are those of the intermediate products of successive stages of the structure 
of production. Thus, Hayek’s subsidiary complaints are really just reflections of the 
primordial difference separating his approach from Keynes’, namely, the emphasis 
on capital’s role – more precisely, changes in the structure of production – in 
explaining industrial fluctuations. 
 Of course, as we have seen, Hayek’s insistence on the importance of capital 
theory failed to impress Keynes. Ideally, yes, Keynes argues, monetary theory should 
be built upon a capital-theoretic foundation, but extant capital theory is unfinished 
and inadequate; in any case, Keynes argues, capital’s role is not all that essential to 
the really interesting problems anyway. What’s more, as Sraffa’s review of Prices and 
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Production shows, Hayek’s capital theory is flawed and may not do all of the work that 
Hayek claims.  
It is little surprise then, that, rather than convincing Keynes, Hayek’s 
criticisms seem to have had almost precisely the opposite effect. Indeed, with respect 
to all of Hayek’s main criticisms, Keynes moves, in The General Theory, further away 
from Hayek’s position: there is less discussion of capital theory in the latter book 
than in the Treatise; moreover, far from starting from a position of equilibrium with 
full employment, The General Theory assumes that unemployment is the normal state 
of the economy and seeks the factors that account for changes in its level; related to 
this, as much as his previous book, Keynes’ General Theory runs in terms of aggregates 
(the levels of “employment,” “output,” “consumption,” “investment,” “government 
expenditure,” etc) and composites (Hayek’s dreaded “price-level”).  
 Thus, it seems that the Hayek-Keynes debate amounts to a disagreement 
about the need to explain fluctuations in industrial activity on the basis of capital 
theory. Hicks’ question – “Which was right?” – reduces to the question whether is it 
better to proceed on the basis of an inadequate capital theory or none at all. 
However, while this may do justice to the details of the debate between Hayek and 
Keynes, it says little about the broader context of the dispute and the respective 
purposes served by the theories of the principals. For it is absolutely essential to keep 
in mind just what Hayek’s approach – with its emphasis on the structure of 
production and the coordinating role of the rate of interest – allows him to show, 
namely, that saving and not consumption is the ultimate driver of economic growth, 
and that it is only when consumption decisions are allowed to get out of gear with 
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saving decisions that negative consequences follow; a point, it must be said, which is 
hard to make without some framework like that provided by the theory of capital 
Hayek inherited from his Austrian predecessors. Conversely, by largely ignoring the 
role of capital and focusing on the relations between aggregates and composites, 
Keynes is able to show that consumption drives economic activity and that increased 
saving is deleterious; a point which – again, it must be said – would be hard to prove 
on the basis of Austrian capital theory. So it is that understanding the terms of the 
Hayek-Keynes debate – the subject of subsequent business cycle theorists’ 
“footnotes” – requires not merely appreciating their respective arguments 
concerning particular assumptions, but also recognizing where these assumptions 
lead, namely, to fundamentally different conceptions of the operation of market 
economies.  
The next issue to consider concerns whether consensus is possible with 
respect to Hicks’ question, and thus, more broadly, with respect to these competing 
visions of the economy, and, in particular, the extent to which the choice between 
the theories of Hayek and Keynes is – indeed, can be – guided by empirical evidence. 
It is to this problem that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDERDETERMINATION AND THE HAYEK-KEYNES DEBATE 
The goal of the present chapter is to articulate the various respects in which the 
choice between the theories of Hayek and Keynes253 is underdetermined by the 
empirical evidence. This requires specifying the observable implications of each 
theory, i.e., what the evidence would look like were one or the other theory right (or 
wrong). It also requires uncovering any strategies that are available to protect each 
theory from what appears to be falsifying evidence. Only if there is some bit of 
possible evidence that favors one theory rather than the other is there any reason to 
think that the Hayek-Keynes debate is empirically tractable. 
 The present chapter considers these matters from the perspective of the 
current (Summer 2012) global, but primarily American, economic context. It may 
seem queer in a paper that addresses philosophical issues in economic science to deal 
directly with the passing events of the real world; traditional philosophers don’t 
typically get their hands mucked in terra firma. But such is the course of recent 
economic history that it provides a convenient and familiar perspective from which 
to explicate the relevant theoretical issues.  
Moreover, it has been suggested that the so-called “Great Recession” 
amounts to a natural-experimental test of the theses of the Hayek-Keynes debate.254 
However, if the arguments of the present chapter are sound, it is absurd to believe 
that there could ever be a test the empirical results of which would favor one and not 
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rather than the theory of the Treatise. 
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the other; and this not so much, as the reader might expect, because of the manifest 
difficulties of interpreting the results of natural experiments, but because there are 
lacunae in both theoretical frameworks that make it convenient to pardon any 
threatening evidence. The choice between the two theories is underdetermined not 
(only) because of the idiosyncrasies of natural experiments, but because the theories 
of Hayek and Keynes leave the predictive possibilities wide open. 
1 Keynes’ Theory and Holist Underdetermination 
What does Keynes’ theory imply about the events of the Great Recession? A simple 
explanation according to The General Theory might go something like this: the ongoing 
recession255 is an indication of a shortfall in aggregate demand: sometime in or 
around 2005, a gap arose between output and the total sum spent by consumers, 
entrepreneurs, and government. The ultimate source of the gap could lie in any 
combination of changes in the expenditures of the latter three groups; however, 
Keynes’, in his discussion of the trade cycle in The General Theory, suggests that the 
ultimate cause of recessions typically resides in a fall in the schedule of the marginal 
efficiency of capital, which discourages private investment, and thereby creates a gap 
between output and aggregate demand. Moreover, the economy has not returned to 
full employment in the years since 2005 because the gap has never been properly 
closed. The total sum spent by consumers, investors, and government continues to 
fall short of output.  
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economy with an 8.2% unemployment rate (June 2012), given the historical trend of 
American unemployment, to be in recession; arbitrary statistical definitions of 
recessions be damned.  
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What’s more, since, according to The General Theory, there is no natural 
mechanism that ensures that output and aggregate demand reach equilibrium at a 
level of full employment, the output gap is likely to remain until and unless the 
respective psychological considerations that determine the marginal propensity to 
consume and the marginal efficiency of capital spontaneously turn cheerful; more 
likely though, the government will have to endeavor to close the gap either by the 
adoption of monetary measures that encourage a sanguine turn in the psychological 
factors relevant to consumption and investment or by its own expenditure on fiscal 
projects. Simply put, an appropriate combination of fiscal and monetary policies, 
prudently designed, implemented, and administered, can serve to fill the gap between 
output and aggregate demand. 
We can summarize the observable implications of Keynes’ theory in terms of 
what the evidence would look like if the theory is right (and what it would look like if 
it is wrong). If The General Theory is correct, then full employment will be obtained – 
i.e., the gap between output and aggregate demand will be closed – if and only if the 
combined application of fiscal and monetary stimulus is both sufficiently large and 
adequately designed, implemented, and administered. More generally, we might say that 
Keynes’ theory predicts that the level of involuntary unemployment that results from 
any political effort to reduce it is determined by the extent of the size (in monetary 
terms) and adequacy of the political means adopted. Of course, conversely, if this 
prediction is false, then Keynes’ theory is incorrect.  
But the question that immediately arises, given our purposes in the present 
essay, is: can this implication be tested against the empirical evidence? It is certainly 
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not the case that the implementation of just any old stimulus program constitutes a 
test of the implications of Keynes’ theory. Even if we otherwise accept Keynes’ 
account, we should expect only those political measures to lower the level of 
involuntary unemployment that are both large enough to do so and not spoiled by 
inadequacies of either design, implementation, or administration256—but, which are 
these?  
Consider the illustration provided by certain recent economic events. One 
might be tempted to think that the observable implications of Keynes’ theory have 
recently been tested and failed. The American government has passed two fiscal 
stimulus packages since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008: one during the 
waning days of the Bush administration and another in the first year of the Obama 
administration; moreover, the Federal Reserve has maintained an easy money policy 
intended to encourage consumption and investment since the end of the housing 
bubble in 2005—aren’t these just the sorts of policies that Keynes advocates in The 
General Theory as a means of reducing involuntary unemployment and doesn’t the fact 
that these policies do not seem to have substantially positively affected the level of 
unemployment prove that Keynes was wrong? What, if anything, is problematic about 
the inference from the failure of these policies to contribute to full(er) employment 
to the failure of Keynes’ theory?  
                                                 
256 Testing Keynes’ theory in practice might require knowledge of circumstances 
other than just knowledge of the adequacy of both the magnitude and bureaucratic 
aspects of a stimulus program. For example, it is not immediately obvious that 
Keynes’ definition of involuntary unemployment (see page 118 above) distinguishes 
it from voluntary unemployment sufficiently for the purposes of practical testing. 
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One problem with this inference is a particular consequence of a general and 
infamous methodological predicament: the implications of The General Theory do not 
confront experience in isolation. What meets experience are the implications of 
Keynes’ theory plus particular stimulus policies (and numerous implicit subsidiary 
assumptions). If a stimulus measure fails to produce the results postulated by 
Keynes, the failure need not be ascribed to the theory, but can be attributed to 
inadequacies in these other elements – typically, to flaws in the particular program 
enacted – instead. In other words, if a particular stimulus program fails to lower the 
level of involuntary unemployment, it can be claimed without inconsistency that 
either a larger or better designed, implemented, and administered stimulus program would have 
worked where the actual one failed.  
It may seem reasonable to believe that we could approach a consensus if only 
we could put a finer point on the twin notions of both what makes a stimulus 
measure large enough and what counts as the proper design, implementation, and 
administration of such a program. In other words, if The General Theory implied 
something substantive about what constitutes both a sufficiently large quantity of 
economic stimulus and a properly designed, implemented, and administered stimulus 
program, then we might be in a better position to test Keynes’ theory. If Keynes’ 
theory implied, e.g., that a government stimulus package of $X implemented using 
methods A, B, and C will lower the level of involuntary unemployment to Y, then 
the failure of such a prediction would seem, at least at first glance, to provide 
evidence of the falsity of Keynes’ theory. We could then implement an economic 
stimulus of $X with methods A, B, and C and see whether the level of involuntary 
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unemployment falls to Y. However, it is important to recognize that, even if we 
possessed such a precisified implication, we would still not be compelled by 
threatening evidence to ascribe the failure of such an implication to Keynes’ theory: 
what counts as both a sufficiently large economic stimulus program and a properly, 
designed, implemented, and administered one is unspecified by Keynes; nothing 
specific with respect to the required size and / or appropriate political instruments of 
economic stimulus is implied by The General Theory. Thus, there is no stimulus 
program the apparent failure of which compels the rejection of Keynes’ theory. 
In order to see this, it helps to consider certain aspects of The General Theory 
in more detail. Recall that the concept of the investment multiplier is supposed to do 
the work with respect to the required size of a stimulus package. That is, according 
to Keynes, government stimulus sets in motion a series of events, the net effect of 
which is a total increase in economic activity that is a greater-than-unity multiple of 
the original stimulus amount. In order to enact a stimulus program that is large 
enough to narrow a particular output gap, we need to know both the extent of the 
shortfall in aggregate demand and the value of the multiplier. Keynes argues in The 
General Theory that the value of the multiplier is a function of the relevant 
community’s marginal propensity to consume (MPC). Numerous statistical 
investigations have been made to determine the value of the MPC at various places 
and times. However, whatever the scientific value of these statistical inquiries, they 
are ultimately independent of Keynes’ theory of the investment multiplier. The 
failure of a stimulus program predicated on a statistical analysis of some community’s 
MPC does not necessarily reflect poorly on Keynes: such failure might be attributed 
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instead to shortcomings in either the relevant data used to estimate MPC or the 
particular statistical methods applied to them.257  
In other words, if we statistically estimate the value of the multiplier in a 
particular community and otherwise properly design, implement, and administer a 
stimulus program on the basis of this estimate, and the posited results fail to 
materialize, it can always be argued that this is due not to shortcomings in Keynes’ 
theory of the multiplier, but to the particular estimate of its value in the given 
                                                 
257 According to Keynes’ most prominent mid-century American defender, Alvin 
Hansen, the apparent failure of the multiplier to produce the results posited by 
Keynes might also be attributed to “leakages”:  
 
Among the most important of these leakages are the following: (1) a part of 
the increment of income is used to pay off debts; (2) a part is saved in the 
form of idle bank deposits; (3) a part is invested in securities purchased from 
others, who in turn fail to spend the proceeds; (4) a part is spent on imports, 
which does not help home employment; (5) a part of the purchases is 
supplied from excess stocks of consumers’ goods, which may not be 
replaced. By reason of leakages of this sort, the employment process peters 
out after awhile. (Hansen 1953, 89-90) 
 
Hansen also lists other “offsetting factors which may nullify (or intensify) the 
original impetus” from an increment of additional investment: 
 
The method of financing the public works may raise the rate of interest and 
so retard private investment…An increase in public works might raise the 
cost of capital goods and so affect private investment unfavorably. In 
addition, the government program might affect ‘confidence’ unfavourably 
and so curtail investment. Also, public capital expenditures in an open 
economy might create a demand for foreign materials and equipment and so 
help employment abroad rather than at home. (Ibid., 104) 
 
Hansen concludes that these offsetting factors “must all be taken into account in 
appraising the net effect of a given increment of public or private investment” (Ibid.). 
However, taking such factors into account requires some guidance on how to 
identify their offsetting influence, which neither Keynes nor Hansen provides. 
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context.258 Indeed, it is worth noting that Keynes himself appears to do precisely this 
in The General Theory: 
It should not be difficult to compile a chart of the marginal propensity to 
consume at each stage of a trade cycle from the statistics (if they were 
available) of aggregate income and aggregate investment at successive dates. 
At present, however, our statistics are not accurate enough (or compiled 
sufficiently with this specific object in view) to allow us to infer more than 
highly approximate estimates. The best for the purpose, of which I am aware, 
are Mr. [Simon] Kuznets figures for the United States…though they are, 
nevertheless, very precarious. Taken in conjunction with estimates of 
national income these suggest, for what they are worth, both a lower figure 
and a more stable figure for the investment multiplier than I should have 
                                                 
258 I have yet to mention Keynes’ concept of the liquidity trap, a notion that further 
confounds the evaluation of the implications of The General Theory. Keynes argues 
that a situation can arise in which monetary policy is powerless to stimulate the 
economy. Such a circumstance arises in Keynes’ framework when the demand for 
money becomes infinitely elastic (i.e., the money demand curve becomes horizontal), 
an indication that expansion of the money supply will not lower the interest rate and, 
therefore, will not serve to stimulate spending and investment. However, the shape 
and position of the money demand curve is not directly observable; without a 
statement of some observable conditions that constitute a liquidity trap, we have no 
way of identifying one. It doesn’t suffice to assert that a liquidity trap exists if and 
only if a particular monetary injection fails to lower the interest rate: the same 
consequence would follow if an expanded money supply were to be compensated by 
a spontaneous commensurate rightward shift in a downward-sloping money demand 
function. And for the same reasons mentioned in the text immediately above, 
statistical estimates of a particular money demand function cannot compel a decision 
with respect to the presence or absence of a liquidity trap: given an estimate of a 
downward-sloping money demand function, the subsequent failure of monetary 
stimulus to lower the interest rate might be ascribed to shortcomings in the particular 
estimate; and the same can be said for the conjunction of an estimate of a horizontal 
demand function and a successful monetary stimulus. There is no evidence that 
compels the rejection of the liquidity trap concept.  
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expected. If single years are taken in isolation, the results look rather wild. But 
if they are grouped in pairs, the multiplier seems to have been less than 3 and 
probably fairly stable in the neighbourhood of 2.5. This suggests a marginal 
propensity to consume not exceeding 60 to 70 percent—a figure quite 
plausible for the boom, but surprisingly, and, in my judgment, implausibly low 
for the slump. It is possible, however, that the extreme conservatism of 
corporate finance in the United States, even during the slump, may account 
for it. In other words, if, when investment is falling heavily through a failure 
to undertake repairs and replacements, financial provision is made, 
nevertheless, in respect of such wastage, the effect is to prevent the rise in 
the marginal propensity to consume which would have occurred otherwise. I 
suspect that this factor may have played a significant part in aggravating the 
degree of the recent slump in the United States. On the other hand, it is 
possible that the statistics somewhat overstate the decline in investment…a moderate 
change in these estimates being capable of making a substantial difference to 
the multiplier.259 [Italics added] 
Parsing this passage is a challenge: Keynes begins by arguing that the available 
statistics aren’t accurate enough to infer more than approximate estimates of the 
relevant values (MPC, and consequently, the multiplier), but then he proceeds to 
infer rather precise estimates from “precarious” data. The estimates that accord with 
his theoretical hunches are deemed “quite plausible,” while others are “improbably 
low.” With respect to the latter, Keynes offers two possible explanations for the 
                                                 
259 Keynes ([1936] 1973, 128) 
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apparent failure of his theory to accord with the data: either American corporate 
practices are to blame or the statistics are wrong. Indeed, every possibility is 
considered but that the theory is wrong.  
At the same time, what Keynes says about the various methods of stimulus 
design, implementation, and administration does not suffice to license the more precisified 
implication stated above. In The General Theory, Keynes argues that monetary 
methods alone are unlikely to suffice to close an output gap, and thus, that fiscal 
methods are likely required as well; however, he offers no specific guidance with 
respect to adequate modes of design, implementation, and administration of stimulus 
programs.260 There is an infinite variety of such modes and there is no reason to 
think that they are all equally effective at lowering the level of involuntary 
unemployment. Though Keynes sometimes speaks in The General Theory as though 
any method will have some positive effect on unemployment, his rather off-the-cuff 
comments in this regard should probably not be taken too seriously.261 One can 
easily imagine a stimulus program the effectiveness of which we’d have every reason 
to doubt in advance. Secretly scuttling a treasure ship carrying billions of dollars in 
booty in the Marianas Trench in the hope that consumers and investors will discover 
the treasure and put it to work is probably a bad way to stimulate the economy; one 
could not legitimately infer the failure of Keynes’ theory on the basis of the failure of 
such a stimulus program.  
                                                 
260 “It would need a volume of a different character from this one to indicate even in 
outline the practical measures in which [Keynes’ policy recommendations] might be 
gradually clothed” (Ibid., 383).  
 
261See, e.g., Ibid., 129  
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Thus, if we take Keynes at his word when he appears to assert that any 
stimulus measure whatever will have some positive effect on the level of 
unemployment, then he – and the theory that supports such a claim – is simply 
wrong. However, best philosophical practices require that we interpret Keynes more 
charitably than this. Unfortunately for Keynes, because he provides little further 
comment from which one might infer criteria of the adequate design, 
implementation, and administration of a stimulus program, there is no way to know 
whether a particular policy measure constitutes a natural-experimental test of 
Keynes’ theory. 
In essence, because of these twin lacunae in Keynes’ theory, one cannot infer 
the failure of Keynes’ theory on the basis of the apparent failure of any stimulus 
program. It can always be claimed without inconsistency that another stimulus policy 
would have worked where some actual one appeared to fail. One cannot infer from 
Keynes’ comments in The General Theory either what it means for a stimulus package 
to be sufficiently large or specific details of legitimate modes of stimulus distribution. 
Thus, though we are free to qualify the implications of Keynes’ theory to make them 
more precise in the way suggested above, any such qualifications must come from 
outside Keynes’ theory. This means that the apparent failure of such an implication need 
not threaten Keynes. The defense can always be offered in the face of an apparent 
predictive failure that the auxiliary elements of the prediction went awry and that, 
since these elements form no part of Keynes’ theory, the latter is unscathed by the 
seemingly threatening evidence.  
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In short, it is not Keynes’ theory that gets falsified by the evidence, but only 
constellations that include both Keynes’ theory and beliefs about the effects of 
particular stimulus policies, and should any such “web of belief” be threatened by the 
available evidence, one can get to an unthreatened constellation by making the 
necessary adjustments, not to Keynes’ theory, but to beliefs about the effects of 
particular stimulus policies. Thus, the rational response to an apparent 
disconfirmation of Keynes’ theory is underdetermined in the holist sense.  
2 Hayek’s Theory and Holist Underdetermination 
According to Hayek’s picture of the business cycle, the Great Recession is a 
consequence of a divergence between the rate at which loans can be had and the 
equilibrium rate that would balance the volume of voluntary savings with that of 
investment. This divergence, which likely first arose during the initial years of the 
current century, especially after September 11, 2001, when the American Federal 
Reserve loosened monetary terms,262 encouraged excessive investments in industries 
– particularly in residential and commercial building construction – at the long end 
of the structure of production, which lead to a boom in these industries. However, 
because the rate of interest at which the relevant loans were made was not indicative 
of the demand that would be available for the products of these industries once they 
reached market – that is, because, once their incomes increased in virtue of the credit 
granted to producers, consumers attempted to reassert their prior demands for 
consumers’ goods – these investments were ultimately revealed to be unprofitable, 
                                                 
262 It could also be argued, with some reason, that the Federal Reserve’s easy credit 
stance has its source in actions taken as far back as 1994 to stem the effects of the 
Mexican peso crisis. 
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many were forced to either shut down or cutback production as a consequence, and 
the bust arrived.  
Moreover, full employment (i.e., equilibrium in Hayek’s sense) has not 
returned because, rather than allowing the structure of production to realign to the 
voluntary decisions of savers and investors, the central bank has continued to hold 
interest rates low in the hopes of stimulating the economy in a Keynesian fashion. 
Of course, according to Hayek’s theory, such credit expansion during a recession 
only prevents the realignment of the structure of production necessary for 
equilibrium; at worst, such measures contribute to further misalignments.  
 Again, we can summarize the observable implications of Hayek’s theory in 
terms of what the evidence would look like if the theory is right (and what the 
evidence would look like if it is wrong). If Hayek’s theory is correct, then, if the other 
assumptions of equilibrium theory obtain, keeping the interest rate on loans equal to 
the natural rate of interest is both necessary and sufficient to ensure that no boom-
bust cycle is ever set in motion; conversely, if either the assumptions of equilibrium 
theory do not hold or loans are made at a rate of interest below the natural rate, then 
within some unspecified timeframe an artificial and unsustainable lengthening of the 
structure of production occurs, which within some unspecified timeframe is reversed in the 
form of a bust, “crisis,” what have you; in other words, an artificial lengthening of 
the structure of production leads in the short-run to what appear to be positive 
effects, which are reversed in the long-run: boom is followed by bust. On the other 
hand, if Hayek’s theory is wrong, then either the boom-bust cycle is a feature even of 
those economies in which both the conditions of equilibrium theory hold and the 
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loan rate is set equal to the natural rate, or the trade cycle does not manifest where 
both of the latter conditions do not obtain.  
  Of course, the difficulties in evaluating Hayek’s theory begin at the 
beginning, so to speak. As Hayek himself notes,263 the natural rate of interest is not 
observable in economic systems that feature fractional-reserve banking. Banks 
(central or otherwise) can never know whether their activities constitute credit 
expansion; they never know in fact whether the current loan rate is below, above, or 
at par with the rate that would obtain in a possible world, distinct from our own, in 
which everything is as it is in this world except that banks hold full reserves and the 
conditions of equilibrium theory obtain. It cannot be known whether the current rate 
of interest on loans is encouraging an artificial lengthening or shortening of, or is 
neutral with respect to, the structure of production. In short, it’s not possible to 
decide on the basis of the observable evidence the truth of the biconditional “the 
trade cycle appears if and only if the structure of production is artificially 
lengthened.”  
Now, this latter difficulty can be set aside in principle. On the assumption 
that the natural rate remains relatively stable over time,264 it is a consequence of 
Hayek’s theory that, other things equal, the extent of encouragement given to more 
roundabout production processes varies inversely with the level of the loan rate. So, 
if it can be shown that changes in the loan rate correlate with the severity of the 
                                                 
263 See page 60 above 
 
264 Such an assumption would not be appropriate where those factors are operative 
that influence the natural rate of interest in one direction or another, e.g., changes in 
risks, technology, new discoveries of natural resources, etc.  
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effects of the business cycle,265 one might acquire some evidence that Hayek’s theory 
is right in the absence of direct evidence of the value of the natural rate of interest. 
Or, to put the point another way, one might acquire evidence that Hayek was wrong 
if it can be shown that no such correlation exists. Thus, in principle, the non-
observability of the natural rate does not prevent the evaluation of Hayek’s theory. 
But this is not to say that the implications of Hayek’s theory can be 
compared with the empirical evidence in practice. The problem with Hayek’s theory 
vis-à-vis appraisal stems from the fact that it provides zero guidance with respect to 
when, following a lowering of the loan rate, one can expect to observe the effects of 
the boom-bust cycle. Evaluating the truth of the posited inverse correlation 
mentioned above requires knowledge of the relevant relata; these should be 
economic conditions at different points in time, but which points in time? The 
posited inverse correlation states, in essence, that the extent to which the loan rate is 
lowered at time t inversely correlates with the severity of the business cycle at time t + x; however, 
Hayek never indicates the value (or range of values) of x. A boom fostered by lower 
interest rates could turn to bust tomorrow, a year from now, or a decade from now. 
Until the bust arrives, Hayek’s theory will keep predicting “the bust is coming,” and 
when the bust does materialize (which, of course, with a long enough time horizon, 
it eventually must), it can be said that “Hayek’s theory predicted it!” But, logically, 
this is little different from the meteorological sage who predicts rain every day: 
eventually he’s bound to be right, but that doesn’t redound predictive excellence 
upon the theory from which he infers his daily prediction. For our purposes, what 
                                                 
265 That is, on the assumption that there is some meaningful way of determining the 
severity of the effects of forced savings, which is probably a false assumption.  
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this means is that there is no observable evidence which compels the rejection of 
Hayek’s theory. Any evidence that appears to threaten the implications of the theory 
can always be excused on the grounds that insufficient time has passed for 
evaluation.266  
 We could, again, attempt to avoid this problem by making the implications of 
Hayek’s theory more precise. However, it is a common theme of Hayek’s 
methodological writings that specific economic events, like the turning point from 
boom to bust, are impossible to predict in advance with any satisfactory degree of 
precision. Given the highly complex phenomena that they investigate, economists 
can make only “pattern predictions” to which temporal parameters cannot be 
adduced. So, whereas Keynes’ theory fails to provide the relevant advice on how to 
make predictions more precise, Hayek’s methodological views augur against the 
possibility of making precise predictions of complex phenomena. If we add temporal 
parameters to the implications of Hayek’s theory, not only are we then not in any 
better position to appraise the theory (because, in a fashion similar to our attempts to 
precisify the implications of Keynes’ theory, such parameters are no consequence of 
Hayek’s theory, so predictive failure could always be attributed to shortcomings with 
                                                 
266 It should be mentioned that a parallel problem arises for Keynes. We’re told by 
Keynes that certain consequences follow the implementation of appropriate policies 
in the short-run and others in the long-run (see, e.g., Keynes [1936] 1973, 306-309), 
but we’re never told when the short-run ends and the long-run begins, which makes it 
convenient for Keynes’ defenders to excuse any seeming predictive failure with the 
claim that insufficient time has passed for the evaluation of the respective prediction: 
given more time, the evidence will show that Keynes was right. Of course, it goes 
without saying that Keynes famous quip about us all being dead in the long run 
provides no sufficient criterion for distinguishing the short- and long-runs. Hansen 
apparently considers the “relatively short-run” capable of lasting “one, two, or three 
decades” (Hansen 1953, 33).  
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our temporal estimates rather than inadequacies in Hayek’s account of the business 
cycle), but we’re actually doing something that Hayek argues is impossible to do well.  
In summary, it is not Hayek’s theory that gets falsified by the evidence, but 
only constellations of beliefs that include both Hayek’s theory plus beliefs about how 
much time must pass for the effects of particular policies to materialize, and should 
any such constellation be threatened by the observed evidence, one can move to an 
unthreatened constellation by making the necessary adjustments, not to Hayek’s 
theory, but to beliefs about how much time must pass for the effects of particular 
policies to materialize. Thus, the rational response to an apparent disconfirmation of 
Hayek’s theory is underdetermined in the holist sense.  
3 A Brief Aside on Pattern Predictions and Underdetermination 
In his (later) methodological work, Hayek argues that economic phenomena are 
fundamentally complex in a way that the phenomena of many natural sciences are not, 
and that, as a consequence, our capacity for theorizing about such phenomena is 
circumscribed. In particular, with respect to complex phenomena like those of the 
trade cycle, we are never able to achieve the epistemic position required to derive 
predictions of particular events: “A theory will always define only a kind (or class) of 
patterns, and the particular manifestation of the pattern to be expected will depend 
on the particular circumstances (the ‘initial and marginal conditions’ to which…we 
shall refer to as ‘data’). How much in fact we shall be able to predict will depend on 
how many of those data we can ascertain.”267 Hayek argues that  
                                                 
267 Hayek ([1964] 1967, 3) 
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The multiplicity of even the minimum number of distinct elements required 
to produce (and therefore also of the minimum number of data required to 
explain) a complex phenomena of a certain kind creates problems which 
dominate the disciplines concerned with such phenomena and gives them an 
appearance very different from that of those concerned with simpler 
phenomena. The chief difficulty in the former becomes one in fact of 
ascertaining all the data determining a particular manifestation of the 
phenomena in question, a difficulty which is often insurmountable in practice 
and sometimes even an absolute one.268  
Hayek’s point here is that in order to derive a prediction of a particular event, we 
need to marry statements of laws to statements of the pertinent data – the relevant 
‘initial and marginal conditions’. However, as the phenomena under investigation 
grow increasingly complex, the number of relevant data increase in number, and 
consequently, our ability to discover and base predictions on them diminishes.  
Nonetheless, predictions of a different sort are possible with respect to 
complex phenomena like those of economics. We cannot to any particular degree of 
satisfaction predict individual economic events, but we can make what Hayek calls 
pattern predictions; moreover, such predictions are, according to Hayek, falsifiable: 
We are…interested not only in individual events, and it is also not only 
predictions of individual events which can be empirically tested. We are 
equally interested in the occurrence of abstract patterns as such, and the 
prediction that a pattern of a certain kind will appear in defined 
                                                 
268 Ibid., 7-8 
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circumstances is a falsifiable (and therefore empirical) statement. Knowledge 
of the conditions in which a pattern of a certain kind will appear, and of what 
depends on its preservation, may be of great practical importance. The 
circumstances or conditions in which the pattern described by the theory will 
appear are defined by the range of values which may be inserted for the 
variables of the formula.269 
Given the infamous problems associated with the names Duhem and Quine, 
Hayek’s claim that pattern predictions are falsifiable is rather doubtful. Hayek’s 
arguments with respect to the distinction between predictions of individual events 
and pattern predictions gives no hint as to why only the former and not the latter 
might be subject to the problems of underdetermination. Indeed, given that he was 
active in philosophy of science at the time that Quine’s 1951 paper “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism” reopened the profession’s eyes to the problems of underdetermination, 
there is a shocking absence of any awareness of the Duhem-Quine problems in 
Hayek’s philosophical oeuvre. True enough, Hayek does recognize that pattern 
predictions possess less empirical content (in Popper’s sense) than predictions of 
particular events,270 but he never acknowledges that the problems of 
                                                 
269 Ibid., 9; According to Hayek, the difference between predictions of particular 
events and pattern predictions is one of degree, not of kind. We might imagine a 
spectrum of predictability determined by the extent of the data that we possess: on 
one end of the spectrum are those cases where we possess sufficient data to generate 
specific predictions; as we move away from this end, our knowledge of the relevant 
data progressively decreases, and thus, our ability to predict with precision decreases 
as well. Naturally, at the opposite end of this spectrum are those cases in which we 
are completely ignorant of the relevant data, and all our knowledge is of the pattern 
predicted by the given theory. 
 
270 Ibid., 9 
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underdetermination effectively annihilate the possibility of testing isolated 
predictions of particular events, and thus, a fortiori make pattern predictions 
unfalsifiable as well. Evaluating a pattern prediction, i.e., determining whether an 
observed pattern of events fits within the range of events to be expected on the basis 
of some theory – is just as subject to interpretation (probably more so) than the 
question of whether the observation of an individual event conforms to a precise 
prediction.  
Indeed, it seems that we perform something like271 tests of pattern 
predictions in the real world and, when we do, the results are as open to 
interpretation as predictions of particular events. Consider that, when someone, even 
an economist, asserts that, e.g., Keynes’ theory “explains” the Great Depression, they 
typically don’t mean that one can literally deduce statements concerning specific 
events of the Depression from the statements of Keynes’ theory plus statements of 
relevant subsidiary assumptions and initial conditions. What they mean is that the 
general pattern of economic activity of the Depression conforms to a broad pattern 
predicted by Keynes’ theory. But, of course, non-Keynesians can and do offer 
alternative interpretations of the same pattern that support their view.272 Conversely, 
Hayek’s supporters usually count the pattern of economic activity observed during 
the stagflation of the 1970s as a vindication of Hayek’s position. But, Keynes’ theory 
has never been rejected once and for all as a consequence of stagflation; Keynes’ 
                                                 
271 I say “something like” because of considerations discussed below. 
 
272 Amity Shlaes (2007) bestseller The Forgotten Man gives a quasi-Austrian gloss to the 
Depression. The canonical Austrian accounts of the Great Depression are Robbins 
(1934) and Rothbard (2008). See also Garrett (2007) and Phillips, McManus, and 
Nelson (2007)  
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followers manage to interpret the pattern of economic events of the 1970s in a way 
that does not refute Keynes.  
It is no less the case with respect to pattern predictions as it is with respect to 
predictions of individual events that they never confront experience in isolation. 
Hayek may be right that, with respect to complex phenomena, we typically do not 
possess all of the statements of conditions necessary to derive a prediction of an 
individual event, but two points are important to keep in mind here: 1) even if we 
don’t know all of the conditions, we presumably do know some of them, and the 
failure of a pattern prediction so derived can always be ascribed to inadequacies with 
these subsidiary statements, and 2) the mere fact that we don’t possess all of the 
statements of conditions necessary to derive a prediction of an individual event itself 
constitutes a means of excusing predictive failure that is not available with respect to 
predictions of individual events, i.e., we can adduce the absence of the relevant data as 
an explanation of some apparent failure of a pattern prediction. It would seem, then, 
that pattern predictions are no more falsifiable, and probably less so, than their more 
precisely specified brethren.273  
In any case, it is important to emphasize that the foregoing discussion of 
pattern predictions and their (lack of) falsifiability is relevant in the present context 
not because we can only hope to get pattern predictions from the theories of Hayek 
and Keynes, but because the implications of the latter two theories don’t even rise to the 
                                                 
273 Hayek comes close to recognizing this fact, but never draws what seems to be the 
appropriate conclusion about the falsifiability of pattern predictions: “Such a theory 
will, of course, in Popper’s terms, be one of small empirical content, because it 
enables us to predict or explain only certain general features of a situation which may 
be compatible with a great many particular circumstances” (Hayek [1964] 1967, 9). 
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level of pattern predictions. According to Hayek, a pattern prediction is derived from a 
theory from which we could derive a prediction of a specific event if only we 
possessed all of the relevant data: that is, a pattern prediction is separated from a 
prediction of a particular event merely by an ocean of unknown data. However, as 
the discussion of the present chapter has hopefully made clear, these data are not all 
that we lack with respect to the business cycle theories of Hayek and Keynes; there is 
some theoretical lacuna in each theory that further separates us from the possibility 
of predicting specific economic events. With respect to Keynes’s theory, we lack 
criteria of bureaucratic best practice, i.e., of principles of adequate policy design, 
implementation, and administration. If we cannot determine whether a particular 
stimulus measure falls within the boundaries of what counts as best practice – and 
we do not get any such criteria from Keynes – then we cannot generate a prediction 
(pattern or otherwise) the falseness of which necessarily reflects poorly on The 
General Theory. Similarly, with respect to Hayek’s theory, we are separated from 
predictions of particular economic events by more than just data, we also need a 
theory of the timing of the effects posited by Hayek; predictions of particular events 
require temporal parameters that we are methodologically debarred from appending 
to the implications of Hayek’s theory.  
Of course, Hayek’s argument that economics is limited to pattern predictions 
implies that there is no way to non-arbitrarily assign temporal parameters. Thus, the 
failure of his theory to make temporally parameterized predictions is very much in 
keeping with his methodology. Moreover, it is no criticism of Keynes to point out 
that he failed to provide a theory of how to design, implement, and administer the 
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policies he recommended: it is by no means obvious that the phenomena of 
bureaucratic best practice fall under the economist’s purview; indeed, it’s not obvious 
that these latter phenomena are the business of any established academic discipline. 
So, in neither case should the failure of the theories to generate even pattern 
predictions be blamed on their respective authors, who each seem to have done the 
best they could with the tools they thought relevant to their economic analyses—it’s 
just that generating even pattern predictions from either of the theories requires 
going beyond economics proper.  
In any case, the failure of the implications of the theories to rise to the level 
of pattern predictions is absolutely essential to recognize for anyone interested in 
achieving consensus with respect to the answer to Hicks’ question “Which was right? 
Keynes or Hayek?” Recall that, directly after claiming that pattern predictions are 
falsifiable, Hayek states that “The circumstances or conditions in which the pattern 
described by the theory will appear are defined by the range of values which may be 
inserted for the variables of the formula.”274 What I’m arguing here is that there are 
variables of each theory that are not so defined; there are variables for which we are 
not given even a range of acceptable values. Thus, the implications of both theories 
are separated from predictions of particular events by more than a mere ocean of 
unknown data. As serious a problem as the collection of the relevant data may be in 
economics – and I don’t deny that it is a serious problem – overcoming this obstacle 
will not suffice to generate testable predictions of either theory. Whether or not we 
are willing to go along with Hayek with regard to the falsifiability of pattern 
                                                 
274 Hayek ([1964] 1967, 9); see pages 146-147 above. 
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predictions, the epistemological problems of the two theories are more pronounced 
than those of more robust theories of other complex phenomena. A theory that 
generates pattern predictions is distinguished from a theory that generates 
predictions of specific events by the cognitive availability of the data required to fill 
in its parameters. A theory that fails to generate even pattern predictions is 
distinguished from a theory that does by the absence in the former of all of the 
relevant parameters – such theories are “gappy” in respects essential to empirical 
evaluation – and it’s this that I’m trying to establish with respect to the theories of 
Hayek and Keynes. 
All of this said, it would appear that Hayek missed an opportunity to use his 
later methodology to attack Keynes’ theory. If the foregoing arguments are sound, 
then according to the criteria of science that prevailed in Hayek’s day, namely, 
falsifiability, the macroeconomics of The General Theory fails the test. Of course, such 
an argument would have required that Hayek cannibalize his own theory of the 
business cycle, which he may have been loath to do. But, in the political world of 
Hayek’s day, where policy was most highly esteemed where it was administered 
according to “scientific” principles, surely the argument that Keynes’ theory did not 
qualify in this respect would have been a powerful one. That he should have taken up 
the suggested argument against Keynes and rejected his own account of the cycle in 
the process is supported by the fact that the argument appears to justify, better than 
any technical-economic argument probably could, one of Hayek’s ultimate concerns, 
namely, the need for caution in the political administration of monetary affairs. If the argument 
is sound, then it means that we have no empirically-grounded reason to accept 
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Keynes’ posited correlation between stimulus policies and involuntary 
unemployment; indeed, we have no empirical reason to believe that such measures 
do not cause more harm than good. We might then imagine Hayek unfurling this 
argument in defense of a sort of Hippocratic Oath for monetary policymakers: 
caution is required where we are ignorant of the effects of our political machinations, as we always 
are with respect monetary policy.  
4 Contrastive Underdetermination and Short-run Evidence 
I take it to be established at this point that the choice between the theories of Hayek 
and Keynes is underdetermined in the holist sense, i.e., that there are convenient 
responses available that protect each theory from what appears to be threatening 
evidence, or, what is the same thing, that there is no possible empirical evidence that 
compels a univocal choice between the two theories. But, what of the two theories 
with respect to the form of underdetermination distinguished above as 
“contrastive”?  
Kyle Stanford describes the distinction between holist and contrastive 
underdetermination in the following way: “It is perhaps most useful to think of 
holist underdetermination as starting from a particular theory or body of beliefs and 
claiming that our revision of those beliefs in response to new evidence may be 
underdetermined, while contrastive underdetermination instead starts from a given 
body of evidence and claims that more than one theory may be well-supported by 
that very evidence.”275 I’m inclined to think that the distinction between contrastive 
and holist underdetermination can be too hastily overdrawn. As Stanford writes, “the 
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two problems are not entirely disconnected, because it is open to us to consider 
alternative possible modifications of the web of beliefs as alternative theories or 
theoretical ‘systems’ between which the empirical evidence alone is powerless to 
decide.”276 In other words, there’s little substantive difference between saying that, 
given some theories, the rational response to new evidence is underdetermined and 
saying that, given some pieces of evidence, the choice between theories is 
underdetermined. Nonetheless, the distinction seems to be useful for our purposes 
in the present essay. 
The sense in which the choice between the two theories is contrastively 
underdetermined is well-represented by an alternative explanation that Keynes’ 
defenders have offered for what might otherwise be interpreted as the failure of 
recent stimulus measures to significantly positively affect unemployment figures. 
Where Keynesians have not argued that the seeming failure is due to inadequacies in 
the particular stimulus policies adopted, they have argued instead that the programs 
enacted – whatever their imperfections – have done much to prevent the further 
deterioration of economic conditions in the United States, i.e., they claim, in essence 
that involuntary unemployment is lower than it would have been in the absence of 
the stimulus policies in question. Whether this assertion is true is not our concern; 
what does need emphasis is that it does nothing to facilitate the evaluation of 
Keynes’ and Hayek’s respective theories. That is, even if we all agree that the 
evidence supports the claim that the policies have had some stimulatory effects, we 
cannot infer from this evidence that Keynes was right and Hayek wrong. This is 
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because it is a consequence of both theories that fiscal and monetary policies can 
manifest stimulatory effect in the short-run. Evidence of such short-run stimulatory 
effects (as well as evidence of the absence of such effects) underdetermines the choice 
between the theories of Keynes and Hayek. Whether it is true or not that the 
stimulus programs enacted since the start of the Great Recession have had some 
positive effects on economic growth, both theories make essentially the same claims 
with respect to these near-term effects, and so, both theories rise or fall together on 
this point. More carefully, given some body of evidence with regard to the short-run 
effects of particular policies, both theories are equally supported (threatened) by the 
evidence. Thus, any given body of short-run evidence contrastively underdetermines 
the choice between Keynes and Hayek.277  
                                                 
277 Consider further that Keynes’ political program is not one of complete 
socialization: there remains a vital role for private enterprise to play in Keynes’ ideal 
political economy: “I do not suppose that the classical medicine will work by itself or 
that we can depend on it. We need quicker and less painful aids…But in the long run 
these expedients will work better and we shall need them less, if the classical 
medicine is also at work. And if we reject the medicine from our systems altogether, 
we may just drift from expedient to expedient and never get really fit again” (Keynes 
1946). However, given this, and moreover, given the enormous difficulties involved 
in pulling apart causal connections in macroeconomics, it may be that the claim that 
the success (or failure) of some stimulus policy is due to political factors is more or 
less equally supported by any evidence as the claim that the success (or failure) of the 
same program is due to elements of private enterprise. In a modern, complex 
economy in which private and public factors comingle, a rational decision whether 
some evidence better supports claims about the causal influence of public rather than 
private factors is well nigh impossible to make, and could be made only on the 
dubious assumption that it is possible to non-arbitrarily distinguish public activity 
from private: for example, how should we classify the economic influence of an 
ostensibly private but heavily regulated industry which, for better or worse, would be 
run very differently in the absence of such regulation? It doesn’t seem likely that we 
can either quantitatively or qualitatively determine the causal impact of the private 
and public spheres. Thus, those cries that are so often heard during difficult 
economic times to the effect that “capitalism (government) is the source of all of our 
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Of course, where Keynes and Hayek differ is in the long-run implications of 
their respective theories with regard to such policies. Keynes claims that stimulus 
policies – properly tended and maintained, of course – can lead to full employment, 
the end of boom and bust, while a consequence of Hayek’s theory is that the 
stimulatory effects of such policies are always transitory: they will be (at least 
partially) reversed when the artificial nature of the lengthening of the structure of 
production is discovered (whenever this might occur). And, of course, for reasons 
already mentioned under the heading of holist underdetermination, this distinction in 
the long-run consequences of the two theories plus evidence of the long-run 
consequences of particular stimulus policies doesn’t compel a unique choice between 
them.  
                                                                                                                                     
economic woes” can probably never be any more justified than one’s brute political 
biases.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CHOOSING BETWEEN UNDERDETERMINED THEORIES 
The present chapter considers the Hayek-Keynes debate from the perspective of 
various alternate strategies in the literature for dealing with the consequences of 
underdetermination. In the first section, we address whether Dan Hausman’s criteria 
for belief in vaguely-qualified generalizations might be fruitfully applied to the 
debate, and, in the second section, we consider the relevance for the two theories of 
Larry Laudan’s argument that choice in the face of underdetermination proceeds on 
the basis of inductive methodological criteria.  
1 Belief in Vaguely-Qualified Generalizations 
The theories of Hayek and Keynes are each underdetermined in the holist sense in 
part because their implications are only vaguely specified. That is, the implications of 
both theories are meant to hold only under certain conditions, which are not all 
explicated. This makes it convenient to excuse apparent predictive failure with the 
claim that the underspecified conditions that must be present in order for the 
respective theory to work do not in fact obtain. In essence, the implications of both 
theories can be understood to include implicit clauses that specify the conditions in 
which they can be expected to work (or not work); however, in both cases, the 
components of the clauses are left understated.  
 In The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, his well-known work on the 
methodology of microeconomics, Dan Hausman identifies two ways in which the 
generalizations of economics are qualified. There are those qualifications that could, 
at least in principle, be populated with elements that economic theory itself identifies 
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as causal factors capable of confounding the generalization: “[T]he meaning and 
justification of ‘laws’ with only such qualifications is relatively unproblematic. 
Provided that one takes for granted fundamental economic theory, the term ‘ceteris 
paribus’ can be replaced with a list of specific causal factors, the effects of which are 
considered separately.”278 On the other hand, there are qualifications that could only 
be populated with causes of economic phenomena that are not identified by 
fundamental economic theory.279 The qualifications with which we are concerned 
with respect to the theories of Hayek and Keynes are of this latter kind. In the case 
of each theory, we need to know something that “fundamental” economic theory 
cannot provide: it is not the business of economics to grade specific modes of policy 
design, implementation, and administration, nor can economic theory (which, at its 
most basic, is static) tell us with any satisfactory degree of precision how much time 
must pass for specific political modes to reveal their effects.  
Hausman argues that belief in vaguely-qualified generalizations is justified 
only if four conditions are met. The relevant question for our purposes is whether 
these criteria can be fruitfully applied to the debate between Hayek and Keynes—
does application of Hausman’s criteria support belief in one but not the other 
theory?280 According to Hausman, 
                                                 
278 Hausman (1992, 134) 
 
279 “Fundamental economic theory considers only some of the causes of economic 
phenomena. The basic claims of economics are true only under various not fully 
specified conditions.” (Ibid.) 
 
280 Hausman’s book is specifically concerned with microeconomics, not business cycle 
theory. However, his discussion in the relevant passages of the book is directed at 
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One is justified in regarding a counterfactual claim with a vague antecedent 
or a statement with a vague ceteris paribus clause as a law only when four 
necessary conditions (lawlikeness, reliability, refinability, and excusability) are 
met: First, the statement must be lawlike. It must be the sort of statement 
which would be a law if it were true…Second, the ceteris paribus law must be 
reliable. In some class of cases, after ignoring the ceteris paribus clause or 
allowing for specific interferences, the scientist should rarely need to explain 
away apparent disconfirmations. Reliability is a statistical requirement. A 
generalization such as “ceteris paribus all F’s are G’s” is reliable only if (perhaps 
after making allowances for specific interferences) almost all F’s are G’s. The 
evidence for reliability will typically be sample frequencies…Third, one does 
not have good reason to regard a qualified claim as a law unless it is refinable. 
If scientists add specific qualifications, the generalization (stripped of its ceteris 
paribus clause) should become more reliable or reliable in a larger 
domain…Finally, no one is justified in regarding a statement with a ceteris 
paribus clause as a law unless it is excusable. One should not invoke the ceteris 
paribus clause blindly. One should know which interferences are important 
and should usually be able to justify relying on the ceteris paribus clause as an 
excuse. The excusability condition differs from both the reliability and 
refinability conditions, because it does not demand good statistical results. 
Unlike the refinability condition it is also unconcerned with modifying 
generalizations. Instead, the excusability condition demands that, after 
                                                                                                                                     
vague qualifications in general and not those of microeconomics alone, so exporting 
Hausman’s criteria to business cycle theory is not inappropriate. 
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scientists have done their tests and identified those cases in which the 
generalization is not reliable, they be able to cite the interfering factors except 
possibly in a few anomalous cases. It should not seem a miracle that the 
generalization “works” sometimes and fails others.281 
Hausman’s requirements are fine as far as they go; unfortunately for our 
interests here, they don’t go very far with respect to resolving the 
underdetermination problems present in the Hayek-Keynes debate. Consider the 
reliability requirement first.282 Whether either theory satisfies this condition cannot 
be determined on the basis of the evidence: one or both theories might in fact be 
reliable, but for the same reasons that the evidence doesn’t compel a decision one 
way or another with respect to the question “Which was right, Keynes or Hayek?” it 
similarly fails to compel a decision with respect to the question “Which is more 
reliable, Keynes or Hayek?” In particular, the interpretative problems that arise in 
evaluating the truth of the implications of the respective theories are in no way 
alleviated by the requirement that they be almost always true. Given that there is no 
evidence that a defender of either theory is logically compelled to accept as a 
falsification, one can simply dig in and claim that her favored theory is more reliable. 
In other words, in order for statistical reliability to serve as a criterion for choosing 
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282 Hausman’s first condition – lawlikeness – is both the most difficult of the 
conditions to define and the easiest to set aside. Hausman offers no specific account 
of lawlikeness, and there are numerous, competing accounts in the literature. 
However, no one on either side of the Hayek-Keynes debate has asserted of the 
implications of the rival theory that they are not sufficiently lawlike to count as laws 
if true. One thing that both sides accept is the lawlikeness of the implications of the 
rival theory. Thus, there’s no need to consider the lawlikeness condition. 
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between the two theories, there must be agreement about what the relevant statistics 
reveal, but given the holist underdetermination of the two theories, there is no such 
agreement. We might say then that whether either theory is in fact reliable, in practice 
the question is epistemically intractable in much the same way and for the same 
reasons that the question “Which was right, Keynes or Hayek?” is epistemically 
intractable.  
This same epistemic problem also confounds the fourth condition, 
excusability. The latter requires that economists be able to identify cases in which the 
vague generalization is not reliable. An economist’s use of a vaguely-qualified 
generalization is excusable only if (“except possibly in a few anomalous cases”) she 
can cite the relevant interfering factors. However, discovering these interfering 
factors requires tests for reliability, the results of which are epistemically intractable. 
In other words, the evidence that one acquires by testing the vague implications of 
the two theories is not going to compel agreement with respect to the cases in which 
the implications are not reliable: different economists will generate different lists of 
interfering factors depending on their judgments of whether the relevant theory is 
reliable in a particular case; there will be no consensus with respect to the 
excusability condition.  
 With respect to refinability, we’re told by Hausman that it is related to 
reliability: a vaguely-qualified generalization is refinable only if adding specific 
qualifications makes the resulting precisified generalization more reliable or reliable 
in a larger domain. Setting aside the just mentioned epistemic difficulties involved in 
determining the reliability of the implications of the respective theories, the question 
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arises whether it is possible to make the required refinements in a way that might 
settle the debate. It is true that we can add specific qualifications to the vague 
implications of both theories, but, as has been emphasized above, such 
precisifications are always auxiliary to the respective theories, which leaves available 
the convenient excuse that the failure of either theory to become more reliable in 
virtue of such refinements is due not to the shortcomings of the respective theory, 
but to inadequacies in the auxiliary refinements. We might say then, in a way that 
accords with economic practice, that each theory is only exogenously refinable, but that 
a minimum requirement for consensus is endogenous refinability, a condition which, in 
principle, neither theory can satisfy. 
2 The Failure of the Appeal to Ampliative Criteria 
So far it has been argued that the choice between the theories of Keynes and Hayek 
is underdetermined in both the holist and contrastive senses and that there are 
convenient strategies that can be adopted to protect either theory from what appears 
to be threatening evidence. However, nothing has been said about the rationality (or 
lack thereof) of adopting such protective measures. In part, this is due to the fact 
that the expressed concern of the present paper is with the absence of consensus 
with respect to the two theories, and for this purpose, the mere convenience of these 
excuses is probably sufficient to explain their adoption. Regardless of the rationality of 
adopting such strategies, their convenience makes their adoption highly alluring 
psychologically.  
In his well-known paper Demystifying Underdetermination, Larry Laudan argues 
that certain philosophers and sociologists of science move too hastily from the 
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acknowledged truth of deductive (or “Humean”) underdetermination to a defense of 
epistemic relativism.283 Laudan argues that deductive underdetermination – i.e., the 
acknowledged fact that a correct explanation of some body of evidence cannot be 
deduced from the evidence alone – does not support the stronger claims concerning 
underdetermination that W.V.O. Quine (and, especially, certain of his immediate 
followers) inferred from Quine’s arguments in Two Dogmas of Empiricism.284 Much of 
Laudan’s paper is concerned with the proper interpretation of the arguments of Two 
Dogmas. Laudan argues that the only acceptable interpretation of the Quinean claim 
that any theory may be retained “come what may” is a psychological one, i.e., that it 
is always psychologically possible to hold on to a theory in the face of threatening 
evidence. However, Laudan argues that deductive underdetermination does not 
support the logically stronger (relativistic) claim that it is always rational to retain a 
theory in the face of recalcitrant evidence and, moreover, that one cannot draw the 
latter conclusion from the psychological premise without a further and, he argues, 
doubtful premise. According to Laudan, the transition from the psychological 
possibility of retaining a theory in the face of threatening evidence to the relativistic 
conclusion requires the truth of the claim that there are no non-deductive rules that 
might determine theory choice. However, Laudan argues that even in the face of the 
truth of both Humean underdetermination and the psychological possibility of 
retaining a seemingly falsified theory, there remains the possibility of rationally 
choosing between underdetermined theories on the basis of “ampliative” rules of 
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theory choice. In short, according to Laudan, though it might be reasonable to hold 
that the resources of deductive logic alone do not suffice to pick out a uniquely 
rational response to threatening evidence, it is not reasonable to believe that a 
deductive logic augmented with ampliative rules also fails to determine theory choice; 
the addition of inductive principles of scientific reasoning like simplicity, conservatism, 
fecundity, etc. suffices to determine the rational choice between multiple deductively-
underdetermined theories.  
It is important to note that such an illegitimate elision from the psychological 
premise to the relativistic conclusion is not what is going on in the present paper. We 
have assumed that the convenience of the relevant strategies makes them appealing, 
and so, probably explains the lack of a consensus with regard to Hicks question; 
however we have pointedly refrained from attaching the adjective “rational” to the 
choices of economists between the theories of Hayek and Keynes. This said, the 
purpose of the present section is to establish that Laudan’s appeal to ampliative 
criteria provides no route to consensus with respect to Hicks’ question. Laudan’s 
argument is powerless to convince those attached to either theory to acquiesce in 
favor of the other for it is not the case that the application of inductive 
methodological rules leaves one theory as the uniquely rational choice between the 
pair.  
The difficulty with Laudan’s suggestion in the context of the Hayek-Keynes 
debate arises mainly from the fact that those who prefer Hayek’s theory emphasize 
the importance of certain ampliative rules that are mostly discounted by those who 
prefer Keynes’ theory and vice versa. For example, consider the apparent tension 
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between the rule that relatively simpler theories (on some definition of theoretical 
simplicity) are to be preferred and the rule that, within certain boundaries in part 
determined by the need for simplicity, theories should be based on plausibly realistic 
assumptions. The application of these rules, by even the most unbiased of observers, 
to the theories of Hayek and Keynes is likely to lead to divergent assessments.  
As we have seen, Hayek criticized Keynes’ for failing to deal with the 
complexities of capital, and Keynes responded that his concerns were too pressing to 
wait for an adequate theoretical analysis of these complexities. Regardless of the level 
of realism of Hayek’s own treatment of capital, there is little doubt that he was right 
about the difficulties of capital theory and that confronting the role of capital in a 
money-using economy would have involved Keynes in many unpleasant 
entanglements—even Keynes seemed to accept as much. Indeed, Keynes seemed 
also to accept that the addition of a capital-theoretic foundation could only improve 
the realism of his account: recall his comment that “a development of [capital] theory 
would be highly relevant to my treatment of monetary matters and likely to throw 
light on dark corners.”285 It seems that whatever one thinks of Hayek’s capital theory, 
his choice to confront the difficulties involved in theorizing about the phenomena of 
capital represents a choice in favor of (what he took to be) realism; while Keynes’ 
decision to set capital aside must count as a choice in favor of simplicity. Thus, those 
who de-emphasize simplicity in favor of realism (as Austrians typically do) are likely 
                                                 
285 Keynes (1973, 252); Keynes said this of the Treatise, but given that the role of 
capital is no more considered in The General Theory than in the previous book, unless 
there were a reason to think Keynes changed his mind about the realism that capital 
theory would bring to his account, it is relevant to a discussion of The General Theory 
as well.  
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to prefer Hayek’s theory, while those who think that the realism rule is less important 
than the simplicity rule (as Keynesians tend to do) are apt to choose Keynes’ theory. 
How do we settle this dispute between realists and simplicitists? It seems that the 
appeal to these ampliative rules leaves us exactly where we started: in the absence of 
empirical evidence that unambiguously supports the more realistic theory in favor of 
the simpler one, or the other way around, how are we to convince those who prefer 
relatively simpler theories to agree with those who prefer relatively more realistic 
ones? 
Examples of such tensions in the Hayek-Keynes debate can be iterated. 
Consider the fact that Hayek’s theory is so complex that its failure to convince more 
economists is often attributed to its complexity, and especially, to the fact that it is 
seemingly impossible to express mathematically. Keynes’ theory, on the other hand, 
was formulated in mathematical terms almost immediately upon its initial public 
airing. In fact, it was our very own Sir John Hicks who made his name in part by 
mathematizing Keynes’ theory in the form of the famous IS-LM model.286 We might 
be inclined to think this shortcoming of Hayek’s theory to be a fatal one; however, 
Austrian economists generally, and few more than Hayek, are well known for 
denying that mathematics has anything but a heuristic role to play in economic 
theorizing. From the Austrian perspective, the inability to formulate Hayek’s theory 
mathematically is no real demerit, and – in part because Austrians hold that an 
economic theory can typically be mathematized only if much of its realism is 
sacrificed – the ease with which Keynes’ theory is expressed mathematically does not 
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particularly count in its favor. On the other hand, from the Keynesian perspective, 
that a sacrifice of a certain degree of realism might be required to make Keynes’ 
theory mathematically tractable is not much of an argument against it and certainly 
no argument in favor of Hayek’s theory. Again, in the absence of evidence that either 
the Keynesian sacrifice of realism or the Hayekian sacrifice of mathematical 
tractability has improved the empirical bona fides of one or the other theory relative to 
its rival, the appeal to these ampliative rules does not contribute to consensus 
building. 
 Moreover, as we have seen, Hayek disparaged the level of aggregation that 
Keynes’ theory trucks in; the effects of individual price changes on other prices and 
not the effects of one aggregate or composite variable on some other are, according 
to Hayek, the phenomena really relevant to the trade cycle. This said, it must be 
admitted that a degree of aggregation higher than that with which Hayek was 
comfortable tends to facilitate the application of the methods of statistics to 
economic phenomena. However, Hayek always denied that either statistics or 
econometrics has a fruitful role to play in testing economic theories; Keynes’ 
followers (though not Keynes himself287) typically deny this latter denial. Thus, in the 
absence of evidence that a highly aggregative theory is empirically superior to a less 
aggregative theory, the appeal to the rule that, other things equal, more aggregation is 
preferable to less (or its opposite) leaves us sans consensus. 
 In another place, his well-known Progress and Its Problems, Laudan argues that 
scientific rationality is ultimately parasitic upon scientific progress rather than the 
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other way around.288 According to Laudan’s argument in Progress, the aim of science 
is the solution of problems, and different “maxi-theories” called research traditions,289 
each constituted by a methodology, an ontology, and various (“mini-”) theories 
constructed according to the attendant methodology and ontology, are evaluated on 
the basis of the extent to which they a) solve important empirical problems in the 
relevant domain of inquiry, b) avoid anomalous problems that they cannot solve 
despite being solved by a competing research tradition, and c) avoid raising 
“conceptual problems,” i.e., problems of either internal consistency or tension with 
some external belief. In Laudan’s words, “the acceptability of a research tradition is 
determined by the problem-solving effectiveness of its latest theories,”290 where “the 
overall problem-solving effectiveness of a theory is determined by assessing the number and importance 
of the empirical problems which the theory solves and deducting therefrom the number and 
importance of the anomalies and conceptual problems which the theory generates.”291 [Italics in the 
original] 
In Progress, Laudan argues that, even in cases in which both the evidence fails 
to favor one theory over another and we lack a methodological Archimedean point 
from which to evaluate competing theories, a rational choice between rival research 
traditions can be made on the basis of comparisons of internal assessments of the 
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289 That is, sets of “general assumptions about the entities and processes in a domain of study, 
and about the appropriate methods to be used for investigating the problems and constructing the 
theories in that domain” (Ibid.; italics in the original). 
 
290 Ibid., 119 
 
291 Ibid., 69 
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problem-solving effectiveness of the respective traditions. That is, Laudan’s view in Progress 
is that it’s not necessary for competing research traditions to share similar appraisals 
of the importance of different methodological rules in order to rationally decide 
between them; all we need to do, besides deciding how well each tradition solves the 
empirical problems it sets out to solve, is determine how well each accords with its 
own methodological and ontological precepts. We don’t need a neutral Archimedean 
point from which to simultaneously judge both research traditions; we can first judge 
how well each research tradition performs according to its own particular precepts 
and then compare these latter evaluations with each other:  
We simply ask whether a research tradition has solved the problems which it 
set for itself; we ask whether, in the process, it generated any empirical 
anomalies or conceptual problems. We ask whether, in the course of time, it 
has managed to expand its domain of explained problems and to minimize 
the number and importance of its remaining conceptual problems and 
anomalies. In this way, we can come up with a characterization of the 
progressiveness (or regressiveness) of the research tradition. 
 If we did this for all the major research traditions in science, then we 
should be able to construct something like a progressive ranking of all 
research traditions at a given time. It is thus possible, at least in principle and 
perhaps eventually in practice, to be able to compare the progressiveness of 
different research traditions.292 
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 What I’m claiming in arguing against the fruitfulness for the Hayek-Keynes 
debate of Laudan’s appeal to ampliative criteria in Demystifying Underdetermination is 
that the respective research traditions are, in any such “progressive ranking of 
research traditions,” essentially tied. Each research tradition is about as effective (or 
not) as the other in solving the empirical problems it sets out to solve and avoiding 
anomalies and conceptual problems. More carefully, as we have seen, both research 
traditions can claim to solve the business cycle problem293 about as effectively as the 
other, and at the same time, each recognizes anomalies only in the rival account. 
Moreover, no conceptual problems arise either, in the first instance, between Keynes’ 
theory and the methodology according to which simplicity and both mathematical 
and statistical tractability are, other things equal, to be preferred to their opposites, 
or, in the second instance, between Hayek’s theory and the methodological rules 
according to which, even at the expanse of simplicity and quantitative tractability, a 
more realistic theory is preferable. There’s little reason to suspect that a comparison 
of internal appraisals of the problem-solving effectiveness of the respective research 
traditions yields anything other than a sister-kissing tie. 
 Finally, we should mention another of Laudan’s arguments in Progress and Its 
Problems concerning rational choice between competing theories, for its failure to 
settle the Hayek-Keynes debate encapsulates the ultimate incommensurability of the 
two rival theories of the business cycle.  
                                                 
293 There are, of course, empirical problems unrelated to the business cycle that each 
research tradition aims to solve, but I’m ignoring such complications here. The 
application of Laudan’s argument to all of the relevant problems confronted by the 
two research traditions would require another, much longer, essay, and, given the 
problems raised here, there’s little reason to suspect that such an exercise would lead 
to a different conclusion.  
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Prior generations of philosophers of science had held that the rational 
evaluation of competing theories required a basis of shared evaluative standards:  
Given the dominance at the time of the linguistic metaphor, this was usually 
conceived as a process of translating the predictions of competing theories 
(via so-called correspondence rules) into some purely observational language. 
Because the observational language was held to be free of any speculative, 
theoretical biases, it was thought to provide objective grounds for the 
empirical appraisal of vying theories.294 
However, with time, philosophers grew rather despondent about the possibilities for 
correspondence rules and observation languages not laden with theoretical biases 
and some went so far as to reject the possibility of objective inter-theoretical 
appraisals. Against this, Laudan argues that neither correspondence rules nor theory-
free observation languages are required, for “we can still talk meaningfully about 
different theories being about the same problem, even when the specific characterization 
of that problem is crucially dependent upon many theoretical assumptions.”295  
The terms in which a problem is characterized generally depend upon the 
acceptance of a range of theoretical assumptions, T1, T2, …, T3. These assumptions 
may, or may not, constitute the theories which solve the problem. If a 
problem can be characterized only within the language and the framework of 
a theory which purports to solve it, then clearly no competing theory could 
be said to solve the same problem. However, so long as the theoretical assumptions 
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necessary to characterize the problem are different from the theories which attempt to solve 
it, then it is possible to show that the competing explanatory theories are addressing 
themselves to the same problem.296 
According to this argument, establishing the incommensurability of two theories 
with respect to some problem is a matter of showing that the problem is 
characterized by the two theories, each of which purports to solve it, in distinct ways. 
This is precisely the case in the debate between Hayek and Keynes over the 
best solution to the business cycle problem. The problem that each theory attempts 
to solve is characterized within the unique language of that theory. Recall that the 
problem that Hayek’s business cycle theory tries to solve is “the emergence of a 
disproportionality among the various productive groups, and in particular the excessive 
production of capital goods.”297 This problem, as Hayek attempts to solve it, is 
characterized in terms of the very capital theory that is part of its solution. Hayek’s 
problem is how it is that a disproportionality can arise between the supply of goods 
in different stages of the structure of production (a term that appears nowhere in Keynes’ 
system) and the demand for the products of those stages. Hayek’s business cycle 
problem is Hayek’s problem alone. Similarly, the problem that Keynes set out to 
solve is the presence of involuntary unemployment as defined according to the very 
theory that purports to solve it. There is no such concept and, therefore, no such 
problem to be solved, according to the ontology associated with the Austrian 
tradition. Keynes’ problem too is uniquely his own. 
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Laudan’s suggestion would be applicable to the debate between Hayek and 
Keynes (and their respective followers) only if the business cycle problem could be 
characterized in a way that is independent of the particular theoretical conceptions 
that each research tradition has respectively devised to both formulate and solve the 
problem. In other words, according to Laudan’s argument, the theories of Hayek and 
Keynes would be commensurable only if a characterization of the business cycle 
could be found that depends upon neither the Austrian theory of capital nor Keynes’ 
theory of unemployment.298 Unfortunately, in the present state of things, no such 
theory-neutral characterization of the business cycle problem is on the horizon. 
 
                                                 
298 Alternatively, commensurability (which is not to say consensus) would follow if 
the members of one research tradition could be convinced to give up their 
characterization of the problem in favor of their rivals’. Of course, for all the reasons 
discussed in the present paper and more, there are few grounds for optimism here. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION - METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND POLITICAL 
CAUTION 
Though, at first glance, the various measures adopted by the American government 
in the wake of the mortgage crisis might appear to be justified by Keynes’ theory, 
and though it may seem reasonable to think that the Great Recession represents 
practically ideal conditions for testing the Hayek-Keynes debate in the real world, the 
considerations discussed herein should give pause to anyone inclined to such a belief. 
In fact, we get no principles of political best practice from Keynes. If the particular 
policies implemented fail to result in economic recovery, one can always argue that 
it’s not because of any flaw in Keynes’ theory, but because of the inadequacies of the 
respective policies. On the other hand, if the negative results that his theory alleges 
to follow from the policies implemented do not materialize, it can always be argued 
that it’s not because of any flaw in Hayek’s theory, but because more time needs to 
pass—“sooner or later” Hayek’s predictions will be realized and he will be 
vindicated.  
So, regardless of the results of the natural experiment that the American 
government would seem to be conducting on behalf of macroeconomists the world 
over, those inclined to Keynes’ view of things can and likely will resort to an 
interpretation that saves Keynes, and Austrians can and will do the same for Hayek. 
The Hayek-Keynes debate is intractable in large part because economists on both 
sides of the divide can easily adopt alternative interpretations of whatever evidence 
may come that protects their favored theory.  
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The main consequence of this paper is that there is no decision algorithm 
that can be applied to yield a uniquely rational choice between the theories of Hayek 
and Keynes. Though there are reasons to choose one way or the other, these reasons 
descend from distinct methodological perspectives, i.e., different “research 
traditions.” The methodological rules of one tradition are in direct opposition to the 
rules of the rival tradition, with no uniquely and obviously rational “winner” in sight 
among them, and so, the application of such rules to the theories of Hayek and 
Keynes do not permit a univocally rational choice among the theories to emerge. 
More carefully, each tradition is approximately equally progressive relative to its own 
precepts, and so, a comparison of assessments of internal progressiveness does not 
favor one theory / tradition over the other.  
If there is anything to this argument, then the series of myopic convergences 
on one and then another explanation of cyclical phenomena that is part of the 
history of the last century of economics must be troubling to anyone concerned 
about the state of the world economy. Economists first shifted their early 20th-
century theoretical infatuations from Austrian-style explanations of the business 
cycle to Keynesian accounts and, from there, to the various explanations associated 
with the Chicago school. Each of these shifts manifested in differing degrees the 
professional isolation of adherents of the ancestor traditions. The last fifty years or 
so has seen the increasing division of academic macroeconomics in the United States 
into programs committed to either the “freshwater” (i.e., “conservative” / Chicago-
influenced) approach or the “saltwater” (“liberal” / Keynesian-influenced) 
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approach;299 while economics departments with a strong Austrian presence exist at 
George Mason University and New York University. If the argument advanced here 
is sound, then none of the shifts and divisions that have cleaved macroeconomics 
over the last century has been dictated by the empirical evidence. It is simply not the 
case that Keynesians displaced Austrians, only to be subsequently displaced by the 
Chicago school, in virtue of the empirical superiority of the usurper; over time, one 
explanation gained at the expense of its predecessors on the basis of considerations 
entirely unconnected to the pressing empirical question of how to get out of an 
actual recession.  
So, given this, and assuming it is true that the subsequent history of business 
cycle theory represents nothing more than footnotes on Hayek and Keynes, what is 
the proper path forward in business cycle research? The arguments of the present 
paper leave two distinct routes open: either nihilism or pluralism. That is, either we 
can give up the business cycle project entirely or we can reopen it to different 
methods both old and new thereby liberating it from the empirically-unjustified 
segregations that have repeatedly divided the discipline.  
A methodological nihilist might claim that the epistemological problems of 
business cycle theorizing are both devastating and permanent. An argument for 
methodological nihilism with respect to the business cycle might go something like 
this: A business cycle prediction (either a precise prediction or a pattern prediction) 
is the conclusion of a very long deductive argument. A business cycle theory (any 
                                                 
299 As the reader may imagine, the freshwater / saltwater distinction has its roots in 
the geographical locations of the programs first associated with the respective 
approaches to macroeconomics, i.e., Chicago and the American Midwest in the case 
of the freshwater approach, and the American coasts in the case of the saltwater. 
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such theory) represents an infinitesimal proportion of the premises necessary to 
deduce such a conclusion. The other premises involve statements about, at 
minimum, multifarious political and financial conditions, institutional arrangements, 
and even, perhaps, the attitudes of individual market participants, all of which fall 
outside the purview of economic science proper. There are many such premises. So 
many, in fact, that discovering all of them is quite likely to be impossible for 
cognitively-limited human beings. Moreover, there will always be many such 
premises: no matter how specific and precise we make our theory, there will always 
be many more auxiliary premises required to deduce a prediction. The blame for an 
apparent predictive failure can always be laid at the feet of one or more of these extra 
premises: the impossibility of testing business cycle predictions is a permanent 
condition.  
In offering such an argument, the nihilist is essentially extending to the 
variables themselves Hayek’s arguments about the impossibility of gathering all of 
the data necessary to deduce a precise prediction, and is thereby denying the 
possibility of even pattern predictions with respect to business cycle phenomena. In 
sum, the nihilist’s argument is that, far from possessing knowledge of the relevant 
data, we lack knowledge even of the relevant variables – we don’t even have enough 
components to make out a “pattern” – and forever it shall be. Of course, the nihilist 
makes the further inference that, as a consequence, business cycle theorizing should 
be scrapped altogether.  
I must confess that I find the nihilist’s argument appealing all but for this last 
inference. For the reasons given – i.e., the impossibility of discovering all of the 
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relevant variables much less their values in a particular context – I’m skeptical of the 
possibility of even pattern predictions with respect to the business cycle (and I’ve 
already expressed above my skepticism with respect to the possibility of falsifying 
such pattern predictions); however, the last inference to the annihilation of business 
cycle theory would seem to require for its justification the claim that accurate 
prediction is the sole criterion by which a business cycle theory is to be judged. In 
other words, if you believe on the basis of the arguments offered in the present 
paper that business cycle theorizing is a lost cause that ought to be scrapped 
altogether, then – given the arguments of the present paper – you must also believe 
that both accurate prediction and a univocal method for discovering the quality of 
predictions are required for a business cycle theory to count as “successful,” 
“acceptable, “valuable,” what have you.  
I want to suggest that this latter inference is made too hastily. More carefully, 
I want to suggest that beyond the point established in the present paper – namely, 
that there is no decision algorithm that can be applied to yield a uniquely rational 
choice between the theories of Hayek and Keynes (and thus, on the relevant 
assumption, business cycle theories more generally) – we simply do not know at 
present what the value of business cycle theory is or will be in the long run. To put 
an end to theorizing about the business cycle is to make a final assessment before 
many other methods have been tried. Macroeconomics grew up in the age of logical 
empiricism. Outside of the Austrian school, which has always been deeply skeptical 
of a narrow identification of the scientific value of an economic theory with 
predictive success, most business cycle theorizing has been directed at successful 
  179 
prediction. If the arguments of the present paper are sound, then it is doubtful that 
we can recognize a successful business cycle prediction when we see it, but it does 
not follow that investigating the business cycle is entirely without value and that it 
ought to be scrapped altogether. A call for the annihilation of business cycle research 
is made far too fast. Thus, in the present state of knowledge, nihilism appears to be 
an epistemological bridge too far. 
This leaves methodological pluralism with respect to the business cycle. 
However, given the arguments of the present paper, it must be a pluralism that is 
aware of the predictive limitations inherent in its object. To repeat the (I believe) 
justified portion of the nihilist’s argument: these limitations are permanent and not 
something to be overcome in the due course of time. It would require a radical 
reconception of the business cycle project to avoid the complications raised here; a 
reconception so radical that it would be hard to deem the result a part of economics 
proper for it would require, at minimum, the addition of the principles of political 
best practice that Keynes (given that he was an economist rather than a scientist of 
bureaucratic practice, rightfully300) did not explicate. It would also require economists 
to add fairly detailed temporal parameters to their predictions, but if Hayek’s 
arguments are sound with respect to precise prediction of complex phenomena like 
those of the business cycle, then this is simply too much to expect from economics. 
In short, the reconception of the business cycle project so as to make the 
implications of resulting theories more easily testable might well result in its 
                                                 
300 The unnamed editor of W.H. Hutt’s Politically Impossible…? (1971, vii) makes the 
trenchant observation in the preface to that work that “the economist is not 
equipped, and he has no authority, to judge which of his conclusions are 'politically 
practicable' (or ' administratively feasible').” 
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amputation from the realm of what has heretofore been considered economic 
science proper (and, given the quasi-mystical undertones associated with predicting 
the future of human beings and of their societies, perhaps even science proper. Such a 
reconception seems rather ill-advised).  
In Beyond Positivism,301 his treatise on the history of 20th-century economic 
methodology, Bruce Caldwell provides a picture of what such a self-aware pluralism, 
as applied to economics generally, might look like in practice. In particular, he 
emphasizes that such a pluralism would take as a virtual axiom that “no universally 
applicable, logically compelling method of theory appraisal exists. (Or, more 
correctly, even if it exists, we can never be sure that we have found it, even if we 
have.)”302 Nonetheless, Caldwell argues that interesting and important problems 
remain for the methodologist: “A partial listing of these would include: to foster an 
understanding of the scientific process among members of his profession; to 
systematize jargon; to rationally reconstruct the methodological content of various 
research programs; to promote an environment in which both novelty and criticism 
can operate freely.”303 
A further suggestion is that economic theories be judged on the basis of the 
principles that govern the research tradition from which they descend rather than 
from some particular perspective (erroneously) taken by the respective judge to be 
                                                 
301 Caldwell (1982, 244-252) 
 
302 Ibid., 245; Obviously, if there is anything to the argument of the present paper, 
then this point is well established with respect to business cycle theory. 
 
303 Ibid., 244-245 
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“more rational,” “better,” “right,” or what have you. In Caldwell’s terms, only 
criticism of an “internal” sort is valid:  
It is in this area, the methodological evaluation of alternative research 
programs, that methodological pluralism has the most to offer. Such 
programs should be criticized either on their own terms, or for failing to 
show how they can be compared to other programs. This approach ensures 
that novelty is promoted, that criticism is not dogmatic, and that a dialogue 
takes place among members of alternative research programs.304  
Given the arguments of the present paper concerning the fruitlessness for the 
Hayek-Keynes debate of Laudan’s view that comparisons of assessments of internal 
progressiveness provide a means of objective theoretical evaluation, there is room 
for skepticism about Caldwell’s rosy assessment of the value of internal criticism. 
Nonetheless, in the end, Caldwell’s suggestion may amount to little more than the 
eminently reasonable advice that economists be more open than they have 
heretofore to both older and newer perspectives on the business cycle, and there’s 
little that can be said against such sage counsel.  
Finally, as argued above, the conclusion that there is no decision algorithm 
that yields a uniquely rational choice between Hayek and Keynes seems to support a 
mild skepticism with regard to Keynesian-style political actions taken to ameliorate 
the consequences of the business cycle. To the extent that Keynes’ name is invoked 
(which, of course, it almost always is), such policies lack an empirically-grounded 
theoretical justification. Economists often offer advice to governments with respect 
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to the business cycle. Indeed, it is sometimes even the case, as it is with the decision-
makers at the head of both the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury 
department, that the professional economist who offers advice and the policymaker 
who acts upon it are one and the same person. In a perfect world, economists would 
base their advice on their knowledge of the right economic theory of the business cycle; 
but, in the world that we are in, economists cannot possess such infallible access to 
the truths of their subject. The most that we might hope is that political advice be 
based on unbiased assessments of the empirical evidence. However, it is the 
argument of the present paper that the theoretical commitments of economists with 
respect to the business cycle cannot be based on empirical considerations. If it’s true 
that the relevant theories of the business cycle are epistemologically suspect, then so 
too, it seems, is any policy based upon such theories; any such policy lacks an 
empirically-grounded theoretical underpinning.  
While this provides no positive warrant for Hayek’s recommendation of 
political inaction with respect to the business cycle, it does provide some negative 
warrant against Keynes’ recommendation of political action, or, more carefully, 
against political action of the variety associated with Keynes’ theory. As has been 
suggested above, if there is anything to the argument of the present essay, then 
action on the basis of the political advice suggested by any given business cycle 
theory should be taken only with some measure of caution.  
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